

# **Militarism, Democracy and Concordance:**

The Role of Citizenry in (Re)-Establishing Democratic  
Order in Argentina and Turkey

Adem Üstün ÇATALBAŞ



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**in the memory of my father, Yakup Catalbas  
and to my mother, Zehra Catalbas**



## Acknowledgements

A couple years ago, my supervisor Dr. Steve Carlton-Ford encouraged me to attend ERGOMAS (European Research Group on Military and Society) conferences. I attended the 2017 meeting of ERGOMAS in Athens, Greece to present my paper on public opinions about militaries and democracy in Argentina and Turkey. During my presentation, I questioned the quality of democracy in my case countries through the lenses of Rebecca Schiff's 'Concordance Theory'. Rebecca Schiff herself was in the audience and after the presentation she raised her hand and indicated that the concordance theory is mainly about civil-military relations, not democracy. She further indicated that the concordance theory questions the previous literature of civil-military relations and tries to extend its scope by bringing citizenry to the scene but it does not say much about the democratic establishment or the quality of democracy. Then she asked me, how I relate her concordance theory to democracy.

It was a big moment for me and I was so excited because, as a doctoral student, I was in front of one of the biggest contemporary names of my topic. Being a good disciple, I replied that I did know that the concordance theory is about civil-military relations. Furthermore, it investigates the future expectations of civil-military relations in a country, especially those which traditionally have politically ambitious militaries. I continued by saying that I was investigating the possible application of the concordance theory to understanding the future of democratic establishments in the countries where the military rules have just transformed to democratic ones. She

understood my motives and appreciated my paper and ideas. Then, she wished me a good luck for my future studies.

I am thankful for her kind support and encouraging comments on my future studies. Of course, this work came true after my hard-work spending hours doing research, learning languages, reading tons of material and of course writing hundreds of pages most of which I have deleted, extended, or rewritten. But the support and effort of the people around me during all these years has had deeper impact on the end-result.

My biggest supporter has always been my advisor. I am from Black Sea Region in Turkey. The people from the Black Sea Region are quite moody and erratic. Patience is not our strong side for sure. I am telling this because during the process of writing my dissertation, I was amazed by my advisor's unlimited patience with me. Steve listened to me, discussed every point in my writings for hours, and always encouraged me. He never said 'no' when I asked to meet him in his office; even it was an unscheduled meeting. I feel lucky for having him as my supervisor. And, as a future academic, I only hope to have the slightest shadow of his patience towards my future students.

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## Abbreviations

### Argentina

AAA – Argentine Anti-communist Alliance (Triple A)

ARS – Argentine Rural Society

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

IRCU – Intransigent Radical Civic Union

ISI – Import Substitution Industrialization

JP – Justicialist Party

LP – Labor Party

MPM – Movimiento Peronista Montonero

NAP – National Autonomist Party

NPR – National Reorganization Process (El Proceso)

PAF – Peronist Armed Forces

RCU – Radical Civic Union (Radicals)

UBA – University of Buenos Aires

### Turkey

CUP – Committee of Union and Progress

DP – Democratic Party

JDP – Justice and Development Party

MP – Motherland Party

NAP – Nationalist Action Party

NSC – National Security Council

RPP – Republican People's Party

PDP – People's Democratic Party

PKK – Kurdistan Worker's Party

SDPP – Social Democratic Populist Party

TAF – Turkish Armed Forces

TPP – True Path Party

VP – Virtue Party

### Other Abbreviations

CENTO – Central Treaty Organization (Baghdad Pact)

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency

EU – European Union

IMF – International Monetary Fund

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

UN – United Nations

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

UK – United Kingdom

USA – United States of America



# CHAPTER I

## Introduction

Modernization processes oftentimes originate from the military (Belge 2011; Moore 1969). The role of the military in modern nation states is controversial but the military is supposed to not only protect the territorial integrity of the state but also protect the regime from 'counter-revolutionary' movements (Huntington 1957, 1996). This practice, namely praetorianism, is specifically problematic for democracies because civil-military relations is at the core of democratization. Civilian control does not necessarily lead to a democratic order in a country (Desch 1996) but it is an indispensable part of the democratization process (Dahl 1971). In other words, without controlling the ambitions of the military institution, civilian rulers cannot process democratic reforms in a polity. This problematique has been of philosophical and scholarly concern since ancient times (Feaver 1996, 1999).

The dilemma is simple: if the military stands as the protector of the regime from its citizens, how can the citizenry be free to express itself? However, this dilemma has more than one dimension. It begs the question that to what degree should the military guard the regime? What are the means of guardianship? Is there a balance between the freedom of expression and military praetorianism?

Civil-military relations are a core concern especially for those countries in which militaries have political ambitions and military interventions are frequent, if not

traditional. There are several challenges to establish the balance between civilian rule and military intrusion in a political environment. One of the main concerns is to understand under what conditions the military intervenes the politics. There are competing arguments for the question. Feaver, for example, suggests that military officers are active agents rather than passive, and that they observe the problems of a given social context (Feaver 2003). If they feel that they are needed to act and address to those problems, they decide not to obey civilians or their superiors, and a military intervention is likely to happen. The citizenry comes to the stage here. Feaver's understanding is a continuation of the classical view of 'citizen soldier' but he only counts the military officers' agency as responsible citizens. Desch, on the other hand, sees military action in national politics as a balance between internal and external threat perceptions. He posits that if internal threat perception is high and external threat perception is low in a country, the possibility of a military intervention is the most likely. But all these explanations of classical civil-military relations theory neglect the role of citizenry as if the citizenry is a passive component of political interactions (R. L. Schiff 2009).

The means of transition of the power after a military rule is another challenge for democratizers. Why and under which circumstances do militaries return power to the civilians? Samuel P. Huntington posits that there are three categories of transferring power; transformation, replacement and transplacement (Huntington 2009). In his conceptualization, the transition period defines the means of civil-military relations after a military rule. Transformation are observed by the militaries and in such cases the military has the upper hand in the negotiations. Transformations are negotiations between civilians and military, and bargaining defines the mode of transition. However, in the cases of

replacement, power change happens because of the failure of the military, and civilians have the upper hand during the process. According to Huntington, this is the best chance for civilians to control the military. And a transplacement process in Huntington's conceptualization, is a combination of transformation and replacement. It implies a midcourse in which the military and democratizers work together.

Establishing a democratic order is just a beginning, consolidating it is often a more challenging task for democratizers. On the one hand, pursuing democracy and perfecting it are the main challenges of society. There are many states in the world that call themselves democracies, including some notoriously authoritarian rules (Tilly 2007). Democracy, in contemporary global politics, is one of the most mistreated notions (Smith 2012). On the other hand, as Charles Tilly aptly put, democracy is a socially constructed phenomenon, and society should be convinced to pursue democratic ideals.

This study aims to investigate the role of citizenry into developing democracy in a country where its military institution has political greed. But first, the term 'citizenry' needs to be defined. Throughout this study, I will refer to citizenry as an active component of political interactions. In other words, in its broader definition, citizenry includes all public reactions to the policies by active agents including voting patterns, street protests, and active membership of NGOs but excluding violence.

Constructing the citizenry established the means of the relationship between the modern nation state and its citizens. With the privilege of joining decision-making processes, the citizens were obliged to defend the state as well. Mass armies emerged among the citizens in the modern nation states throughout the world (Belge 2011;

Lucassen and Zürcher 1999). Compulsory mass recruitment for every healthy man in a nation created a direct bond between the state and the citizenry. In modern nation states, military service has been a duty for the patria. From the perspective of Morris Janowitz (Feaver 1996; Janowitz 1960, 1977), this new era signifies civic participation through the protection of the state by the citizen-soldier. Moreover, according to Rebecca L. Schiff, with the recruitment model the citizenry has an opportunity to interact and impact the military's actions (Schiff 2009:44). However, different countries followed different paths to create modern citizenry and as I will show in this study, this differentiation is vital in the consolidation of democracy.

This summary leads to the research question of this proposed thesis: what defines the quality of a democracy during and after the period of transition of power from a military rule to a democratic one? In the comparative nature of this thesis, the question can be paraphrased as: why has Argentina managed to establish a working democracy whereas Turkey still struggles to do so, and experiences an authoritarian one man show? Before elaborating the arguments of this proposed thesis, I shall address, in the next section, the basis of the arguments within the civil-military and democratization literatures which I briefly mentioned here.

### ***Theoretical Background***

The research question has two implications. First, how has power been handed over from military to civilians in Argentina and Turkey? And second, what are the struggles regarding the sustainability of democratization processes in both countries?

For the first implication, Samuel P. Huntington (2009) suggests that cases like Argentina, the process works as 'replacement'. In other words, if the military fails to fulfill its promises, it will be replaced by civilian rule. However, in the Turkish case, Huntington posits that it is a 'transformation' because, if the military keeps its promises when it has intervened in politics, it would have an upper-hand during the re-setting process of politics (Huntington 2009:54–55).

Indeed, Argentina's armed forces were in a weak position after the defeat of the Falkland War, and civilians had the bargaining ability against the military junta (Pion-Berlin 2001a; Sotomayor Velázquez 2004; Trinkunas 2000). The junta came to the power in 1976 under severe economic problems in the country, suggesting that civilians were not capable of addressing social problems. However, as the military rule was not able to solve the problems they intended to, it failed to do its main duty, which is to keep the country safe. When civilians regained power in 1983, they could redesign the political environment to some degree (Hunter 1998). Concordantly to Huntington's equation, the Turkish army achieved a political and economic stabilization of the country when they intervened in politics in 1980, and after three years of military rule, they willingly handed power back to the civilians in 1983, meaning that they had bargaining power to design new-politics within the country (Demirel 2005; Heper and Evin 1988; Jenkins 2007).

However, Huntingtonian terminology explains only the initial period of the process and does not say much about the possible later phases. In the Argentinean case, the military did not have bargaining power at first but several mutinies within the armed forces made the civilian authorities hesitate to push trials of former generals and

military officers of the junta government for their misuse of the power. On the other hand, the Turkish military pursued its tutelary position in Turkish politics for more than two decades after handing back power to civilians. However, when civilians succeeded in eroding the military's tutelary stance in the country in the last decade, it did not lead to a more democratic, transparent governing style but to an illiberal/authoritarian regime.

Transitioning to democracy from military rule is just the beginning of the process. At the initial level of the transition to democracy in Argentina, civilians were able to restrict the political ambitions of the Argentinean military. Budget cuts, redefining the role of the military in the society, reducing its size, changing conscription methods, bringing military officers to account for their misconduct during *Guerra Sucia* (Dirty Wars) were some of the major civilian impacts on the Argentinean military. Charles Moskos defines these implementations as part of a post-modern military. According to Moskos, the changing nature of the dynamics within both national and international politics led to changes within military set-ups globally. However, these changes imply a significant departure from modern military applications (Moskos, John Allen Williams, and Segal 2000).

In his early works, Moskos describes a transformation in the perception of military duty (Moskos 1977). He says modern military understanding was based on institutional values. Members of the military were attracted by the values of the institution and were put through indoctrination processes to absorb these values. They were subject to different jurisdictional procedures, and enjoyed some prerogatives of military life, such as housing, closed circuit socialization, etc. (Moskos 1977:42) However, in the contemporary world, jobs related to the military are

occupations determined primarily by the market dynamics. In the occupational model of military service, Moskos claims, people tend to stay indifferent to the institutional values and indoctrination but assess work's place in the job market (Moskos 1977:43). Military personnel do not want to be contained perpetually in military life. Thus, housing does not appeal to them. As I will investigate in the following chapters, according to Charles Moskos' conceptualization, Argentina has successfully transformed its military while the Turkish military successfully managed to keep its tutelary position until recently.

A recent theory in civil-military relations suggests that the classical theory on civil-military relations neglects the role of citizenry (Schiff 1995, 2012), that citizenry is a part of the equation to control the ambitions of the military institution. Rebecca Schiff posits that previous literature oftentimes perceive citizenry as a passive component of politics. According to Schiff, the citizenry is an active agent in civil-military relations and contributes to the balance of civil-military relations in a country. This balance is built between civilian policy makers, military professionals, and the citizenry upon four indicators: 1) social composition of officer corps, 2) the political decision making process, 3) recruitment method and 4) military style (R. L. Schiff 2009:319). Moreover, if there is a concordance between the three components (namely; civilian policymakers, the military, and citizenry) upon these four indicators, a military intervention is less likely to occur in a country.

However, her focus is limited to civilian control over the military, and she only explains the dynamics of military interventions in the modern world. Yet, the role of the citizenry in the process of recovering democratic order after a military rule needs scholarly attention. This study aims to

fill the gap in both civil-military relations and democracy literature. By its nature, democracies deal and collaborate with the citizenry. The citizenry shows its demands, reflects its opinion, and expresses itself through democratic channels. The bare minimum of a democratic establishment, the ballot box, is designed to hear public opinion, to ensure that the citizenry expresses itself periodically. Of course, the ballot box is not the only means for the citizenry to represent itself. NGOs, the parliamentary (or other branches of democratic representation within the legislation), and even street rallies and protests are different means of self-expression for the citizenry.

For the second implication indicated above, Adam Przeworski says that economic development guarantees the democratic establishment. If a democracy achieves a certain degree of economic development, Przeworski claims, there would be no return to authoritarian regimes (Przeworski 1995; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). One of the first theorists on the issue of correlation and causation between development and democracy was Seymour M. Lipset. He investigated the problematique first, and asked the question whether modernization/economic development causes/brings about democracy in a country (Diamond and Linz 1989). Lipset posits that modernization efforts and economic development leads to a certain degree of social changes among society which generate enough leverage to establish democracy (Lipset 1959). In other words, Lipset sees a certain degree of causation between modernization and democracy.

Adam Przeworski challenges Lipset's argument by simply saying that political regimes do not transform to



democratic polities just because the economy develops.<sup>1</sup> The contrary is true most of the cases, Przeworski claims (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Democratic transformations of authoritarian regimes depend on many reasons but once the transformation to democracy happens, according to Przeworski, democracies with plausible economic performances remain democratic. Przeworski uses gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as the indicator. However, there are some problems with this thesis. First, the definition of economic development is vital for Przeworski's claims but it is highly interpretive and erratic. And second, Turkey stands as an exception to this thesis.<sup>2</sup> Turkey's authoritarian turn in the third wave of democratization occurred when the country passed the threshold Przeworski suggests (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016; Brownlee 2016).

In contrast, Daron Acemoğlu and James Robinson claim that democracy insures stable development (Acemoğlu and Robinson 2012). They argue that if democratic institutions and rule of law are established in a country, then a stable economic development can be expected. They acknowledge some exceptions; such as China (Acemoğlu and Robinson 2012:442). However, they continue arguing, these exceptions are misleading cues because development without democracy and rule of law leads to only temporary economic development, which will not last

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<sup>1</sup> There are many critics of modernization theory. One of them is Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein criticize the uniformity and ethno-centric nature of the understanding of modernization. According to him, modernization erodes cultural differences and makes other cultures and ethnic groups resemble western cultures. In other words, modernization in many ways means westernization. Many cultures across the globe become more western each passing year. This argument is valid, but this proposed thesis focuses on the discussions over political transformation and civil-military relations. Hence, I only include relevant criticisms of modernization theory in this study.

<sup>2</sup> Turkey is not the sole exception; Venezuela also stands as an exception.

long, instead leading to stagnation. The main reason for this pattern is that investors of both local and/or global capital want to be sure of their future benefits from the economic environment in which they invested.

I aim to show in this study that the concordance between citizenry, military officials, and political actors is critical to establish a balance in terms of civil-military relations as Rebecca L. Schiff suggests, and applies to the democratic establishment as well. Rebecca L. Schiff, in her book, does not deal with the fate of democracy but is merely interested in civilian control over the military. What I propose is that in a country where the military has been active as a political actor, the same concordance matters for the sake of democracy. In other words, the imbalance between the aforementioned players could deteriorate not only through civilian control over the military but also over the democratic order. The concordance in civil-military relations does not necessarily lead a democratic order in a country. Political actors must demand it.

By political actors, I refer not only to individual policy-makers but also institutions and organizations such as parties, unions, militaries, and so on so forth as Mainwaring and Perez-Linan suggested. Their contribution and/or consent is important to developing a working democracy. Scott Mainwaring and Anibal Perez-Linan in their book suggest that political actors' normative position towards democratic order influence the fate of the regime (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013:5–6).

I suggest, in this study, that concordance among the military, civilian political leadership, and citizenry for democracy would enhance the quality of democracy in a polity where democratic installations have traditionally been

interrupted by the military. The concordance on democracy must regard five indicators:

- Security of the ballot box
- Democratic procedures of conduct in the times of crisis (economic, political, natural disasters)
- Concordance in civil-military relations
- Transparency of the institutions and accountability of the government
- Institutionalization of democracy

The first indicator implies a secure means of communication for the citizenry. Modern representative democracies are based on the ballot box, and the ballot box is the greatest means for citizenry to show its demands. I acknowledge that ballot box is not and cannot be the sole means of communication for citizenry. But since it is the bare minimum for a representative democracy, it must be secure for the use of citizenry. By security, I refer to free and competitive elections in which no-one and/or no pressure group can force a single citizen to cast his/her vote, and there should be several (or at least more than one) competing ideas, candidates, and parties. Moreover, these ideas, candidates, and parties should find a space in which they can freely campaign without having difficulty or being accused of any kind of guilt for their ideas, programs, and speeches.

The second indicator assures that democracy is the only game in the town (as Linz suggested) for the consolidation of a democratic order. As Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl aptly put, regimes that are based on majority assertion will regularly harm minority groups and tend to ignore details while processing decisions. Similarly, Larry Diamond—who coined the term

'electoral fallacy'—argues that democracy cannot be based only on elections. In times of crisis of any kind (e.g. economic crisis) militaries tend to involve themselves in civilian politics, especially in those countries where militaries have historically been ambitious. Or, even civilian politics by using the crisis as an excuse tend to consolidate the power. To assure the democratic procedures prevails even in the times of crisis, the three actors need to come to an agreement on the second indicator.


As I will show throughout this study, civilian control over the military does not necessarily mean democratic order. There are many authoritarian regimes in the world which have perfect control over the military. Yet, for democracies, civilian control is a must, an indispensable feature of the regime. Therefore, the aforementioned three partners should have an agreement on the third indicator to prevent any kind of military intervention (memorandum, coups, military uprisings, etc.).

Institutionalization of democracy, the fourth indicator, is manifold. First, the elections should be regular and frequent. Second, democracy should function through independent institutions (parliament, elected government, local administrations, etc.). Third, since an individual citizen is the most vulnerable part of this partnership, citizens should be able to form pressure organizations, watch groups, NGOs, and so on so forth.

And finally, all three partners of concordance must be prevented from making arbitrary decisions. There should be a medium through which to communicate, and to explain their actions. Even when they make mistakes, the investigation (and trials, if necessary) must be transparent. The MP in the parliament and public prosecutors must be able to question policy makers and executives.

Still, the phrase ‘quality of democracy’ remains unexplained. Among others, Charles Tilly moving from Dahl’s conceptualization acknowledges these indicators in a democratic order. Moreover, Tilly categorizes regimes on their success in realizing these goals. He observes that even authoritarian regimes, which are notoriously famous for their actions against human rights, tend to call themselves democracies. Hence, a scholar should be careful in assessing a regime as democracy. He proposes a simple typology by categorizing regimes into four groups: high-capacity undemocratic, low-capacity undemocratic, high-capacity democratic, and finally low-capacity democratic, as in Figure 1 below.

**Figure 1: Variation in Regimes (Tilly 2007:17)**





## CHAPTER II

### **Methodology**

This proposed thesis is meant to explain the possible social and political consequences of political decisions of the players (citizenry, military and politicians) in Argentina and Turkey. The core of the study consists in civil-military relations and democratization processes in both countries. Civil-military relations is of vital importance to this study because of the historical evolution of the state apparatus in both Argentina and Turkey. Democracy is not an unfamiliar means of politics for either society. However, historical progresses and changes have led to authoritarian military rule in the pasts of both countries. This study is designed to explain these historical backgrounds in connection with a contemporary search to establishing working democracies in both societies. In other words, I will not only compare democratic developments in Argentina and Turkey but will also compare each country's past democratic experiences to their contemporary democratic order.

The literatures of civil-military relations and democracy are dominated by the discipline of political science. However, both subjects are open to sociological investigation. Making it of sociological concern is one of the challenges of this study as well. There are four main reasons why both civil-military relations and democracy are of sociological concern. First, both scholarly subjects of this study (namely, civil-military relations and democracy) were created by society. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (Berger and Luckmann 2011), in their groundbreaking work,

argue that all our knowledge comes from social interactions. Social constructionism is not a new idea, and many scholars tried to develop a theoretical frame for the concept (Bauman 2003; Latour 1993). In Bauman's words, the truth (such as power, liberty, property) is a social interaction (Bauman 2003). Our understanding is delimited by the society. Second, both civil-military relations and democracy can be realized in a social context, hence they are both of sociological concern. According to Hüsamettin Arslan (Arslan 2018), a Turkish sociologist and social theorist, if something is produced by and happens in a society, it is subject to sociological investigations. Third, the modes of development of both civil-military relations and democracy are defined by the society in which they are situated. Historical developments of the notions in a society, cultural backgrounds, and social interactions matter to understanding civil-military relations and democratic development (Smith 2012; Tilly 1995, 2007). Four, executives of the institutions are members of society. The conscience of a political decision-maker, or a military general, develops in a society (Feaver 1996, 1999; Janowitz 1960; Schiff 1995). All these reasons are not independent each other but rather interrelated.

This study is mainly based on the historical comparative sociological approach with the inclusion of mixed methods. The historical comparative approach allows me to study social processes over time and across different countries. In this study, I contrast Argentina and Turkey in terms of democratization processes by employing an historical comparative approach; I also compare each country's past and present. While employing a historical comparative sociological approach, I depend on interpretive understandings of my subject. I do not discuss here the interpretive approach in full scale but this notion has



become widespread in the social sciences, and it has emerged in the sociological tradition. Max Weber and Georg Simmel, two German sociologists in the early phase of the discipline, introduced and developed interpretive examination of subjects in the social sciences, and called the approach *Verstehen* (Eng.: to understand). Although the German philosophical tradition has played an important role in the development of interpretivism in social sciences, it became one of the mainstream approaches in contemporary social sciences. This change indicates a dramatic shift in the discourse of social sciences. According to Zygmunt Bauman, a Polish origin British sociologist, in the contemporary social sciences sociologists are no longer legislators of social interactions but mere interpreters (Bauman 2012). That is to say, in the era of positivist social sciences, social scientists were meant to find the universal laws of modern society and social interactions but eventually they realized that social life has an ambivalent nature, and there is no determinist certainty but rather contingency. In his outstanding work titled *Thinking Sociologically*, Bauman posits that by its nature sociology does not fit to freeze realities. Sociological thinking is an interpretation fed by other interpretations (Bauman 2003:256).

This discussion brings me to the generalizability of this proposed thesis. The comparative historical sociological approach leads me, inevitably, to investigate large scale processes in two different societies (Argentina and Turkey). Although my method helps me to identify general patterns, it also requires that I rule out some details. As Benjamin Jerry Cohen, an international political economy professor, aptly puts, 'the degree of change in any given era may be easily exaggerated' (Cohen 2008:66). The same is true for comparative studies where similarities and differences are open to confirmation bias. In other words, if a researcher

wants to see similarities and/or differences in his/her subjects, s/he may easily find many, but will tend to exaggerate them. It must be noted that from a two-nation comparison, it is hard, if not impossible, to create universally applicable and generalizable theories. As Theda Skocpol once indicated, limited cases delimit the ability of the study to test competing theories as well (Skocpol 1984). However, as I already indicated above, history matters, and the historical comparative approach opens other possibilities for the researcher. Today historical comparative analyses have become more interactive to other approaches in social sciences (Skocpol 2003:412). By its nature the historical comparative approach includes interdisciplinary analyses, which give researches a broader area and comfort zone to employ deeper investigation of the subject. The historical comparative sociological approach best fits in this study, as it aims to generate a hypothesis regarding the development of democracy in countries where the military is a traditionally ambitious political player. While doing that, the historical comparative approach also provides enough flexibility for the researcher to challenge (in some cases) the established literature when previous studies fail to explain different regional, national, and global dynamics together, and which in this case have ignored the citizenry, which this study tries to give credit to for its role in democratization.

Yet, a vital question still stands unanswered: why Argentina and Turkey? What was the process in selecting the cases? Is it resemblance, or difference? Here, I explain the process of constructing the cases, and time periods.

### *Case Selection and the Comparison of the Cases*

My case selection includes one country (Argentina) that has had a stable democratic establishment since 1983 when the

military junta was replaced by a competitive regime, even though the country had a turbulent past. The other country (Turkey) has a military that has been influential within the politics since 1983 when the military handed power to the civilians willingly. I have several criteria in the selection of cases. First, the military should be effective in gaining independence, or in foundations of the country. Moreover, I look for politically ambitious militaries. It was not uncommon in the history of the countries that I will examine here that former military generals took presidential seats, and the military, as an institution, has been an important and influential player in politics. It is important to see democratic transformations from authoritarian military rules to competitive electoral regimes in the cases. Second; the transformation of the regime should be relatively peaceful. I understand that military regimes are often, if not always, brutal. They usually are not afraid of using violence as an instrument. However, I do not seek large scale civil-wars, or armed revolutions to alter the political regime. Third, cross-regional analyses are one of the core focuses of this study. Therefore, I choose my cases from different regions so that I can evaluate regional, cultural, (and if applicable religious) differences. Fourth, the case selections should represent democratic shifts in all three waves of democracy in Huntington's terminology<sup>3</sup>. In this way, the comparative nature of this study would be able to track the democratic development and the breakdowns of the democratic order in

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<sup>3</sup> According to Huntington (1993:16), there have been three global scale democratization waves. The first wave occurred between 1828-1926, and then a reverse wave happened between 1922-1942. The second wave of democratization was shorter and took place in the post war era (roughly between 1943-1962). A second reverse wave affected world politics between 1958-1975. With the collapse of Portuguese dictatorship in 1975 a third wave of democratization started and still prevailing in the contemporary global political arena.

the case countries. And finally, I wanted to focus on the cases that do not fit in the classical civil-military relations, modernization, and democratization theories. In one way or other, both cases deviate from the classical theories. I believe there are some other cases that fit in these criteria but let this study be an example for future studies.

The histories of democracy in Argentina and Turkey have similarities. Aside from economic instability, modernization processes, and nation building, one of the main impediments for the democratic establishment has been distortion within civil-military relations in both countries. Of course, these factors are inter-related, and have had an impact on the democratic establishments in Argentina and Turkey. This work will focus on the civil-military relations and its impact on the evolution of democracy by considering other factors' impacts on the problematique. Since 1930 until 1983, Argentinean democracy experienced six military interventions (1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966, and 1976). None of the elected presidents (except Juan Domingo Peron in his first term between 1946-1952) in this era could complete their terms due to constant military tutelage and interventions (Rouquie 1987:272). On the other hand, Turkey, since 1960, experienced three military interventions (1960, 1971, 1980).

**Table 1: Social, Economic and Governmental Comparison between Argentina and Turkey (1946-1983)**

<b>Similarity</b>	<b>Argentina</b>	<b>Turkey</b>
Military involvement	Praetorian military	Praetorian military
Political leader	Former military generals	Former military generals elected by the parliament
Governments	Mostly conservatives	Mostly Conservatives
Economics	Import substitution industrialization Statist economy	Import substitution industrialization Statist economy
Social Inequality	High	High
Modernization	State governed modernization Secular state	State governed modernization Secular state
Military	German style modern military Military has a big budget	German style modern military Military has a big budget
<b>Difference</b>		
Regime type	Presidential democracy	Parliamentary democracy
Economics	Integrated to international economics (relatively)	Protectionist; not well-integrated to international system
Security	Does not have major international conflict	NATO member, part of cold war
International stance	Fairly neutral with an inclination to Americanism	NATO member, part of cold war
NGOs	Have active and strong NGOs	Strong state tutelage over NGOs
Religion	Christianity with strong church	Islam; state oversees religious activities
Urbanization	High	Emerging
Ethnic conflict	Low	High
External treat	Conflict with the UK over Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)	NATO member which borders the Soviet Union
Social composition	European immigrants from different backgrounds The majority is white Catholic Christians	Turkic people, Kurds, Arabs  The majority is Sunni Muslim in Hanafi school of Islam

### Resemblance

Argentinean and Turkish militaries have shown praetorian threats throughout their histories. That is to say, both national armed forces were important players in the political arena. After the independence war campaigned by Jose de San Martin, the Argentinean military designed the country's political approach (Huser 2002; Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013). Generals and military officers from all ranks found posts in national congress, the parliament, governing circles, and even some of them become presidents (Falleti 2011). Similarly in Turkey, almost all founding fathers of the republic were military officers within the late Ottoman Empire. A colossal empire collapsed despite their efforts, and when they founded the Republic of Turkey, they formed a huge military, which was appointed as the guardian of the young republic (Demirel 2003; Zürcher 1999, 2010).

The history of democracy in both Argentina and Turkey goes back to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. However, democracy was welcomed with suspicious acclamations. Even the most ardent supporters of democracy and democratic institutions were a bit reluctant and were not sure if democracy fit the national political culture. This suspicious stance resulted in several abrupt and violent military interventions in both countries (Belge 2011; Falleti 2011; Lewis 2007; Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013; Schamis 2006). Of course, these interventions prevented the democratic institutions from being settled in Argentina and Turkey. In other words, although the history of democratization processes is relatively long in both countries, it would be optimistic (or unrealistic) to talk about a democratic tradition in terms of institutionalization, governance, and civil-military relations.

The dilemma lays under the problematique of modernization efforts. Both nations traditionally view themselves as being late to modernization. The unquestionable dominance of western societies in the modern era urged Argentinean and Turkish elites to quicken the modernization effort to catch up with western societies (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013; Ortaylı 1991). Modernizers first started with the military (Belge 2011; Zürcher 1999). It was a vital move against the ambitious European colonizers. However, once modernization started with the military, there would be several implications. This brings us to John Stuart Mill's conceptualization of the 'benevolent dictator', also known as 'enlightened despotism'.<sup>4</sup> As Mill suggests 'in dealing with barbarism, despotism is legitimate' and 'liberty has no application to such a state of things.' (Mill 1874:23). Once military elites took power after gaining independence from former Spanish and Ottoman Empires in Argentina and Turkey respectively, they started implementing their ideas and ideals in the new nation states. The quick pace of the reforms did not wait for the adoption of democratic values, and military elites, in the collaboration with political and economic elites, ignored democracy and oftentimes applied harsh measures to stabilize the country (Belge 2011:588; Köker 2010; Zürcher and Atabaki 2012).

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<sup>4</sup> The terms 'benevolent dictator' or 'enlightened despotism' are not coined by John Stuart Mill. The discussion on dictatorships has a long history in philosophy, going back to ancient Greek philosophers like Plato. In other cultures, there are several authors discussed the nature of dictatorships. In the Islamic tradition, for example, there are some philosophers who discuss the nature of power. Maybe the most infamous example of promoting despotism is Niccolò Machiavelli of Florence. John Stuart Mill, in his essay favors democracy, and describes the modern applications of the terms. Only for undeveloped countries does he condone 'despotisms' or 'dictators' in order to prevent the rule of 'barbarism'.

Peronism<sup>5</sup> in Argentina, and Kemalism<sup>6</sup> in Turkey have been defining political ideologies in each country's political environments for a long time. Even today, their influence is still efficacious in the politics of Argentina and Turkey. Both ideologies have shown similar traits. First and foremost, both figures that led to the naming of these ideologies are military men. This is important because their profession often defined their actions. Peron, in Argentina, came to power after a military intervention, and even after his electoral succession to power as president, he sought concordance with the military (Huser 2002; Philip 1984). He was an ardent statist, and his economic model was based on corporatism (Bora 2003; Köker 2010). Turkey's Mustafa Kemal also had a statist understanding inspired by European corporatism. Unlike Peron, Mustafa Kemal often took strict measures to employ his policies in Turkey. Juan Peron was a populist politician in the sense of attracting mass support. However, Mustafa Kemal's understanding of 'populism'<sup>7</sup> was more like transferring power to the people. In other words, Kemalist thought, in theory, was trying to create an active citizenry to replace the passive subjects of the Ottoman Empire. However, the praxis in Turkey developed in the opposite direction.

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<sup>5</sup> A statist conservative ideology named after President Juan Peron who was once a military colonel.

<sup>6</sup> Founding ideology of Turkish Republic referring to the founding father of new republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk whose original profession was a military officer.

<sup>7</sup> Often, populism is seen as a form of deceit by a politician to attract the support of the masses and has a pejorative connotation. However, in this context, it is a political approach that refers to transferring power to the people by allowing them to engage in decision making processes. Both Juan Domingo Peron of Argentina and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk of Turkey used this ideological background of the term. Nevertheless, in praxis, Peronism became a populist movement in the common sense, and Kemalism never fulfilled its promise.



Ethnic minorities are the most suffered social groups of these harsh measures. Indigenous people in the south Argentina (Patagonia) and Kurdish people in the south-east Turkey were heavily oppressed (Cizre and Walker 2010; Manzano 2015; Warren 2009). Militaries of both countries campaigned against minority groups several times after independence. The minority problems and ethnic violence are still exhausting political phenomena in both countries, especially in Turkey. Implementing nationalist policies and the process of creating of a nation state led to resistance in both countries. Resistance against the dominant national identity with military force typically results a vicious circle of violence. In other words, using force stirs more resistance. Moreover, resistance finds a moral and legitimate ground.

On the other hand, modernization efforts at the hands of the state apparatus creates inequality. By saying this, I do not mean that without state involvement there would not be social inequality in Argentina and Turkey. What I mean is that economic institutions, along with other social institutions, become dependent on the political elites (Köker 2010; Philip 1984; Zürcher and Atabaki 2012). In other words, the state has the ultimate power over the economic environment. Cronyism became prevalent, and politicians provide economic and political opportunities to their most loyal supporters. This situation prevents economic classes from raising their voices against political agents because the agents control the economic sources in the countries. Without fulfilling their ambitions, it is almost impossible to find economic opportunity. Thus, institutions of all kinds in Argentina and Turkey are weak and struggling to create their own democratic traditions.

I can safely say that both militaries (armed forces in the most general sense of the word) are the most well-

established institutions in their societies which bring this proposed thesis to the scholarly investigation concerning civil-military relations in relation to the democratic establishments in both countries.

### *Distinction*

Argentina and Turkey have experienced several military interventions throughout their democratic histories, and the impacts of these military interventions are still discernible in the political arena of the two countries. However, there are distinct outcomes of military involvements with politics between Argentina and Turkey. During the third wave of democracy (Huntington 1993) throughout the world, both Argentina and Turkey became affected by neo-democratization processes. After the last military rule in Argentina between 1976 – 1983, and the last military intervention in Turkey between 1980 – 1983, democratization efforts have led to different results in each country. On the one hand, Argentina has achieved a working democracy. After the decisive defeat during the Falkland War against the UK, the military could no longer pursue ruling the country having lost its credibility and popularity. The generals holding governmental posts at the time were forced to transfer power to civilians (Hunter 1998; Karl 1990). Democratic institutions in Argentina were rising again. The military in Argentina was too weak to bargain for power during the transition period, and civilians limited the military's role in the political arena. The military budget is now under the control of civilians, non-institutional mechanisms of the Argentinean military over the society have been eliminated, and elected civil presidents are in power (Huser 2002). However, the strong demand by the public for the trials of the military officials on the misuse of

the power during the military rule, aka *Guerra Sucia* (Dirty War) created tension between civilians and the military (Pion-Berlin and Lopez 1991). Petty officers of the military revolted several times in the new democratic regimes under Raul Alfonsín and Carlos Menem. These revolts were quelled, but they caused civilians to become reluctant to pursue trials against the military generals from the junta (Huser 2002:128).

On the other hand, Turkey, until very recently, still had a politically ambitious military. Even after the failed coup d'état in 2016, the military's failure did not lead to a fully democratic political institutionalization. Instead, president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan consolidated all political power in one hand, and the country became a semi-authoritarian state (Abramowitz 2018:7).

Another distinction between Argentina and Turkey is public opinion on civil-military relations. In Argentina, the people have always been critical about military coups d'état and have disputed military rule throughout history. The Turkish people, except for the failed coup d'état in 2016, never raised their voice against the armed forces even after the fall of popular governments and political leaders. The 1960 military intervention is important since it shows the reaction of ordinary Turks. When democratically elected and then still popular leader Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was sentenced to death by the military court, the public silence after the intervention continued, and Menderes was executed. Even though the majority of Turkish people still love the 'martyr of democracy', they stayed silent in the aftermath of the 1960 coup. Interestingly enough, politicians - who were direct victims of the coup - did not raise their voice against the military after the intervention, even though

they had popular support (Demirel 2005:246; Heper and Evin 1988; Jenkins 2007:339; Sarigil 2015).

Moreover, when it comes to both militaries' stance towards democratic establishments, another distinctive feature appears between the two militaries in Argentina and Turkey. In Argentina, the armed forces have always been more politically ambitious than its counterpart in Turkey. Between 1930 and 1983, Argentina experienced several military interventions and militaristic rules, and the armed forces ruled the country more often than did democratically elected governments (Rouquie 1987:272). However, in Turkey, the armed forces followed a different strategy. Between 1960 and 1983, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) employed three successful coups d'état but unlike its Argentinean counterpart, after initial processes, in every case, the Turkish military voluntarily returned power to the democratically elected civil governments and parliament. Total military rule in Turkey does not exceed five years. Instead, the Turkish military has preferred maintaining its observatory, if not tutelary, role in politics (Belge 2011:723; Jenkins 2001, 2007). Moreover, the Turkish Armed Forces intervened in politics with the promise of increased democratic values, and with the acknowledgement of international institutions and international law. This strategy allows the Turkish military to have the upper hand in negotiations of state power.

Turkey has traditionally followed the French style of governing (Köker 2010; Sadoğlu 2007).<sup>8</sup> The Turkish state apparatus is designed to control almost everything within the country. Like France, Turkey is a unitary state in which

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<sup>8</sup> Many scholars acknowledge the similarities between French and Turkish state establishments but there are some scholars who challenge the classical view. For one example see: (Kahraman 2008)

every governmental branch (even the local governments) depends on the central government. This design gives the central government tremendous power, and the power struggle in the capital can be brutal because whoever gets the legislative power controls the country. Unlike Turkey, Argentina has a federal governing style, although the presidential system gives the president almost absolute power (Huser 2002; Kuhl 1976; Peruzzotti 2006). Yet when it comes to local governing, every state enjoys a certain degree of freedom from the federal government.

Traditionally, Argentina has been ruled through a presidential system with strong presidential powers. Although there is a lower house and senate, both institutions are weak in comparison to the president (Peruzzotti 2006). The government style is supposed to be based on the separation of powers, as the constitution promotes, but in practice, the president controls other effective political institutions, including the judiciary branch. Turkey's political system is more complicated than Argentina's. Historically, there has always been a supervisor at the top to prevent the democratically elected government from reversing the country's path. It was the Sultan during the late Ottoman Empire. After the collapse of the empire, the young republic implemented several bold reforms but in a conservative society, these reforms supposedly needed to be protected from the reactionary movements. Thus, a one-party regime was established in the early stage of the republican era. Several attempts for multi-party democracy under the guidance of Mustafa Kemal were halted due to fears of the founding fathers to lose the power in a competitive electoral regime (Belge 2011:585; Köker 2010; Zürcher and Atabaki 2012).

*The Role of the Citizenry in the Procedures of Constructing Democracy*

So far, I have explained the general structure of civil-military relations in Argentina and Turkey. In this brief explanation, the citizenry stands as a passive agent. In the previous literature too, the role of the citizenry is often overlooked (Kadivar 2018). The purpose of this study is to show that the citizenry is an important and active agent in the construction of civilian control of the military, and of democracy in a polity. There are many studies that investigate public perceptions towards civil-military relations in different contexts (Sarigil 2015; Schiff 2009). However, there is a lack of scholarly investigation relating to the public perception of the military and democratic establishment from a comparative perspective considering Argentina and Turkey.

In early 2016, I analyzed a dataset obtained from World Values Survey (WVS), an international research project that explores people's beliefs globally, since 1981.<sup>9</sup> I have investigated public opinion on military and democratic values in both the Argentinean and Turkish contexts. As can be seen in Table 2 below, different people from different backgrounds attribute different meanings to these notions. The dataset I used has several rounds for every country. In my investigation, I used the 2006 round for Argentina and the 2007 round for Turkey. The control category is Germany because of its close ties to both Argentina and Turkey militarily, as I will discuss in the following chapters. My research is designed to identify and analyze societal attitudes toward the military and civil-military relations in Argentina and Turkey from a comparative perspective. The

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<sup>9</sup> I presented my paper titled "Sons of Gun: Projections on the Future of Civil-Military Relations in Argentina and Turkey" in the biennial ERGOMAS (European Research Group of Military and Society) conference in Athens. I wrote the paper before but presented it following the failed coup d'état in Turkey in 2016.

dataset includes face-to-face interviews in 2006 in Argentina and Germany, and in 2007 in Turkey (representative samples of 3,809 respondents in total) using a random sampling technique.

**Table 2: OLS Regression Table - Support of Military and Democracy in Argentina and Turkey<sup>10</sup>**

	<u>Model 1: Military as a part of Democracy</u>		<u>Model 2: Confidence to Military</u>		<u>Model 3: Importance of Democracy</u>	
<b>Nationality</b>						
Turkey	3.119124	(.117666)***	-1.04698	(.033244)***	0.049745	(.060803)
Argentina	1.07053	(.122531)***	0.39646	(.034618)***	0.054846	(.063317)
<b>Gender</b>						
female	0.103644	(.09269)	-0.01747	(.026187)	0.008043	(.047897)
<b>Age</b>						
young	0.294838	(.137687)*	0.078069	(.0389)*	-0.20473	(.071149)**
middle age	0.231491	(.130937)	0.024129	(.036993)	-0.13096	(.067661)
senior age	-0.07498	(.1425)	-0.07216	(.04026)	0.037692	(.073636)
<b>Education</b>						
low education	1.016183	(.138644)***	-0.24934	(.03917)***	-0.39847	(.071643)***
average education	0.542556	(.138318)***	-0.11584	(.039078)**	-0.14681	(.071475)*
<b>Life Satisfaction</b>						
	-0.02937	(.022769)	-0.05095	(.006433)***	0.060867	(.011766)***
Intercept	1.574338	(.222823)	3.081688	(.062953)	8.942224	(.115142)
	N	3809	3809		3809	
	R <sup>2</sup>	0.2073	0.3397		0.0186	
	Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.2054	0.3381		0.0163	
Probability	.000		.000			.000

Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001

<sup>10</sup> Before using the OLS regression analysis in this paper, I checked the Ordered Logit Regression Analysis of the same dataset in Stata. Since the results are the same and/or close to each other, I preferred the OLS regression table. There are 603 missing values in the dataset. However, I did not use the Multiple Imputation method because I intentionally omit the responses 'no answer', 'do not know', and 'did not asked in the survey'. For further questions about the dataset and the regression processes email to [ustuncatalbas@alparslan.edu.tr](mailto:ustuncatalbas@alparslan.edu.tr)

Before the analysis, I would like to briefly provide information about the variables. In the Table 2 above, three main questions (dependent variables) are addressed regarding six social categories (independent variables). The questions in the survey for the dependent variables are: 1) “Military takes over when the government is incompetent”: The answers are scaled 1 to 10, and 1 (lower) is oppose military rule while 10 (higher) thinks that democracy includes military takeovers (i.e. has no contradiction). In order to prevent the reader from confusion, it should be noted that positive numbers show more support of the military; 2) Confidence in the military: The answers of the respondents are scaled 1 to 4, and 1 shows absolute confidence while 4 shows absolute distrust of military; and 3) Support for democracy: The answers for this variable are scaled 1 to 10, and 1 is less supportive while 10 is fully supportive of democracy.

The independent variables include gender, ethnicity, marital status, life satisfaction, age and education. I have created dummy variables for every independent variable which can be seen on the left column of the table. First, in order to compare Argentinians to Turks, I created two dummy variables, one for each nation; simply ‘Argentinian’ and ‘Turkish’. The dummy variables contrast Argentina and Turkey to Germany. Nationality is the focal association in this research because I intend to compare the popular support for the militaries in these countries. Other variables stand as control variables in the table. That is because I wanted to know under which circumstances people support military rule, and/or who are more supportive to the military. Gender was coded into two categories: male (=1) and female (=0). The dataset has no income question and has limited income-related questions which makes it difficult to pinpoint class divisions in the dataset. Instead, I had to use



life satisfaction. The variable is scaled 1 to 10; and 1 (lower) is less satisfied and 10 (higher) is more satisfied. In order to see the difference between generations, the variable age is divided into four categories; young (18 – 30 years old), middle aged (31 – 45 years old), old (46 – 60 years old), and senior (65 +). The variable for education has six categories but I re-organized the variable by dividing the variable into three categories; lower education (less than secondary school), average education (secondary and high school education), and higher education (college dropout or college education).

If we look at Table 2 above, the first model shows us that both Argentineans and Turks are more supportive of military rule than Germans, but Turkish people are more supportive than Argentineans. Age categories show different levels of support for military interventions. While older generations are less supportive, younger generations are more supportive. Moreover, education has a direct impact on the perception of military rule; more educated people are less supportive toward military rule.

The second model in the table focuses on the confidence level of the society to the military. Here, the model suggests that Turks are more confident in their military than are Argentineans in general. However, gender has no direct impact on the confidence level. Education keeps its importance; more education brings less confidence in the military. Unlike the first model, in the second model life satisfaction (quality of life) has a statistically important effect on the confidence level toward military; as one's life satisfaction increases, his/her confidence with the military decreases.

According to the third model in the table, nationality makes no difference in terms of democracy. All national

groups highly value democracy (intercept is 8.9 in the scale of 1 to 10 – and 10 is absolute support to democracy). Positive numbers imply that, although there is no statistical significance, Argentineans and Turks value democracy more than Germans. Still gender has no importance, and education is still important. Interestingly, younger generations value democracy less than older generations.

The significance of Table 2 is that it shows us that considering the pasts of both countries, the people have reasonable doubts for the sake of democratic establishment in their countries. And recent history justifies the doubts of Turkish people, as I aim to show in this study. However, both citizenry in Argentina and Turkey have nominal support to democratic order. Yet, as briefed above, the citizenry has always been more active in Argentina than in Turkey. In the third wave of democratization, the Argentinean citizenry encouraged civilian political elites to push the military back to the barracks.

Classical literature tends to neglect the role of the citizenry in democratization processes (Kadivar 2018) but there is rising scholarly attention in the contemporary social sciences to the role of the citizenry in accounting for both civil-military relations and democratization processes. Kadivar argues that, contrary to the scholarly skepticism in the literature, democracies which were established through mass mobilization may have better chances to survive (Kadivar 2018). Like Kadivar, I argue that if the citizenry actively joins the negotiations between the military and political elites, democratic order would have a better chance to survive and develop.

### **Data Sources**

Here, I briefly discuss the most significant data sources of this study. This study uses four main data sources, namely

academic records that describe historical facts, political records, un-biased statistical records, and media.

First, what I mean by 'academic records' is the scholarly books and articles written by experts of various disciplines of the social sciences. History is a produced reality. Our ideological, political, and religious identities and positions may affect our vision when we try to understand the historical circumstances. It is important to describe historical 'facts' as accurately as possible. Thus, I will cross-examine studies related to the historical context in both countries. However, it must be said that events, names and dates are un-biased facts, and I will not use such a meticulous methodology to describe them. Likewise, I will not use personal opinion columns, novels, poetry, personal blogs. However, autobiographies and biographies will be used in this study when it is necessary because personal diaries, biographies, and published auto-biographies of important historical figures are useful for academic purposes as they stand as first-hand observations and accounts.

Second, my understanding of political records extends beyond records of political parties and politicians. This study uses records of NGOs (such as Mothers of Plaza de Mayo), labor unions (such as Scholars at Risk), and international pressure groups (such as the European Parliament, Human Rights Watch) as well. Records will include but not limited to released statistical data, annual reports on democratization processes, press-conferences, pamphlets on political intentions, and bulletins. I am well-aware that all of these groups (politicians, political parties, NGOs, so on so forth) have their own political agendas, and this fact may affect their storyline to describe the past-events. It is possible that when they present their past and future projections, their views may be distorted by their political expectations. Hence, when a scholar processes the

'facts' coming from such sources, they should use cross-verification methods.

Third, there are many international organizations with and without political affiliations that observe social and political changes annually in the world. Observatory institutions such as Freedom House and Amnesty International release annual reports to record and observe democratic and human rights progress in the world. Also, many international institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have their own global databank open to scholars. Political affiliations and ideological backgrounds of some institutions, especially the World Bank and IMF, often stir heated debates. However, their statistical data are collected by experts and are quality sources. Moreover, many scholarly institutions such as the World Values Survey and Eurostat collect data solely for the use of scholars. I intend to use, and in some cases process, their data in this study. Furthermore, there are national level statistical institutions in Argentina (INDEC) and Turkey (TÜİK) as well. Both institutions release monthly and annual reports for the use of decision-makers in their countries, but these data are open for scholarly use.

Fourth, public media can be a fecund source for sociologists. Media plays an important mediating role between the general populace and political elites. In both Argentina and Turkey, the initiation of the public media falls after the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century. In both countries, with the growth of the literacy rates and technology, public media became mass media. To trace daily political discussions past and present, newspapers (such as *Hürriyet Daily* in Turkey, *La Nacion* in Argentina), and other printed or online media (such as *The New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Reuters*) -- both in national and international level -- are important sources for scholarly investigations. Many scholars, opinion leaders,

politicians in Argentina and Turkey write pieces in newspapers and news-journals to convey their political messages. I use accounts of Argentinean and Turkish journalists and mass media as two of my data sources. However, in the growing authoritarian atmosphere in Turkey, media coverage is highly controversial and subject to fabulous conspiracy theories. Power and pressure groups (of any kind but especially affiliated with the government) use anonymous newsletters to manipulate facts in the age of post-truth. Hence, when I use newspaper articles or news from media, I will carefully select the ones in which the name of the author/correspondent/journalist is given. Similarly, I will cite them with their authors not the newspaper.

### *Organization of Chapters*

The third chapter in the thesis will be a theoretical discussion of the previous literature over democracy, civil-military relations, and transitions from military rules to democracy. Democracy is the determining concept in contemporary global politics, and there are many definitions of it. Concordantly, it would be better to describe what kind of democracies the study is involved in. Moreover, this study investigates a specific kind of process; namely democratic establishments after military involvement in politics. For this reason, I will investigate the civil-military relations literature in depth. Both the literature of democracy and civil-military relations involve the transition processes from military rules to democratic establishments. In the third chapter of the study, I will open a separate title to investigate the types of transitions because Argentina and Turkey have experienced different types of transitions, and the consequences of this difference effects the countries' political environments.

The fourth chapter will be devoted to Argentina's democratic history and democratization efforts. It will be the first case study within the thesis. What are the distinguishing features of Argentina's social and political context which affect the democratic experience? What are the concerns that stir the ambition of the armed forces of Argentina?

The fifth chapter will focus on Turkey as the second case study of the thesis. Like the fourth chapter, I will investigate the historical roots of Turkish Armed Forces' ideological and organizational set-up, and its political and institutional position within the country. Why does the Turkish military show praetorian features? Why does the Turkish military supervise the politics in the country but does not involve itself with governing the country?

I will analyze, in the sixth chapter, both countries' contemporary democratic establishment and the set-up of civil-military relations with the lens of comparative historical sociological analysis. I will try to find an answer to the core research question of this proposed thesis, which is 'What defines the quality of democracy during and after the period of transition of power from a military rule to a democratic one?' Of course, this question is not the only concern of this study, albeit it is the essential.

In the conclusion, I will analyze both the similarities and the differences of the democratic institutionalization of Argentina and Turkey with the description of the contemporary political atmospheres in both countries. As I indicated in the methodology section, this thesis is not generalizable in the global context, but it is generalizable within its own context; i.e. Argentina and Turkey. Concordantly, I will make some predictions for the future of both countries' democracies, but these predictions will be speculations.

## CHAPTER III

### Literature Review

Democracy of Turkey and Argentina has been interrupted several times by their militaries during 20<sup>th</sup> century. Civil-military relations in both countries have long been problematic due to the militaries' political ambitions. While Argentina's democracy has been intervened with six times by Argentinean military, Turkish democracy was suspended three times. Moreover, Turkey has experienced three failed military coups in 1962, 1963 and 2016, one indirect military intervention in 1997, and one military memorandum in 2007.

After the last military rules in both countries, Argentina and Turkey have been struggling to establish a proper democratic rule in the political arena. During the transition periods, Argentina has achieved a functioning rule of law, and initiated successful civilian control over its military. On the other hand, Turkish Armed Forces (TAF – Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri – TSK) has had a dominant position and had the upper hand in front of civilian political environment until recently. Hence, Turkish democracy is still fragile, and the rule of law is at stake. According to Freedom House Report in 2018, Argentina is a free country with some democratic flaws but Turkey is a non-free state with strong inclinations to authoritarian rule (Abramowitz 2018:7).

The last military rule in Argentina (*Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional*/ National Reorganization Process– shortly *El Proceso* / The Process– 1976 – 1983) lasted seven years, and failed to fulfill its promises by economic, political

or security means. Thus, after their defeat by the United Kingdom over Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), the Argentinean military had no ability to bargain in terms of transition of the power (Hunter 1998; Huntington 2009). After the fall of military rule in the country, the elected president Raul Alfonsin had been able to put the military in civilian control for the sake of democratic establishment (Huser 2002). Although there were several attempts by the junior officers of the military in the late 80s and early 90s to influence the democratic processes and the judicial prosecutions of the military generals for their misuse of the power during the junta rule, Argentinean civilian politics has achieved a stable democracy (Fitch 1998). In short, civilian control over the military has resulted in a stable democracy in Argentina.

However, the same is not true of Turkey. The military took power on September 12, 1980 by promising a return to democracy after securing order in the economy, internal security, and politics. After three years, the Turkish military kept its promises, and started transferring the power to the civilian politicians by establishing elections. However, since the military had the upper hand, and was relatively successful of ruling the country, the military and members of the junta dominated the transition period, and regulated the means of transition to democracy (Demirel 2005; Huntington 2009). Thus, civilian control over the military in Turkey has been weak and fragile until 2009.

In April 2007, the chief of staff of Turkish Armed Forces declared a memorandum against the civilian government related to the ongoing debates on secularism in the country but the government resisted to the military and a conservative president, Abdullah Gül, was elected by the parliament (Kuru 2009:184). After the memorandum, several



lawsuits opened in the civilian courts accusing a secret clique within the army about to force the government resign. It was for the first-time civilians took action to prevent ambitions of the military in the country. Although the lawsuits lead a civilian control over the military, they also made ambitions of then prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan possible, and democratic values were gradually eroded. Especially after the failed coup d'état, President Erdoğan used the coup attempt as a leverage to consolidate all the power at his hands.

In this chapter, I aim to evaluate the previous literature on democracy and civil-military relations. While doing it, I will also summarize the contemporary transformation within the military profession. Specifically, I will examine the transformation of political power from military to democracy. By its nature, this essay deals with three main scholarly questions with some related sub-questions:

1) In its broadest means, what is democracy? This question not only refers to a mere definition of democracy but its coverage and usage as well. Thus, I will also seek the scholarly answers to the question 'how countries democratize?' In other words, 'what kinds of social changes trigger democratic transformations?' To simply put, 'what precedes democracy in a social context?'

2) For the sake of an established democracy, how can civilians gain control over their military? This is an important problematique since Plato because it is vital for a democratic establishment to control its military to survive. Hence, 'how can citizens feel comfortable in a society with their military?' In other words, 'Is there any objective measures to evaluate the civilian control over military?' And finally;

3) What are the means of transition after a military rule? This question is two-fold: Militaries do not just leave the power. Since a military is the biggest power outlet in a country, I will investigate 'why does a military give up the power?' And when a military hands the power to civilians, 'how does a transition happens?'

All these questions are highly interdisciplinary problems in the social sciences and are inter-connected. I will attempt to provide a framework by referring to scholarly discussions from democratization literature. First, I will review the discussion over the definitions of democracy; second, I will discuss and critically evaluate civil-military literature, and finally, I will present a conceptual frame for the process of democratization in a global sense. In the fourth section, I will present unanswered questions in the wide literature and offer future scholarly directions on democratization processes in the global scale. Finally, in the conclusion section, I will elaborate on why I choose certain theoretical frames for my study.

### *Theories of Democracy*

The task to define what democracy is, is very challenging duty. There is no single definition of democracy because of the nature of social life. Every society has a unique cultural, historical, and geographical context, and all these determinants impact social processes. According to one account (Collier and Levitsky 1997) there are hundreds of definitions of democracy in the social science literature. Of course, it is beyond the scope of this essay to evaluate all these accounts. Thus, here I will present only the major understandings of democratic procedure in the social sciences.

One of the most cited theorists of democracy is Joseph Schumpeter. In his now classical book on democracy, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (Schumpeter 1950), he sees democracy as procedural combinations of ruling method. He states that the democratic method is institutional regulation in which individuals gain the power to make political decisions by competing for the peoples' votes (Schumpeter 1950:256). Schumpeter's emphasis is on participation and competition.

However, although it might be useful in comparative analysis, some other authors are not satisfied with Schumpeter's intuitional minimalist approach and look for a more comprehensive definition. Robert Dahl, another distinguished theorist of democracy, lists five indispensable features of democracy (Dahl 1982). These are namely, a universal suffrage, equal voting rights for every individual, effective participation, enlightened apprehension, and citizen's control on the political agenda. He also mentions seven institutional guarantees in a political system in order to improve the quality of democracy (Dahl 1982:10-11). According to Dahl, democracy is a poliarchy that is a multi-layered system of governing which requires more than elections. What define a "poliarchy" are competition and inclusiveness (Dahl 1971:24). Power holders in a state tend to construct a "closed hegemony" but with the pressure of other interest groups they start including some other groups and share the power. Hence, democratization follows the path of competition and inclusiveness together. If there is no inclusiveness but there is competition, it would lead to a "competitive oligarchic regime." If there is no competition but there is inclusiveness, the regime would be an inclusive hegemony (Dahl 1971:7).

On the other hand, John Rawls, a political scientist, in his contemporary classic work, *A Theory of Justice* (1971), takes a more maximalist stance on democracy. He comes closer to the understanding of social-democracy, and sees democracy as a more comprehensive historical, cultural and judicial form. Democracy should be infused in every bit of the social life. He is not alone with his approach. German sociologist Jurgen Habermas contributed to the literature by elaborating the term “deliberative democracy” coined by Joseph Bessette (1980). The concept of deliberative democracy is based on negotiations of proposals in the political arena. Instead of putting a list of ideas to the mere voting system, they must be discussed deliberatively by the people (Habermas 1996)

There are many other democratic theories, some of which take a radical position on behalf of democratic rule. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their influential book (2001) claim that deliberative and liberal theories of democracy are based on negotiations and consensus. According to their understanding, consensus creates an oppressive environment for the endless differing opinions, lifestyles and worldviews at the final point, and moreover, eliminates plurality in the society. Radical democracy posits that every society has resisting differences, and a democracy should take an action to include every single social movement (Keyman 2000). However, radical democratic understanding is pretty much inapplicable, and if radical democracy is applied to a scholarly research, the scholar would reach the result that there is no ‘true’ democracy in the history.

Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl in their small but quite influential article (2006) take one step back and suggest another strategy to better understand what

democracy is. According to them, often it is better to examine undemocratic procedures to understand the democratic ones. There are some countries which hold elections on a regular basis but still they struggle to establish a properly working democratic rule. Sometimes “a properly assembled majority [...] regularly makes decisions that harm some minority.” Fareed Zakaria labels these types of regimes as “illiberal democracies” (1997). Hence, elections do not necessarily lead to an established, stable democracy. “Electoralism” is a common fallacy in the literature of democracy, and some leaders in a rigid system try to silence opposition by using the election results. Hence, the essential procedural requirements of democracy include universal suffrage, fair elections, freedom of speech, and freedom of association.

Along the same line, Charles Tilly (2007) evaluates the theories of democracy and acknowledges the differences of social contexts. In his perspective, “a regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation.” There are many types of regimes in the world, and many of them call themselves democracies; even some surprising regimes. Even an authoritarian-bureaucratic one-man regime, like the one in North Korea, officially calls itself a democracy (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). In order to evaluate the quality of a regime’s democracy, one should first evaluate the aforementioned qualities in the country (Tilly 2007:18). Tilly describes and proposes a more solid theory of democracy. His analysis is also useful for the researchers in the area. He distinguishes four types of democratic rule by their capacities: high-capacity undemocratic, low-capacity undemocratic, high-capacity democratic, and finally low-capacity democratic. High-capacity undemocratic regimes

have little public voice and often state security forces involve themselves in politics. Regime changes through elite struggle or mass rebellion (as in Iran or Kazakhstan). Low-capacity undemocratic regimes signify frequent violent struggle including civil wars (as in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo). In high-capacity democratic regimes there are both political party mobilization and freedom of speech. Interest groups can work in freedom (as in Norway and Japan). And finally, low capacity democratic regimes have frequent social mobility but the state itself is less effective in governing (as in Belgium and Jamaica) (Tilly 2007:20).

### Road to Democracy

As I already indicated above, in the voluminous literature of democracy, there are many different adjectives used by the scholars to describe democratic systems in the world. Moreover, democracy is one of the most abused word in political arena (Smith 2012:6). Thus, it is important to mention at least major contributions to the literature to better understand and to conceptualize the term in actual social arena.

All of the major theories I mentioned above only describe a democratic regime at its perfection. In other words, they do not answer the question how and why a democratic regime emerges or is needed in a social context. In this section, I seek the answers that scholars from different disciplines have contributed in the literature. The scholarly question here is ‘under what conditions does a democratic regime develop?’ In other words, ‘what precedes democracy?’

According to Seymour M. Lipset, when a nation develops democracy accompanies (Lipset 1959). His thesis is

simple, if modernization processes go well in a society, democracy has a chance. The critical concept in his thesis is modernization. Education level, wealth, industrial production capacity and technological development would lead a democratic establishment (Dahl 1971:50). Robert Dahl supports his thesis by observing several democratized countries. Dahl's concerns are understandable: if education level increases, awareness increases as well. Or, if the nation gets wealthy, interest groups will fight for their investments.

However, as the history shows us this is not true in every case. There are different nation states that have prosperous and developed social contexts, and yet still struggle to establish democratic regimes (Sorensen 1998:24–29). On the opposite side, Guillermo O'Donnell challenges Lipset's argument and says authoritarianism is more likely to accompany modernization efforts. O'Donnell's reasoning comes mostly from the observation of Latin American cases. When industrial modernization took place in most Latin American countries, the political process was not in favor of masses. However, the elites saw the transformation as vital, hence in order to pursue the transformative model, authoritarian regimes emerged to repress the masses (O'Donnell 1973).

In his masterpiece, Barrington-Moore tries to examine the historical context of democracies, and his conclusion posits that democratic establishment is highly related to urbanization (Moore 1969). In the western democratic societies, Barrington-Moore observes, there were highly established urban middle classes that preceded the democratic establishment. Hence, a bourgeoisie class that supports democracy in order to promote its political and social gains is a vital component of democratic establishment. In sum, he sees bourgeoisie as an

indispensable proponent of breaking the traditional feudal ties in a society in favor of democratic developments.

Nevertheless, according to Goran Therborn, although Barrington-Moore's analysis supplies us a historical account of the role of bourgeoisie in some societies (especially in western societies), it overlooks and exaggerates the role of bourgeoisie in establishing democratic regimes. Therborn posits that for most cases the opposite argument is more reliable (Sorensen 1998:26). He says that democratic struggle has always been performed against the will of the bourgeoisie elites. Bourgeoisie can perform under any kind of regime; thus, democratic establishments do not require a bourgeoisie. On the contrary, authoritarian regimes have no difficulties in collaborating with developed middle-classes per se.

According to Fareed Zakaria, democracy was brought to Western European countries by constitutional liberalism. In other words, Zakaria claims that constitutional liberalism led democratic regime in western countries during 19<sup>th</sup> century (Zakaria 1997:25). After the acceptance of civic rights in western societies democracy become inevitable. However, Zakaria further posits, democracy does not necessarily bring constitutional liberalism (1997:28). The difference is important because without constitutional guarantees of the civic rights democracy quickly turns into an authoritarian or semi-democratic structure as many contemporary experiences show us. Once constitutional acknowledgement of civil rights is established, turning back from a democratic regime becomes more difficult for those who have authoritarian ambitions.

Peter H. Smith, in his inclusionary work, acknowledges all the contributions to the literature, and posits that every democratic experience is multifaceted and



many elements contribute to the performance of a democratic establishment (Smith 2012). According to Smith to better examine democratic experiences it would be wiser to adopt an eclectic and interdisciplinary model instead of relying on one or another approach (Smith 2012:14). Accordingly, he posits that in the analytical perspective to assessing democracies scholars consider that definitions, historical background, social class formations, performances of institutions, performance of the democracy, and ideology all matter (Smith 2012:15–16). As I already cited above Peter H. Smith argues that democracy is one of the most misused term in political arena. When scholars are concerned about conceptualizing emerging democracies in different contexts, it causes “a proliferation of alternative conceptual forms” in the literature (Collier and Levitsky 1997:430-431). In the contemporary world, democracy is a rising value and powerholders utilize democratic discourse on behalf of their political ambitions but do little to institutionalize democracy and its institutions(Smith 2012; Tilly 2007). On the other hand, different nations have different kind of democratic establishments.

### *Democratic Regimes with Different Adjectives*

So far, I have investigated the definitions and basic elements of democracy as an idea. However, there is a question still waiting for an answer: What happens when a democracy cannot reproduce itself, or is not flexible enough to find solutions to newly emerging problems? In other words, “how would a society consolidate democracy?” Democracy is a never-ending process and should be replicated every time. As life evolves, the challenges to democratic regimes evolve as well. The sustainability of a democratic regime depends heavily on how able it is to respond to the changing

nature of the social context. In this section, I investigate the sustainability of democracies.

The transitions from a non-democratic regime to a democratic one is just “the first battle” (Haynes 2000:128). The real question is “how and under which conditions would a democracy survive?” Adam Przeworski (1995) insists that once a democracy emerges, the biggest problem is to consolidate the new political institutions in the face of economic pressure (p. 109) because people feel uncomfortable when they are about to lose their social gains and positions (p. 36). However, without an effective state, there can be no democracy (Przeworski 1995:110).

Consolidation of democracy is a very sensitive and oftentimes fragile process at the initial stages. There are many obstacles for new democracies. In many cases, if a country fails to consolidate democracy, and cannot produce democratic institutions, authoritarianism strikes back (Kingstone 2006; O’Donnell 1986; Stepan 2009b) or, at least, it evolves into a kind of hybrid regime (a mixture of authoritarianism and democracy). Many scholars have proposed adjectives for the phenomenon (such as tutelary democracy, illiberal democracy, guarded democracy, controlled democracy, restricted democracy, so on so forth) (see: Collier and Levitsky 1997:440). The problem is obvious; democracy is a fragile value and needs to be protected, but “who will protect democracy?”

In another work, Adam Przeworski and Roberto Limongi (Przeworski and Limongi 1997) claim that democracy is a self-sustaining regime. Inspired by the seminal work of Seymour Lipset (Lipset 1959), they analyzed democratic countries and concluded that wealthy democracies do not return to authoritarianism. They claim that “democracy is not a byproduct of economic

development” but “once it is established” economic performance play a role: “the chances for the survival of democracy are greater when the country is richer” (Przeworski and Limongi 1997:177). Similarly, Larry Diamond and Juan Linz (1989) posit that economic crisis is one of the most prevalent threat to democratic stability in a country. Argentina and to some degree Uruguay are exceptions for Przeworski and Limongi’s findings but prove Diamond and Linz’s observations. In the same track, Peter H. Smith (Smith 2012) is much more certain on the fate of liberal democracy. Once established, he insists, democracy “can give a way to illiberalism or even semi-democracy but not outright autocracy” (p. 336).

On the other hand, it is vital for the sake of democracy to make sure of the subordination of the military in a country. As Robert Dahl says poliarchy (i.e. democracy) is “impossible unless the military is sufficiently depoliticized to permit civilian rule” (Dahl 1971:50). Hence, the very first problem for a new democratic establishment in a country where a military regime has been replaced by democracy is to subordinate its military (Stepan 2009b). Narcis Serra recommends that civilian governments introduce several reforms to protect civil-rights and to preserve democratic establishment after the transition; but first and foremost, the military’s organizational and political autonomy should be eliminated (Serra 2009). This problematique leads us to investigate the scholarly discussions of civil-military relations.

### **Civil-Military Relations in Democracy**

When it comes to civil-military relations in a democratic establishment, scholars unanimously assert that civilian control of the military is an indispensable feature of a democratic rule (Dahl 1998:147; Feaver 1999:215; Smith

2012). The difference between scholars emerges from the modes of control. Different scholars have different solutions for the problematique.

Historically, militaries are designed to protect the nation from external threats. In the ancient Rome, the Roman army was a mediator in the politics within the Roman territory. Due to this fact, the term 'praetorianism' emerged to describe the military's role in the polity. In modern times, many militaries in the world have played the same role for a long time. Many military coup d'états and interventions happened in different regions because countries lacked institutional mechanisms in the times of political, economic, or social crisis.

Who will guard the guardians? Why would the military obey to the civilians instead of holding the power while it can? These questions underline the paradox in civil-military relations. The paradox is simple; the military is the most powerful institution within a state, so how can civilians, who have no weapons in their hands, persuade military officials - who are trained to use their weapons - not to use them in the first place (Karl 1990). Civil-military relations is a key factor for a democratic rule. By its nature, militaries are undemocratic organizations. They are hierarchically constructed bodies and hold the most coercive power in a country. Thus, a democracy should be able to control its military to promote and to preserve the democratic rule. By its nature, civil-military relations are the core focus of this study. Hence, I must deal with the previous civil-military relations literature first.

Any student who started digging into civil-military relations' literature shall encounter and should read the two pillars of the literature on civil-military relations: Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz. These two scholars are not

the first ones who tried to understand the dynamics of the civil military relations in terms of democratic establishment but they constitute the theoretical background of civil military relations in the post-World War II context (Pion-Berlin 2011), and some of their hypothesis and analyses are still used by scholars.

Huntington suggests, in his now landmark work *The Soldier and the State* (Huntington 1957), that in order to preserve democratic rule in a country, it is necessary to put an “objective control” over the military by civilians. This can be done by realizing professionalism and delimiting the role of the military in the political arena. According to Huntington objective control can be achieved only in established democracies. He posits that the military should be separated from the civilian body of the politics but should be controlled by the civilians. In other words, in a democracy, the military should be granted a degree of autonomy. But the ultimate decisions should be made by civilian leaders. This can be done through professionalism, according to Huntington. Huntington’s understanding of civilian control of military extends beyond the democratic style of governing but offers a universal solution to the problem. While constructing his theory, he also refers to the Soviet Union which was obviously not a democratic state but its military was perfectly controlled by the civilian elites (Huntington 1996). He suggests two types of civilian control over the military; namely ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ control. If there is no control over the military, the regime will end in total authoritarianism. On the other hand, if civilians maximize their control over the military, in other words have total control, this would lead to a ‘subjective control’. In this case, the military would not work properly but in the first place it is already impossible to do so for civilians because of conflicting interests among them (Huntington

1957:80). The civilian part of the equation tends to be diverse, and some groups may want to see that the military is involved in the power struggle. For Huntington, the proper solution is establishing an 'objective control' of military that gives a certain degree of autonomy to the military professionals that would be beneficial for both parties (Huntington 1957:83).

Morris Janowitz is one of the early critics of Huntington, and one of the first scholars who deals with civil-military relations from a sociological perspective. In his related work, Janowitz delineates the desirable civil-military relations in a democratic country. He does not agree with the Huntingtonean understanding of separatism of military professionalism. According to his "civic-republican theory" he sees the military personnel as a product of their social context. According to Janowitz, a military officer is not a person isolated from the society. Of course, the military would be directly involved in the decision-making processes, and military officials would be politically concerned individuals (Janowitz 1960). Thus, it is crucial to raise military officers according to democratic values with civic virtues. He uses the term "citizen soldier" and military service is not viewed as a negative duty because it may be used as a medium to indoctrinate the citizens. Hence, military has a distinctive role in the process of nation building (Schiff 2009:31). Janowitz further elaborates his understanding of ideal civil-military relations. According to him, a stiff congressional oversight on the military and military expenditure is crucial. Moreover, he suggests that civilians should be involved in the development of military standards and educational doctrines. And furthermore, civilian servants in a military should have longer tenures.

Peter A. Feaver also has a critical position with regard to Huntington's theoretical stand but he also opposes Janowitz. According to Feaver, both Huntington and Janowitz ignore the agency of the military (Feaver 1996, 2003). Particularly, his interest is deployed to the military agents. If there is obedience, there are obedient individuals who are themselves agents, and these agents are capable of making their own decisions. According to Feaver, the quality of civil-military relations is determined by the decisions and acts of these agents on both sides of the pendulum (Feaver 1999). Military officers as agents act on their own preferences. While civilians cannot be sure of their intentions, the military, on the other hand, cannot be sure that it will not be caught and punished (Feaver 2003:10–12). There is a contract between civilians and military, and "working" or "shirking" attitudes of the military determine the usefulness of this contract. While 'working' is the desirable conduct of the military, if the military is 'shirking', civilians would lose the control over military.

A more recent theory on civil-military relations challenges all previous theorists and uses a new lens in order to better understand the dynamics of the relations in the political arena. Rebecca L. Schiff, coming from the discipline of Political Science, offers a sociologically useful model to understand civil-military relations (Schiff 2009). She says that all of the previous theories and theorists have ignored the role of the citizenry. She posits that there are three partners in the game: namely the military, the political elites, and the citizenry (Schiff 1995). The concordance between the partners determines the quality of civil-military relations in a polity. The main argument of Schiff's "concordance theory" is that cultural and historical contexts in a society are directly related to the set of the relationship in the political

arena. In other words, culture and history should be taken into account.

As already indicated above traditional civil-military relations literature is based on the observation of the US army and includes the dichotomy of cold war era, namely Soviet Union vs the USA. Huntington and Janowitz see the US context as a role model for other democratic states. Furthermore, classic literature suggests a separation between military professionalism and civil government. Rebecca L. Schiff challenges the uniqueness of the US case and the idea of separation in civil-military relations. According to Schiff, there is one more component of the equation which is called 'citizenry'. The citizenry corresponds to civil political elites and military professionals with respect to four indicators: 1) social composition of officer corps, 2) political decision making process, 3) recruitment method, and 4) military style (Schiff 2012:319). She further claims that historical, institutional, and cultural experiences all together determine the quality of civil-military relations, and every society has different experiences. The argument of 'concordance theory' is that a domestic military intervention is less likely to occur if three partners (political elites, military professionals, and citizenry) agree upon the four indicators.

In concordance theory, Schiff does not see the military and its personnel as abstract ideas but as part of the society. This distinction is important in this sociological investigation as well. First and foremost, the military is comprised of citizens of the country. This fact not only acknowledges the personnel's social identities but also gives credit to the social construction of the military as an institution. Similarly, the recruitment model of a military shapes and strengthens the social composition of the military. Universal compulsory male enlistment is a



common source to military masculinity. Alternatively, exclusion of certain (ethnic, religious, gender, etc.) groups defines the institutional mindset. The position of the military leaders in the decision-making processes in the country also plays an important role in establishing concordance. If the military enjoys a high degree of autonomy, it would be hard for civilians to control the military's actions and prevent interference in politics. It is vital for the civilians to be able to define the limits of military duty, indoctrination, and internal affairs. The last indicator, military style, which Schiff names, is related to military autonomy. In the political formations in which military tutelage is common, it is not a surprise to see the military in a stronger position. In such regimes, the military is usually the carrier of the modernization process. In fact, it is not surprising to observe that the modernization process starts from the military in these contexts.

One of the key factors in the concordance model is the citizenry. In its broad definition, the citizenry is the collective composition of the citizens of a polity. In modern polities, the citizens are expected to be active agents with individual and/or collective interests, and they are assumed to act according to their beliefs, personal/collective interests, and future expectations. The citizenry implies a dramatic transformation of and differentiation from the passive subjects of pre-modern societies. However, I posit in this study that the creation of citizenry matters as well. In many cases throughout the world, the citizenry fought to promote their rights. The best-known example is the French Revolution but there are many other cases when the transformation of citizenry was an imposed process as it was in Soviet Russia and Mao's China.

*Post-Modern Transformation of Militaries*

Militaries change as time changes. As I indicated above, the classic literature on civil-military relations is based on the set-up of cold war era. Thus, it begs the question, “is there any change to military establishments after the cold war?” If yes, “what are the changes, and what defines the contemporary military understanding?” In this part, I examine the contemporary military set-up, and its effects on civil-military relations.

In his collected essays, French philosopher and social theorist Jean Baudrillard, investigates the first Gulf War took place in 1991 (Baudrillard 1995). His major concern is not the legitimacy of the war but the reality of the event. It was the first war live-broadcasted, and people were watching the conflict zones while eating their popcorn. According to Baudrillard the whole event was a simulation. The first Gulf War was the turning point in the contemporary warfare. Baudrillard further claims that instantaneous information flow and media coverage signal that contemporary military confrontations are not about killing opponents but convincing them that they cannot win. Nevertheless, the new information warfare also leads to a credibility problem too. He further investigates the changing nature of military actions in the contemporary world.

Taking the end of the Cold War as the turning point for postmodern transformation would be misleading (Booth, Kestnbaum, and Segal 2001). Charles Moskos started writing on the changing nature of the modern militaries in the mid-70s after the Vietnam War (see: Moskos 1977). When he first introduced his institutional and occupational models of military organization, Morris Janowitz challenged his ideas (Janowitz 1977) and the two scholars developed a productive theoretical discussion (Booth et al. 2001:321). Contemporary

changes, whether they are called postmodern or not, fell well before the end of Cold War. According to Alfred Stepan, expansion of the military's role to internal threats signals a new professionalism (1988). When contemporary armies start seeing internal threats as one of their main concerns, they involve themselves more in the politics. He supports his claim by observing Latin American cases, especially Brazilian and Peruvian cases, which are the recent examples to support his argument. In many other Latin American cases, however, militaries intervened in civilian politics with the excuses of failed civilian governments that failed against internal insurgencies (Call 2002:4; Stepan 1971, 1973, 1988).

The transformation of military defines the new modes of relations between civilian governments and the military in a country. Changing interpretations of civilian and military spheres have direct impact on the relationship between the two. Hence it is important to investigate contemporary changes related to military establishment. Here, I will look at the primary observations made by the scholars on the changing military environment in the globe.

Traditional military studies were defined mostly by the post-second world war environment, and the starting point for military specializations in the social sciences coincides with the cold war era (Feaver 1996, 1999:212). Modern militaries are based on mass and mandatory recruitments and fundamental tools of nation-states (Zürcher 2010). However, especially after the Cold War era, this foundation changed. Charles Moskos is one of the first and the most comprehensive theorist of the changing military environment, and he calls the new concept as the "postmodern military" (Moskos 2000; Moskos, John Allen Williams, et al. 2000). However, he notes that to use the term "postmodern", theorists should show some significant

differences of the new military concepts from the “modern” forms (Moskos, Williams, and Segal 2000:1). Otherwise it is just another misapplication of the term “postmodern”.

Postmodernism is a direct challenge to the ideas of modernity. It finds its ground in the needs of industrial, economic, political, social and cultural environment in the contemporary world. It is hard to pin-point the exact shift from modernity to postmodernity but many scholars agree that the postmodern shift becomes more visible after the oil crisis in 1973 (Kumar 2005). Here, I do not track the history of postmodernity and postmodernism, but I will mention the basic ideas of postmodernity in order to understand what it offers to military and civil-military relations. It would be useful to establish a ground for a discussion about the new military understanding.

Zygmunt Bauman defines postmodernism as acknowledgement of the ambiguity of life (Bauman 2008). Modern ideas are based on definitive rules of social life and modern social sciences were established for this purpose. Postmodernism takes a critical and reflexive stance towards modernity (Bauman 2003, 2013). The postmodern condition, as French philosopher Francois Lyotard argues, marks a more intuitive, interpretive, and speculative epistemology. The postmodern condition is an “intense distrust of all universal or ‘totalizing’ discourses” and “incredulity toward metanarratives” (quoted by: Booth et al. 2001:324).

Although postmodernism questions the idea of nation, nationalism, and nation states, all these concepts and national armies are still prevalent in the world. However, interconnectedness of the nations and nation states are growing, and accordingly, militaries adapt and develop new strategies for the crisis not only within their national borders but also at international scales (Booth et al. 2001). After the

demise of Cold War era, with the collapse of Warsaw pact, NATO developed a new strategy and extended its coverage to the former Soviet countries in order to secure democratic establishments, reduced its size and spending, and multiply its mission from merely a defense pact to humanitarian aim (Moskos 1976, 2000; Moskos et al. 2000). Many national armies have made similar adjustments as well.

The postmodern condition is not a mere intangible, abstract philosophical discussion. It also based on empirical observations. Daniel Bell -- who is the first sociologist who observed and introduced the notion of the postindustrial society based on his observations of the changes of the modes of production -- suggests "end of ideology" (Bell 2001). He posits that in the very early phase of contemporary postindustrial society that modern class relations have been eroded and industrial societies are experiencing totally different class formations. The service sector is the backbone of the new era, and professional and technical employees take the place of the traditional working class in the center of economic social network (Booth et al. 2001:325).

Militaries responded to the postindustrial set-up, and started employing more civilian technocrats and experts within the ranks (Moskos 2005; Moskos et al. 2000). Modern armies are expensive and have no profits in return. Most of them were establish with the inspiration of total war ideologies of world wars in 20<sup>th</sup> century. According to Karl Haltiner what differentiates the postmodern era from modernity in terms of the military is the bulky mass army (Haltiner 1998). The postmodern military is smaller, but its mobility is greater. With the new definition of new goals, militaries become more affordable and sustainable, and goal oriented.

Charles Moskos et al. list five distinctive postmodern military conditions in the contemporary military: 1) new interpretation of civilian and military spheres, 2) an equalizing emphasis on differences in all military related specialties (combat, support, ranks, service etc.), 3) changing definitions of the military missions (more humanitarian missions rather than war combating), 4) increasing coalition and collaboration of national armies under the umbrella of international organizations such as United Nations, and 5) the internationalization of national armed forces themselves (Moskos et al. 2000). Moreover, traditional gender roles in the armies tend to change in the new era. Many national armies have started accepting LGBT individuals in the military services. Some other armies decreased the emphasis on masculinity, albeit still need to advance (Basaran 2014; Haltiner and Hirt 2000; van der Meulen 2000).

Don Snider acknowledges Moskos' description of the post-modern transformation of military (Snider 2000) and further claims that although initially the American military was uneasy with some specific transformations (such as increasing number of women soldiers, accepting homosexuals in military service etc.), postmodern transformation is tangible in the contemporary American military environment (Snider 2000:50). What defines the postmodern military today, according to Snider, is citizenry. Snider argues that the traditional citizen-soldier understanding is still prevalent in Western democracies but citizens' willingness to defend traditional values at the risk of their own lives is declining. Military's in social engineering is not an important problem for either civilians or military officers. Moreover, military has become less conservative on the civil rights issues (Snider 2000:48-50).

With the introduction of new communication technologies, interaction between the military and populace is growing, and the traditional neutrality of the military declining. Military officers are more interested in the social problems. The increasing interest of the military's over social and political changes and decisions poses a threat to the civilian control over military. The possible reaction of the citizenry and civilian politics to the growing interests of the military will define the new conditions of civil-military relations in contemporary society (Snider 2000) as it has always been (Schiff 2009; Schiff 1995).

### ***From Military Rule to Democracy: Modes of Transition***

So far, I have investigated the meaning of democracy, the preconditions that lead to democratic establishment, and civil-military relations in democracy. However, there is still a set of scholarly questions left unanswered: Why do countries democratize? Why authoritarian regimes transform to democratic ones and give power to a new group of elites? What defines the quality of a democratic establishment? What are the means of transition?

Although civilian control over military does not necessarily lead a democratic rule (Desch 1999), it is an indispensable feature of a democracy because the immediate threat to a democratic establishment is the military. Military involvement erodes the democratic values in a society and there is no exception to this phenomenon.

During the third democratic wave in the world, nearly forty countries have experienced a democratic transformation (Huntington 2009). Many of these countries are formerly military-led authoritarian regimes. In order to understand the quality of a democratic transformation, it is important to see how countries democratize during the

transformation processes. Hence, it is important to look at the civil-military relations literature in terms of democracy. Many scholars who are dealing with civil-military relations often put scholarly interest on the democratic establishment of the societies. Since civilian control over military is a must for a democracy, it is understandable why theorists of democracy have attended to the problematique.

Samuel P. Huntington is one of the most comprehensive scholars of civil-military relations in the literature. He conceptualizes the democratization processes in the third wave era into three categories (Huntington 2009). These categories are namely transformations (as in Turkey, Brazil, Peru etc.), replacement (as in Greece, Argentina), and transplacement (as in Uruguay, Korea, Bolivia etc.). Among all these categories, transformation is the most prevalent one in the third wave of democratization. Sixteen cases out of thirty-five countries which have experienced democratization since 1974 until 1990 are transformations. Basically, transformation is a form of negotiation between the ruling government and the opposition which wants to transform the country to a democracy. Replacement, on the other hand, implies a system failure. When the current regime fails to meet its promises, the opposition takes the power without a negotiation. For a replacement process, the country has to have a strong opposition.

Transplacement is a mixed form of transformation and replacement. When there is a will to democracy but weaker, uncoordinated opposition, transplacement occurs. It is a painful and long process. First, the public shows its discomfort with mass demonstrations, and urges the government to take an action. The government makes some liberalization efforts, but the public does not find them satisfactory and pursues strikes, street-demonstrations until



there is an agreement and/or common ground between the two actors.

**Table 3: Authoritarian Regimes and Liberalization/Democratization Processes: 1974-1990**

<u>Processes</u>	<b>One Party</b>	<b>Personal</b>	<b>Military</b>	<b>Racial Oligarchy</b>
<b><u>Transformation</u></b>	Bulgaria Hungary Mexico Taiwan The USSR	Spain India China	Brasil Ecuador Guatemala Nigeria Pakistan Peru Sudan <b>Turkey</b>	
<b>16</b>				
<b><u>Transplacement</u></b>	Poland Czechoslovakia Nicaragua Mongolia	(Nepal)	Uruguay Bolivia Honduras El Salvador Korea	South Africa
<b>11</b>				
<b><u>Replacement</u></b>	East Germany	Portugal Philippines	Greece <b>Argentina</b>	
<b>6</b>				
<b><u>Intervention</u></b>	Grenada		Panama	
<b>2</b>				
<b><u>Totals</u></b>				
<b>35</b>	11	7	16	1

**Source: Samuel P. Huntington (1992:34)**

There are some contradicting approaches in the democratic transformation literature. According to Harold Laswell (Lasswell 1941), it would be a very challenging task for the civilians to control the military in the times of external conflict (i.e. war). On the contrary, Stanislaw Andreski claims that it is easier to control the military when external threat is increased because the military would be unified, and has no time to interfere in politics (Andreski 1980).

Michael C. Desch also challenges Laswell's argument. He takes Andreski's theoretical frame and adds more variables to construct his understanding of civilian control of the military. According to Desch, external and internal perception of threats not only defines civil-military relations but also delineates the democratic transformation (Desch 1999). He posits that when internal threat perception goes high, militaries tend to intervene in politics more. However, when the level of external threat elevates, Desch continues, civilian control of the military is more possible; like Andreski suggested. In other words, Michael Desch develops Andreski's thesis by adding one more variable, and tests his hypothesis by investigating different case studies.

Oftentimes, it is easier to transform the political environment to a democratic one rather than pursuing the democratic goals in a country. According to Linz, democracy is consolidated "when it becomes the only game in the town" (quoted by Montero 1998). However, initial problems in a transition may delimit and hinder the democratic progress in a country, and become "birth defects" (Karl 1990). According to Terry Lynn Karl, there are four modes of transition to democracy, especially in Latin America, which are namely: pact, reform, imposition and revolution. These

modes of transition imply two main strategical categories: compromise and force. While pact and reform in a transition period can be considered as compromises, other two; imposition and revolution fit into the “force” category. She further claims that it is also important how democratization happens: from above or from below. It is important to note that according to Karl, in Latin America specifically, the mass participation of the public in transitions did not result better consequences (Karl 1990). Yet, social life is not linear and sometimes there might be a mixed combination of transition modes. If the army stays unified and intact, it would be hard to consolidate democracy in a disorganized civilian-political environment.

By the same token, David Pion-Berlin states that the political environment in a society is definitive to the fate of democratic establishment. History shows us that there are too many power-hungry militaries in the world, which seek an opportunity to grasp the governing power. The real issue lies under the legitimacy of the institutions (Pion-Berlin 2001b). If the institutions are weak and illegitimate, civilian control is unlikely. Moreover, Pion-Berlin opposes the theoretical understanding of Michael Desch that I have described above. Pion-Berlin claims that civilian control may remain strong even if the external threat is high, if the institutions are strong enough. He uses the conflicting cases of Pakistan and India in order to strengthen his claim (Pion-Berlin 2011).

Samuel Fitch has a more skeptical approach to the theories of civil-military relations. He acknowledges the differences in each social context and underlines the relativity of procedural progress in each society. He clearly states that a proper policy in Argentina may lead to a disaster in Guatemala (Fitch 1998:xvii). He further notes that,

although, there are countless variations of policy implementations, civilian control over military can be summarized within four stereotypical conditions. These categories are democratic control, conditional subordination, military tutelage, and military control (military rule). While “democratic control” implies the desired result for a democratic regime, “military control” is the worst-case scenario. Fitch emphasizes that in a fully democratic regime, “the armed forces are neither policymakers nor political actors nor are they above the law” (Fitch 1998:38). He uses Schmitter and Karl’s approach, explained above, to define democracy, and adds that democracy also requires civilian control of military. Similarly, Georg Sorensen reaches the same conclusion and indicates that there is no deterministic historical law to specify the processes of transition and transformation of democracies in the world (Sorensen 1998).

### *A Critical Evaluation of the Literature*

Civilian control over the military does not always lead an established, working democracy. The best known and well-investigated case is the Soviet Union (Desch 1996). The civilian bureaucratic elites of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union had absolute power over the Soviet Military like in the US but after all it was a non-democratic country. After the collapse of the union, the Russian Federation during its early days lost the civil-military balance and a failed coup attempt occurred. Vladimir Putin, after his succession to the presidency, has achieved control of the military’s enthusiasm to be partner of the ruling government but still the quality of Russia’s democracy is an open debate.

The literature on democracy is vast, and the differences of the definitions may be either painstakingly tiny, or diametrically opposite. In other words, while the

difference between the theoretical schools are huge, the difference within a theoretical school can be tiny to discern. Every contribution of the schools has historical roots, and their contributions are important. However, I think, the usage of a theory defines the real difference. While Schumpeter's minimalist approach is useful for quantitative studies, radical theories are more open to philosophical brainstorming. It is beyond the scope of this work to list every democratic theory for the reader. Nor shall I try to create a new understanding of democracy in theoretical basis.

Although, elections are the bare minimum of democracy, a democratic rule is more than just ballot-box. Many elected presidents of different nations often lead oppressive regimes in their countries. Vladimir Putin of Russia, or Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey have won every election in their political careers but their adherence to democratic values are highly questionable. Maybe the most notorious case in the history is Adolf Hitler of Germany. Moreover, oftentimes, as this study will focus, militaries steal a role from elected governments, and exert pressure over them. Although, many theories and theorists credit civilian control over military in a democratic regime, they fail to articulate the means of control. Radical democratic understanding might be the most inclusive theory in the literature, but it is almost inapplicable. When radical democracy is considered to evaluate democratic experiences, one might conclude that there is no democracy in the world after all. On the other hand, democracy as a consensus is way too vague, and I need more a concrete understanding of democracy to analyze democratization processes in Argentina and Turkey in terms of civil-military relations.

On the other side of the equation, civilian control over the military takes a big portion of the previous literature related to this study. Huntington and Janowitz are two pillars of the literature on civil-military relations. Their contributions and influences are significant and continual. However, both theorists and their theories are the products of a certain time-period of the world history, namely the cold war era. They see the world through the lenses of the cold war. Moreover, their theories are highly ethnocentric. They both take the US case as an explanatory and exemplary case, but there are many different establishments of democracy and the military in the world. Each society comes from a different historical background and contributes to the democratic literature. Every cultural context is worthy to be considered and to be examined. Besides, both Huntington and Janowitz come from different paths but suggest the same solution to the problematic, and their suggestions are vague. After all, public opinion has either no place or when it finds a place in their theories, it plays a passive role (Feaver 1996).

Feaver, on the other hand, gives credit to the military as an active agent, and recognizes the military officers as people who have prerogatives but he still misses public opinion. His conceptualization is quite limited and does not lead to a wide range of sociological analyses. Furthermore, as he is critical to his predecessors, his theory is also limited to the observations only in the US case (Feaver 1996, 2003:2; Schiff 2009:34). The classic civil-military relations literature tends to see military's role limited to external threats. However, oftentimes militaries tend to intervene domestic politics too (Stepan 1973, 1988). In many regions in the world, militaries continue influencing the internal political arena and acting in decision-making processes. It is safe to say that the military's role is not limited to external threats.

On the contrary, it has always been involved in domestic social interactions, and policing duties within the national borders tend to increase.

In his analysis of democratization processes in the new democracies, Huntington gives an elaborated description after coining the term “third wave”. Even though I find his analysis useful, I think it misses the details in different countries, and it is open to many interpretations. In other words, the analysis depends on the analyzer’s view. Moreover, I think his analysis helps to explain the mode of transition but fails to explain consolidation of democratic establishment. Thus, I will refer to his analysis in the explanation of transitions to democracy in my cases, but I will use Rebecca Schiff’s Concordance Theory of civil-military relations, and Scott Mainwaring’s political actor’s normative preference theory.

On the problems of new democracies to consolidate and institutionalize democratic establishment, there are several suggestions for different possible problems. Many of these theories are quite explanatory on paper but when it comes to face reality, reality invalidates the theory. Hence, I will challenge, or question the validity of, some of the aforementioned theories on the transformation and consolidation of democratic regimes.

Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, for example, posit that if a country, after shifting from an authoritarian rule to democracy, reaches a certain threshold with their GDP, it is highly unlikely that it would shift from democracy to an authoritarian regime (Przeworski and Limongi 1997).<sup>11</sup> Moving from Lipset’s now-classical work (1959), Przeworski and Limongi find out that democracy is a

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<sup>11</sup> Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi’s article covers non-oil GDPs in democratic countries.

self-sustaining regime. However, although the Argentinean case supports their claim, Turkey becomes a challenge to their theory. In contrast to classical modernization theory, Daron Acemoğlu and James Robinson posit that for the stability of economic development, the role of democratic institutionalization and rule of law is vital. Thus, according to them, the theoretical suggestions should not be formed after a regime change, but rather democracy must be the ultimate goal for a country. I will refer to modernization theories throughout this study when it is relevant.

On the other hand, Desch's argument is one sided. Besides, I see one of my case studies as an exception (Turkey). External threat perception has always been high in Turkey, yet the Turkish military never hesitated to intervene the politics. Likewise, during times of relatively peaceful internal environments the military often did not hesitate to intervene (for example the 1960 coup d'état). Moreover, as it was the case in Turkey, the military itself may create the disorder to justify its actions (e.g., 1980 coup d'état and 1997 military pressure on the civilian government).

In my analyses, I will employ several theories rooted in the literature, and apply them to my case studies. On the one hand, I will use Charles Tilly's conceptualization in this study. Moving from Robert Dahl's understanding of democratic rule, Tilly clearly categorizes democratic countries into four groups which are more applicable than Dahl's analysis. On the other hand, I will look at the undemocratic features of my case countries – namely Argentina and Turkey, like Schmitter and Karl offer. There are several reasons determining my preferences. Above all, it is not fair to expect Argentina and Turkey to establish an all-inclusive democracy within three or four decades. It is a long, meticulous, and oftentimes tiring process. As Robert



Dahl indicates, countries which have no experience of public contestation, political competition, tolerance, and no tradition of polyarchy are rather unlikely to turn into democracies (Dahl 1971:208). It takes, in some instances, generations to establish a polyarchical regime. Second, radical democracy theories depict a democratic utopia. I have reasonable doubts that any country in the world has a radical democratic rule. It may be a good dream but still a dream. Even in developed democratic countries, there are many obstacles for different interest groups and identities. Hence, it would be reasonable to utilize Tilly's categorization and make comparisons between two previously militarized countries.

While using Tilly's categorization for democratic rules in the world, I will also employ Schiff's concordance theory in order to analyze civil-military relations in both countries. Schiff's concordance theory does not ignore the role of the public, analyzes citizenry as an active agent, and gives credit to every agent in the equation. Moreover, concordance theory is open to sociological analytical possibilities as well.

Finally, in my analysis of post-military transition periods, I will use Fitch's conceptualization. His understanding of the democratization process is flexible, and he acknowledges the relativity of social contexts. However, I will challenge his understanding that suggests civilian control over military in a democratic regime leads to "democratic control". I will suggest that in some cases civilian control over military in a democratic regime may result in illiberal repercussions and a reduction of the quality of democratic rule. Although, the understanding of democratization processes of David Pion-Berlin is also

similar to Samuel Fitch's approach, I find Fitch's conceptualization more useful and clear.

In order to reach a comprehensive comparative analysis, while applying these approaches, I will still use and refer to other perspectives where I find necessary. Political culture, (democratic and military) institutions, institutionalization, and regional and global dynamics are also important factors in the development of civil-military relations and democracy (Smith 2012). Hence, I will refer to related perspectives in my analysis.

### *Limitations, Misinterpretations, and False-Generalizations in the Previous Literature*

Implications and counter arguments of modernization theory are important for the cases of this proposed thesis. Lipset's argument does not fit Turkey because Argentina and Turkey show similar economic performances. Yet, according to the Freedom House report in 2018, Argentina is in the democracy league and Turkey not (Abramowitz 2018). Freedom House classifies Argentina as a free country, but Turkey is considered a non-free country. Considering the fact that just one decade ago Turkey was considered a partly-free country, Turkey's democracy shows signs of deterioration (Abramowitz 2018:7).

The main concern of this proposed thesis is democratic development and establishment in Argentina and Turkey, but since both countries have a profound militarist history in politics, the thesis inevitably interacts with the civil-military relations as well. This thesis ultimately shows that civilian control over the military does not always lead to a democratic establishment. As the literature has already shown, civilian control over the military in the Soviet Union was exemplary. Yet, the

democratic nature of the state apparatus was highly questionable throughout the Soviet history.

In another account, Michael Desch posits that internal and external threat perceptions of a country determine the quality of civil-military relations. He basically equates that if there is a low internal threat but high external threat, the situation is ideal for civilians to control the ambitions of the military. According to Desch, the worst-case scenario for civilians is a high internal threat and low external threat in a country (Desch 1996, 1999). Michael Desch has convincing examples in his works, and a Turkish political scientist, Ezgi Elçi used both Huntington's and Desch's arguments to explain the differences between Argentina and Turkey in her master's thesis (Elçi 2014). She only investigates the civil-military relations in her thesis and does not put any scholarly attention to contemporary democratic establishment. However, I think Desch's equation does not fit, at least, Turkey's historical background.

Ezgi Elçi, in her thesis, argues that Turkey's PKK problem causes a high internal threat, and the end of Cold War signifies a low external threat for the country (Elçi 2014:3). In short, in Desch's terms, these two factors undermine civil-military relations, and unbalance the power equation on behalf of the military. However, when the Turkish military first intervened in the country's politics in 1960, the internal threat level was quite low and the Cold War was at its peak but these two facts did not stop the military from intervening in Turkey's democracy. If Desch only counts third wave democracies, still the facts for Turkey can be interpreted differently. Although, I agree with Desch on the importance of internal and international factors in civil-military relations, the argument is open to speculation,

and is highly interpretive. I think Ezgi Elçi falls into the 'confirmation bias' trap to justify her thesis based on Desch's argument. This study is not only a contribution to the literature on democracy and civil-military relations but also serves as a challenge to the previous literature. In this thesis, I will make a revision to Huntington's post military rule ideas by considering Schiff's concordance theory, with a specific emphasis on the role of the citizenry.

There is a vast literature on democracy, democratization, and civil-military relations related to Argentina and Turkey separately, but scholarly analyses from a comparative perspective are limited. However, when it comes to comparing democratic establishment or democratization processes in the two countries, the literature is even thinner. As I already mentioned above, Ezgi Elçi, a Turkish political scientist, covers civil-military relations in Argentina and Turkey in her master's thesis. Another Turkish political scientist, Aslı Postacı also compares civil-military relations in Argentina and Turkey by applying Schiff's concordance theory in her doctoral thesis (Postacı 2012). Nevertheless, both studies deal solely with civil-military relations in comparative perspective. Both authors say very little regarding the establishment and future of democracy in both countries. Furthermore, there is a gap in sociological investigations on both civil-military relations and democratization processes from the lens of cross-regional comparative analyses for both countries.

### Gaps in the Literature

Despite the fact that the military's position has always been a problematic for thinkers since Plato, military studies in social sciences are relatively new. David Pion-Berlin sorts contemporary paradigms of military analyses into three

categories: rationalist, structuralist, and culturalist approaches. (Pion-Berlin 2001:17). Every paradigm has strengths as well as weaknesses. Samuel Fitch (2001) criticizes military studies of being ignorant of theory, and heavily relying on case studies. There is a vast literature of theoretical suggestions for a student entering the scholarly area. However, since Fitch would be critical, I will not construct a brand-new theory over military studies. Rather, I will make a theoretical contribution to previous theories through my comparative analysis on Argentina and Turkey.

Argentina and Turkey are not random choices. Argentina, in Latin American context, is the most comparable case to Turkey. Of course, there are countless differences between the two, both major and minor but there are many similarities as well. Although the two nations are located entirely different geographical regions in the world, economic, cultural, democratic development of both nations are quite parallel. Military establishments and the influence of the militaries on the political arena and the societies show parallelism too. Both countries have similar militaristic backgrounds. In both Argentina and Turkey, militaries were historically praetorian institutions. Moreover, historically, there is a certain German effect on both countries' militaries<sup>12</sup> (Atkins and Thompson 1972; Zürcher 2010).

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<sup>12</sup> Turkish military was modernized by Germans before World War I in the late Ottoman Empire, and after the foundation of the republic German influence continued. Although Turkey never involved World War II, Germans and Turks were closely watching each other (Ihrig 2014). Today remnants of German influence in Turkish military can still be traced. On the other hand, Argentine military foundation was influenced by Germans too but after World War II, during 1960s, Argentine military was re-modeled under the French influence and after the last military junta in 1983 under the US influence. Moreover, President Juan Peron had close ties with Germans and many German war criminals fled to Argentina after the Second World War, and German influence among the ranks continued. Germans also made contributions to Argentinean defense industry until 1980s. These Nazi war criminals caused many diplomatic

However, after a 7 year-long military junta regime (between 1976 – 1983) in Argentina and military intervention between 1980 and 1983 in Turkey, the democratic experiences of both nations are quite different.

Cross-cultural analysis is very seminal and productive in understanding the essentials and roots of democratic transformation and civil-military relations. There is a vast comparative historical literature in social sciences in terms of civil-military relations. The literature of democracy within civil-military relations grows exponentially. Yet, the literature is based on “regionalism”. That is to say; scholars usually compare neighboring or regional countries which show similar historical, cultural, social conditions. Aside from some unpublished dissertations, there is no comprehensive scholarly attention to Middle Eastern and Latin American democratizations; let alone Turkey and Argentina specifically. Even the limited studies on Turkey and Argentina lack a focus on democracy or proper categorization of democratic development in both countries. To be clear, there is a vast literature on Turkey or Argentina separately but there is a lack of comparative perspective.

I will analyze democratic developments in Argentina and Turkey within the perspective of civil-military relations. This investigation is not merely upon democracy or the military. I intend to analyze historical developments of democratic and militaristic establishments in both countries under the consideration of contemporary transformations. My research question is “What defines the quality of democracy during and after the period of transition of power from a military rule to a democratic one?” This

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tensions. The most astonishing case is the abduction of Otto Adolf Eichmann by the Israeli secret service from Argentina to Israel. Famous Jewish-American philosopher Hannah Arendt wrote her well-known report based on Eichmann (see: Arendt 1994).

question necessarily leads to other sub-questions: 'What are the flaws of democratic establishments in both countries, if there are any?' 'How do militaries respond to democratic demands in contemporary social contexts?' 'Do civil-military relations change as postmodern, or contemporary, militaries change? If yes, how?' 'What are the possible hinderances to democracy in Turkey and Argentina?' These scholarly questions can be multiplied but more importantly, I will also focus on the citizenry. That is to say, the possible reactions of Turks and Argentineans to the changing roles of Turkish and Argentinean militaries in both countries. I think one of the determining factor of the democratic struggle in both countries is citizenry, and I will supply evidence to explain its role in the past and in the contemporary context.

While explaining the different democratic experiences in contemporary Argentina and Turkey, I will utilize previous theories in the literature I have described above. But, more importantly, I will take a critical stance towards some of the theoretical frames, and I will challenge some existing conclusions related to my case studies.





## CHAPTER IV

### **The development of Democracy in Argentina: 1810-1983**

Argentina's military has always been involved in politics, since the independence war from the Spanish Empire. The military has also consistently played a role in social change in the country, at times even defining the course of change in Argentinean modernization. Before analyzing contemporary civil-military relations and democratic establishment in Argentina and Turkey from a comparative perspective, I briefly present in this chapter: 1) the historical development of military's role in Argentina with a focus on civil-military relations, 2) the military's role within the society, and 3) the introduction of a competitive electoral regime in the country. Moreover, I will also occasionally refer to social fragmentation and to the development of citizenry in Argentina. Since there are many names, social and political formations, and dates throughout this chapter, to help the reader, there are some simple charts presented (page 89 and 116) to frame the main historical milestones in the creation of modern Argentina. This chapter covers the history of Argentina since its independence from the Spanish Empire until 1983, when the last military junta collapsed, and democratic order was re-established. This chapter aims to find an answer to the scholarly question, "what are the distinguishing features of Argentina's social and political context which affect the democratic experience?" In other words, what are the concerns that stir the ambition of the

armed forces of Argentina? The research strategy of this chapter is two-fold. First, I will identify the key actors and, second, diagnose and describe the repeated patterns of democratic collapse in this period (1916-1983). By doing so, I will be able to show the differentiating dynamics between Argentina's previous and contemporary democratic experiences but more importantly compare Argentina's democracy to Turkey's democratic order in the following chapters.

### **Independence from the Spanish Empire and State Formation: 1810-1880**

The modern history of Argentina is a story of an active citizenry which pursued its rights. The citizenry in Argentina became a self-actualized form of citizenship by fighting for its rights. Argentina was an important part of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata in the Spanish Empire, and Buenos Aires was the headquarter of the viceroy. The constant turmoil in Europe made the Spanish Empire weak and unresponsive to the demands of the people in its overseas territories. First of all, there was a kind of caste system between the '*peninsulares*'<sup>13</sup> (the ruling class of European origin) and *Criollos* (creoles)<sup>14</sup>, *Mestizos* (mixed

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<sup>13</sup> Peninsulares were the Spanish born Spaniards who were residing in the Spanish colonies during the colonial era. The term Peninsular comes from the Iberian Peninsula and refers to Peninsular Spain. Peninsulares, as a racial group, stayed at the top of the *casta* system (racial hierarchy) that was created by the Spanish Empire.

<sup>14</sup> In English, Creoles (in Spanish *Criollos*) were referred to as a mixed race during the European colonization era in the European overseas colonies (especially in the Americas). In English, creolization is a process of mixing the races. However, in Spanish *Criollo* had a different connotation. It is translated as Creole, but its meaning is a person of Spanish descent who was born in the colonies. The difference was important in the social structures of the Spanish colonies because the Spanish Empire ruled its colonies based on a unique *casta*

race), Indians, and other groups of people (Huser 2002:27). Often the peninsulares stayed indifferent to the needs of local people, focusing only on their career within the Spanish Empire. The demands by the Spanish empire of its colonies were great and continuous but the benefit to the colonies was small. Many times, the Spanish Empire went to war with different nations at the expense of its colonies (Brown 2010:63), and caused growing discontent in the Americas. The Spanish Empire frequently limited and prohibited trade with other countries because the Spanish Empire wanted to maintain its privileges, and take full advantage of its colonies (Brown 2010:64).

Ideas that came out of the American and French revolutions had a major impact on the independence wars in Latin American history (Elçi 2014:63–64). The ideas and ideals of the age of enlightenment inevitably reached the colonies, and the people demanded a change in their lives. The American revolution was exemplary for Latin American independence wars. Its leaders often stayed in touch with the leaders of the American revolution. The nationalistic ideals of the French Revolution were influential too, and the French Revolution certainly supplied intellectual ammunition to the liberators (Lynch 1985) but its results were much more effective in igniting the desire for self-rule by the Spanish Colonies in the Americas.

In Argentina, extravagant military campaigns by the Spanish Empire against its neighbors in Europe were the last straw that broke the camel's back for the local people in the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata. The indirect results of the French Revolution, Napoleon Bonaparte and the Napoleonic Wars, had direct results on the fate of Spanish colonies. In

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system (racial hierarchy – caste system) that they created and established. To avoid confusion, I will keep using the Spanish term *Criollos* in my writings.

1806, during the Anglo-Spanish wars<sup>15</sup>, the British Empire tried to invade Buenos Aires. Napoleon imposed a trade blockade on the British Empire, against which he was campaigning. Britain's supply chain was broken, and the empire needed of goods to maintain its productivity and so sought a collaboration with the colonies of the Spanish Empire in the Americas. However, the Spanish Empire was also at war with the British Empire. Besides, the Spanish Empire held the monopoly as the sole trading partner of its colonies. (Brown 2010:80–82).

In the meantime, the social structure in the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata was fluctuating. After centuries of European settlements, a mixed-race caste called mestizos who were of both Spanish and native American decent, was formed in the region. There was a growing tension between *Peninsulares*, *Criollos* (Creoles), and Mestizos. The position of the *Criollos* was unique. Even though they had the same privileges as the *Peninsulares*, and basically were considered Spaniards, they thought that the *Peninsulares* had undue weight in the decision-making processes.<sup>16</sup> *Peninsulares* did not want to share their power.

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<sup>15</sup> A series of naval and army campaigns between the British Empire and the Spanish Empire first fought between 1796 and 1802, then between 1804 and 1808 but this time as part of the Napoleonic Wars. In the later stages of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain and the Spanish Empire formed an alliance.

<sup>16</sup> The racial structure in the Spanish colonies had different competing layers. *Peninsulares* (whites, Europeans, Spanish born people) were placed at the top, and often enjoyed the privileges of their positions. *Criollos* (Creole people) were near the top place and had several privileges too but the ultimate decision-makers were *peninsulares*. Mestizos were the mixed race, and by the time the independence war erupted, they were the biggest racial group in the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata. They consisted of the lower level of the Spanish *casta* system (racial hierarchy) in the colonies. There were several other racial groups in the Spanish colonies in the Americas (such as mulattos, *Pardos*, *Indios*, and *Negros*) but *peninsulares*, *Criollos*, and mestizos were the main bodies of social life. *Indios* usually lived in the rural parts of the region, and when they came to the main cities they were treated as a low class. Slavery was a fact in the

In contrast, Mestizos could not break into business circles. Even new immigrants from Europe (mostly from the Iberian Peninsula) who had humble origins enjoyed more privilege than the Mestizos (Brown 2010:64; Hedges 2011:viii).

Little had changed for the people after Argentina gained its independence from the Spanish Empire. The independence movement was split into two groups (Unitarians and Federalists) and a long series of civil wars erupted in the country between 1810 and 1880. During these civil wars the Patagonian region was conquered by the Argentinean Army where the prosperity of the country originated during late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century. *Latifundistas*<sup>17</sup> (big farmers and landowners) benefited the most from the new conquests, and the rural provinces finally put an end to the domination of Buenos Aires province, which had the only access to marine trade in Argentina at the time. The elites of Buenos Aires province did not want to give up their privileges and declared independence from mainland Argentina, but other provinces united against

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Spanish colonies but usually involving the Indian population as slaves rather using those brought through the Atlantic Slave Trade. Slaves from Africa were more common in the Viceroyalty of New Granada (today's Colombia, Panama, Venezuela, and Ecuador) than in the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata during the Spanish rule in the Americas.

<sup>17</sup> A *Latifundia* is a large piece of land that belongs to a single owner (individual or family). The term originated in ancient Rome. Historically, mainly aristocrats and/or upper class had *latifundium* in the empire. In the case of Latin America, *latifundia* has different forms in different contexts. In Colombia, for example, the famous *haciendas* (big farms) are prevalent. In the context of Argentina, *latifundistas* were the traditional big landowners who originated in the Spanish colonial era. The families had big farmhouses (*estancias*) surrounded by the vast lands again belonging to the family. These families were the backbone of t(agrarian) production, and the source of the nation's wealth in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. With the growing industrialism, mass immigration, and constitutional democracy, their wealth and influence in the country gradually eroded. They were the main source of the conservative movements in Argentina's politics, and remnants of their influence in the country can still be seen in the rural provinces.

Buenos Aires. With the defeat of Buenos Aires province, modern Argentina emerged in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

**Conservative Domination and Dictatorship in Argentina:  
1880-1916**

The military was the dominant power after unification of the country. In collaborations with the big farmers and landowners (*Latifundistas*), military generals ascended to power between 1880 and 1916. Even though there was a parliament, Argentina was not a democracy but rather a semi-authoritarian regime. Presidents were elected by the parliament, but these presidential elections were not based on universal suffrage nor on competitive elections among parties but took place in the congress. Even the constitution of the congress was not based on general elections but rather was a closed system open only to elites (MacLachlan 2006:26–27). There was a popular demand for competitive general elections with universal male suffrage throughout this authoritarian regime. This period was defined by power struggles between the conservative elites and progressives (socialists, liberals, radicals, etc.) to whom I shall refer later.

During the period of authoritarian conservative domination in politics, Argentina experienced gradual unification and nation building, and industrialization in farming and agricultural business. Nevertheless, industrialization remained limited to agriculture and farming, and did not include heavy industrialization. This was mainly due to conservative pressure and domination in economy and politics. *Latifundistas* wanted to keep their influence in the country. With the industrialization of agriculture and farming, the economy benefited from a foreign investment level that became the highest among all

Latin American economies (Akdağ 2006:63–64). Argentina in this period was one of the wealthiest nations in the world. The country attracted many immigrants from all over the world, especially from Italy.<sup>18</sup>

The growing size of the cities, due to immigration and urbanization, caused discontent with the conservative hegemony in the country. Workers had no rights, and the people had no influence to make favorable adjustments in politics. Moreover, there was a faction within the conservative one-party regime (*Partido Autonomista Nacional/PAN* – National Autonomist Party/NAP) due to the effects of the long-term global economic recession (Long Depression) between 1873-1879.<sup>19</sup> Argentina was one of the least affected countries by the price depression but still its effects halted the rapid economic growth. Additionally, the government started secular, free and universal education efforts in this period with the aim of nation building; but these efforts were countered with opposition from the Catholic Church which has always been a dominant institution in the country. The Catholic Church's position within the society has always been problematic. Although the country follows a secular path in politics, governments occasionally appeal to the church for popular support (Rock 1975:5).

Towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, social movements that opposed the conservative hegemony became visible. Many social organizations -- opposition

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<sup>18</sup> Italian immigration flow with considerable sizes started around the 1850s and lasted until the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century. Due to Italian immigration to Argentina, after Spain, Italy became culturally influential in the country, and this influence has occasionally been political, which I refer to in the following pages.

<sup>19</sup> Following the American Civil War, beginning in 1873, there was a worldwide economic recession called the Long Depression. It affected mainly Europe and the United States but was felt in other regions. It led to worker movements, strikes, and protectionist economy policies in the world.

unions and parties, revolutionary movements, and protests - emerged and became prevalent throughout the country forcing the conservative governments to make reforms in politics, the economy, and social rights (Rock 1975:25-26). But many of these protests ended in bloodbaths with brutal suppressions by the governments (MacLachlan 2006:71-72). Nevertheless, these social movements and changes eventually led to a democratic shift in the country. Yet, this power struggle between the conservative oligarchy and emerging urban industrial pro-democracy groups continued unabated in Argentinean politics (Akdağ 2006).

### 1916 Democratic Shift in Argentina

The role of citizenry in developing a competitive electoral regime (democracy) is often disregarded in the literature (Kadivar 2018). In Argentina, the citizenry was not only active in gaining independence but also was active in developing a competitive electoral regime. However, political actors failed to consolidate the new regime (Levitsky and Murillo 2005a:22) because of a lack of normative preference for democracy among key actors (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013:124). As I explained above, Argentina's politics was dominated by conservative authoritarian oligarchic governments in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> and at the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. In response, a socialist opposition movement, called *Union Civica* (Civic Union), emerged demanding universal male suffrage and a competitive electoral regime initially led by Bartolome Mitre, former president of the country (during 1860s). However, this union soon dissolved after a failed attempt to force the conservative president Miguel Juarez Celman to accept reform demands. The incident is called *Revolucion del Parque* (Revolution of the Park). Although the attempt failed to bring an elected regime to the country, it led the president to



resign. The uprising was suppressed by the governmental forces, and the Civic Union (*Union Civica*) split. The original Civic Union was dissolved but another union called *Union Civica Radical* (UCR -Radical Civic Union/RCU, simply Radicals<sup>20</sup>) was formed by Leandro Alem and his nephew Hipolito Yrigoyen along with numerous opposition groups, with a stress on socialist agenda (MacLachlan 2006:72–73).

Radical uprisings during the 1890s and early 1900s gradually undermined the corrupt conservative oligarchic regime (Rock 1975:27). The radical uprisings were violent, and oftentimes arms were used by both the opposition to topple the government and the government to suppress the opposition. The first uprising called the Radical Revolution happened in 1893 but it was brutally suppressed by the government and the uprising failed. After the failure of the 1893 Radical Revolution's attempt to challenge the traditional authoritarian oligarchic regime, Leandro Alem committed suicide, and his nephew, Yrigoyen, who was a lawyer, became the face of the movement which soon turned into a political party. In 1905, the Radicals attempted a revolution once again this time under the leadership of Hipolito Yrigoyen (Brown 2010:141; MacLachlan 2006:74). 1905 civil unrests, a series of mass demonstrations, often turned into armed conflicts between the government and the protesting groups. Protesters and the social movements came together from different backgrounds ranging from far left to liberal ideologies. Reforms on the working conditions, electoral demands for a competitive regime, and universal male suffrage were the main themes of the demonstrations.

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<sup>20</sup> Although it seems outdated today, universal male suffrage was a radical demand at the time in the country. The name of the union comes from their then radical ideas and demands. The party formed the first democratically elected government in Argentina. The UCR is now one of the oldest political parties in the country.

The first demonstrations started in February 1905 and continued sporadically throughout the year in the country, especially in Buenos Aires, the capital. The conservative response to the protests was brutal; the government crushed the protests with force, at the expense of many lives of its citizens. Thousands of people were arrested, a state of emergency was proclaimed, and the army suppressed protests in the country (Hedges 2011:34–35; MacLachlan 2006:48).

The citizenry was highly active, and eventually forced the oligarchy to accept a democratic shift in politics. The 1905 revolutionary movements were one of the most widespread, violent, and important rebellions in Argentine history, with several consequences. On the protesters' side, after the brutal crushing of the movements in different regions, the opposition underwent a transformation, changing its strategy from violent armed rebellions to a more pacifist, compromising position (Potash 1969:9). On the other hand, the government took a conciliatory position too. With the fear of a social revolution, the NAP (the conservative party) leaders eventually recognized the popular demands, and the congress passed the Saenz Peña Law (due to the support of the president Saenz Peña) which in 1912 enabled the male population to vote in free competitive elections. There was a faction in the military favoring the popular demands towards an electoral regime (Potash 1969:9–10), and the conservative government thought it was wiser to pave the way towards a peaceful transformation of the regime. In the following elections, in 1916, the RCU (Radicals) won but could not get the majority of the seats in the parliament (Rock 1975:96). The conservatives were still powerful but popular demand was growing.

For the first time in Argentinean history, the military, political elites, and the citizenry reached a limited concordance in terms of the electoral competitive regime in this era. The head of the army and navy was the same general prior to Yrigoyen's election (Rock 1975:95), but the units were separated and given separate leadership under Yrigoyen's presidency. Although female citizens and immigrants were excluded from the election processes, the general elections in 1916 were fairly free and secure. Moreover, Yrigoyen favored workers' rights; at least in the early days of his presidency. However, this promising start deteriorated in the following years.

Yrigoyen's first years were fairly promising. Although there was a conservative resistance, the Radical government achieved several reform packages concerning worker's rights, university reforms, and industrialization. However, Yrigoyen had little influence in either the senate or in the provinces controlled by the opposition. In fact, the senate members were appointed by the provincial legislatures, most of which were controlled by the conservatives. Thus, as the president, Yrigoyen often used his presidential provisions which later enable the radical presidents (including Yrigoyen himself, especially in his second term between 1928-1930) to consolidate power, becoming gradually authoritarian (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013:129).

A set of events seriously weakened the limited concordance on democracy (between the citizenry, the military and the political elites). Yrigoyen gradually became authoritarian, and the military started becoming involved in suppressing social movements. During his presidency between 1916 and 1922, Yrigoyen managed to avoid the turmoil of the First World War but could not prevent

international events from affecting the country. Inspired by the October Revolution in the Russian Empire, the Argentinean socialist left and some anarchist<sup>21</sup> groups incited protests in the country. Anarchist groups had been active in Argentina in the early years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and had tried to assassinate the president Victorino de la Plaza in 1916, just before the elections (Rock 1975:39). After the democratic transition, anarchist and socialist groups did not stop pursuing their agendas in the country. During the presidency of Hipolito Yrigoyen, especially after the October Revolution in Russia, there were violent strikes across Argentina. In January 1919, a conflict emerged between leftist groups and troops that were ordered by the government to ease the protests. The clash was unexpectedly long and brutal. In one week, hundreds of people from both sides were killed, thousands of people were left injured, martial laws were launched by the government, and many people were arrested (Hedges 2011:38–39). The event was dubbed the *Semana Tragica* (Tragic Week),<sup>22</sup> and marked a turning point in Yrigoyen's presidency. He was not directly responsible for ordering brutal measures in the suppression of the social movements, but he condoned the violence, and did not pursue investigations of military officials after the clashes.

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<sup>21</sup> Although having a definite/well-theorized philosophical background, 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century anarchism had a tendency towards violence all over the world. Bombings of governmental buildings, kidnapping and even assassinating public figures were signature practices of anarchist individuals and groups, not only in Argentina but also other regions around the world.

<sup>22</sup> Not to be confused with Radical Party uprisings in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Although Radical Party components include socialist movements, the Radical Party is a centrist party, and the main demand was an electoral regime with universal male suffrage which was considered 'radical' at the time, and the name of the movement got its name from its 'radical' stance in Argentinean politics. The civil unrests in 1918 and in 1919 were more related to far left and anarchist movements.

In the following year (1920), workers in Patagonia went on general strikes commonly referred to as *Patagonia Rebelde* (Rebel Patagonia). In fact, many participants were Chilean workers, whose own strike was violently suppressed by the Chilean authorities, and who had sought refuge in Argentinean Patagonia. The main cause of the strikes was the dramatic drop in the prices of agricultural products which were the backbone of both economies until the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Rock 1975:202). President Yrigoyen deployed a regiment to the region and ordered an end to the strikes. The military's action was violent. With several rounds of strikes between 1920 and 1922, the military declared a state of emergency. First, workers were besieged and then soldiers shot the striking workers in one of the most tragic massacres in Argentine history (Hedges 2011:39). The death toll was about 1,500. The number of the wounded yet to be known.

Despite the widespread civil unrest and Yrigoyen's growing authoritarianism, the RCU (Radicals) was still popular in the country, and in the 1922 general elections Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear, the designated successor of Yrigoyen by himself, won the elections with a landslide victory over the conservative party. During Alvear's presidency the country's economy showed a positive performance with the growing industrialism in the country. Traditionally, Argentina's economy depended on agriculture and farming (Postaci 2012:11). The country was one of the most important meat exporting countries at the time, and among the wealthiest countries until the Great Depression. However, dependence on agriculture and farming had political consequences that I shall mention later in this chapter. Briefly, large rural landholders had a great

influence in politics.<sup>23</sup> Modernization efforts in the country date back to the early 19<sup>th</sup> century as I explained earlier in this chapter. However, the country had trouble matching Western states in terms of industrialization. Lack of full industrialization affected agriculture production. With the mechanization, it was possible to grow more products with less expense, but the country still depended on imported manufactured goods. Thus, the wealth created in the country was flowing to industrialized Western countries.

Rapid urbanization in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century also caused problems. Traditionally Argentina had been a vast land with a small population, which continues today with a population of about fifty million, making it one of the less populated countries in the world considering the size of the country. Historically, the population in the rural areas was occupied with agricultural production. With the industrial revolution in Europe, Argentina's demographic make-up started changing. There was a new wave of migration from Europe to Argentina. Since the country was among the wealthiest, it was a popular destination for immigrants, especially Italians who were looking for new opportunities. With the new waves of immigration, there was a population boom in the country. In 1914, more than half of the workers in Buenos Aires were foreign born (Rock 1975:68–69). Moreover, urbanization of the Argentinean-born citizens also skyrocketed but the job market was overcrowded with an insufficient number of jobs in the cities. Unemployment rates became higher in the early decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Working conditions were poor, and the workers did not have enough rights to protect their interests against employers and the government's policies.

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<sup>23</sup> Even in contemporary politics, aristocratic families from provinces and rural areas still control their own territories, and even though they cannot determine politics, they are still influential in it.

The Radical Party governments were aware of the unsustainability of this economic inequality. Radical Party (RCU) governments started transforming the economy by extending economic productivity to other areas to create new jobs, and by investing in heavy industry. This policy change concerning economic productivity worked for more than a decade but the Great Depression suppressed Argentina's economy (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013:161) and the country lost its place among the most wealthy nations in the world. Even while the economy improved prior to the Great Depression, with the increasing fascist tendencies in Europe (especially in Spain and Italy), Argentinean governments became hesitant to pursue better working conditions and workers' rights. In fact, during Alvear's presidency between 1922-1928, the president reversed some of his predecessor's reforms in terms of social rights on behalf of the working class (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013:130; Rock 1975:221-22).

Due to close ties with the European countries (especially Italy and Spain), every development in the old continent was closely observed by the Argentinean people. As I already indicated above, during Yrigoyen's presidency, several instances of civil unrest erupted in the country, and the president condoned brutal suppression of the military to the protests. Although, the protests in 1918 and in 1919 were violent, the government's response was brutal and inhumane. Alvear's term made no difference in crushing public unrests. The president's excessive use of power in suppressing strikes and public demonstrations enabled the military to become more independent from the civilian governments (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013:130). Hipolito Yrigoyen, in his second presidential term starting in 1928, saw the problem and started appointing his trusted officials to the military ranks. However, this attitude eventually led to a backlash due to highly politicized

promotions within the ranks. This politicization generated fragmentation and the disintegration of professionalism within the military, which eventually led to the military intervention in 1930 (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013:132). The limited concordance on democracy was broken, and decades of military interventions started.

### **1930 Military Intervention and Infamous Decade (Decada Infame): 1930-1943**

With the 1930 military intervention, the limited concordance on democracy -- as I suggest in this study -- was broken in Argentine politics. The base of a democratic regime, electoral security, was diminished during the 1930s--called *Decada Infame* (Infamous Decade)--due to electoral frauds (Brown 2010:189). Several factors played significant roles in the 1930 Military intervention. Radical Party presidents' use of presidential provisions to by-pass the parliament in order to execute policies, and impose federal interventions in the provinces, enabled them to gradually increase their authoritarian control but also caused widespread discontent in the country, especially among conservatives (O'Donnell 1973:9). Authoritarianism was on the rise all over the world, making the international political atmosphere favorable for a military intervention. Traditional powers fell to authoritarian regimes one-by-one during 1920s. Turkey was under the control of a semi-military one-party regime, Russia became a totalitarian regime under Soviet rule with Stalin's one man show, Germany was in turmoil after the treaty of Versailles. However, because of the traditional ties of the country with Italy and Spain, the most influential countries in Argentine politics were Italy's fascist dictatorship and Spain's military regime under the leadership of General Miguel Primo de Rivera (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013:132; Postacı 2012:118).



**Table 4: List of Military Coups, Interventions, and Insurgencies in Argentina, 1930-1990**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Nature</b>	<b>Leader(s)</b>	<b>Engagement</b>	<b>Result</b>
1930	Direct military coup d'état	General Jose Felix Uriburu	Unspecified but authoritarian - fascist	Successful
1943	Direct military coup d'état	General Pedro Pablo Ramirez	Progressive – with popular support	Successful
1951	Military mutiny	General Benjamin Andes Menendez	Anti-Peronist	Failed – but the mutiny delayed Eva Peron's political ambitions
June 16, 1955 (Aerial and Naval Bombings of Plaza de Mayo)	Magnicide by bombing civilians who support president Juan Peron	Multiple Navy and Air Force commanders	Anti-Peronist military insurgency	Failed – The coup suppressed
September 16 – 23, 1955	Direct military coup d'état	General Eduardo Lonardi	Anti-Peronist	Successful – President Juan Peron was toppled and sent to exile in Spain
1962	Military intervention	Within chain of command	Unspecified (concerned with economic instability in the country – possible anti-communist sentiment)	Successful – The military replaced leftist president with handpicked Jose Maria Guido
1966-1973	Direct military takeover	General Juan Carlos Ongania	Fascist military dictatorship – Nationalist ideology with a strong anti-communist sentiment	Successful – The military establish a military dictatorship (Argentine Revolution)

1976-1983	Direct military takeover	General Jorge R. Videla General Roberto Viola General Leopoldo Galtieri	Fascist military dictatorship – Nationalist ideology with a strong anti-communist sentiment	Successful – The military re-establish military dictatorship (National Reorganization Process – El Proceso)
April 15, 1987 – January, 1988 – December, 1988 – December 3, 1990 (four times)	Military mutiny	Death squad called Carapintadas (painted faces) first Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico then Colonel Mohamed Ali Seineldin	Ideologically nonaligned conservative movement within the military demanding justice for junior staff after El Proceso	Failed – the mutineers were expelled from the military, leaders were arrested

Moreover, Hipolito Yrigoyen's presidency was shaken by a severe economic crisis precipitated by the Great Depression in the US. The Radical Party's electoral hegemony against the conservatives forced opposition groups to appeal to, cooperate with, and use the military as leverage. As is shown above in Table 4, in 1930, a military coup d'état led by General Jose Felix Uriburu took place, and President Hipolito Yrigoyen was ousted. The military intervention favored and was supported by the Argentine Rural Society (*La Sociedad Rural Argentina* – rural conservatives in the country)<sup>24</sup> (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013:131). General Uriburu ruled the country for two

<sup>24</sup> *La Sociedad Rural Argentina* (Argentine Rural Society) is one of the largest and oldest employers' association founded in 1866. The Society still organizes one of the biggest agricultural and farming fairs, *La Rural* (full name *La Exposicion Rural* – The Rural Exhibition) in Argentina. The society is also traditionally influential in politics with a conservative stance. It has an infamous history of backing authoritarian military regimes.

years and handed power to the elected Agustin Pedro Justo government. However, the elections were controversial for many people, and electoral fraud perpetrated by the conservatives with the condoning attitude of the military was common in the elections in this era, and governments lacked legitimacy because of common distrust to the elections and electoral system (Potash 1969:88).

As I mentioned earlier, Argentina was one of the wealthiest country in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and at the very beginning of the Infamous Decade (*Decada Infame*), it was still among the most developed countries in the world (Akdağ 2006:50). However, Argentina gradually lost its position in the global markets because of economic crises, political scandals, lack of transformation and adaptation to the new characteristics of the national, regional, and global markets. Shrinkage of regional and global markets due to the Great Depression, and later World War II added fuel to the fire.

During the presidency of Agustin Pedro Justo (1932-1938), the country experienced trade isolationism via import substitution (Akdağ 2006:57). The phenomenon was not limited to Argentina with many countries taking similar precautions. Economic policies in Argentina became more interventionist than liberal, and the main aim was to render the markets under state supervision. International involvement in the country's economic activities was becoming unwelcome, and the government started nationalizing some private manufacturing industries. The Central Bank of Argentina tried to keep up with the prices of the national currency (Argentinean Peso), and to regulate interest rates in the markets. However, interest rates and the value of peso were not entirely subject to the rules of the free market. Even the prices of the products were controlled by

the state. If there was overproduction of any product (agricultural and/or industrial), the export surpluses (such as wine, corn, cotton, textile products) were collected by the state agencies (*Juntas Reguladores Nacionales* – National Regulatory Juntas) and destroyed (Smith 1989:23).

Economic instability, from the Great Depression and its aftermath, hit the working class the hardest. Employment rates were low, wages were not enough, and working conditions were disastrous (Hedges 2011:44–45). Moreover, the government wanted to reduce wages to lower rates under the name of economic progress. Continuing consecutive austerity measures made the working class anxious and restless. Hence, several violent and bloody strikes occurred in this period.

In 1938, general elections took place, and president Justo peacefully handed the post to his successor Roberto Marcelino Ortiz, which is a rare event in Argentina in the pre-1983 political era. However, the elections were again controversial. Roberto Marcelino Ortiz was from the same conservative political party, *Concordancia*,<sup>25</sup> as his predecessor. After Ortiz came to the power, World War II erupted. Although Argentina did not become involved in the war, the war had dire effects on its economy (Smith 1989:24). The main clients of Argentina's economy were at war, and economic growth was still low ten years after the Great Depression. Moreover, many people fled the war in Europe to Argentina in hopes of finding shelter, and economic opportunities.

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<sup>25</sup> *Concordancia* was a conservative political alliance in Argentina backed by the 1930 military junta. The party was found in 1931 by General Uriburu (then head of the military junta and the president) and Agustin Pedro Justo (later the president) fraudulently won three consecutive general elections between 1932 and 1943. The alliance was disposed of after the 1943 military intervention.

President Ortiz became ill, and his running mate, Vice President Ramon Castillo, began serving as the acting president in the absence of president elect Ortiz. With his death, Castillo became the interim president. He managed to keep the country neutral during WW-II, but the promises of the 1930 military junta and conservative governments were failing. There were no signs of economic development. On the contrary, clientelism, cronyism, and corruption became characteristic of the Argentinean economy (Potash 1969:197). Cities were becoming larger due to the rural exodus, which suppressed wages. The working classes were unhappy with daily strikes happening in the capital. The country lost its position among the wealthiest nations in the world. Under these circumstances, on June 4, 1943, a left-leaning junta opposed to corruption intervened in politics claiming electoral fraud in all elections during the *Decada Infame* (Infamous Decade) (Smith 1989:26).

### *Ascent of Juan Peron and Peronism in Argentina*

Once again, the citizenry played an important role in the emergence of the second wave of democratization in Argentina in 1945. Rebecca L. Schiff (2009:94) argues that since Juan Domingo Peron had a military background and was part of the military junta and military-backed governments throughout *Decada Infame* (Infamous Decade), he was able to convince conservative political elites and military cadres to form a concordance in civil-military relations during his presidency between 1945 and 1955. This argument is partly true; Peron was a charismatic leader, but he ascended to the presidency with the public support on the streets. It was the citizenry which forced the conservative coalition to step back.

Peron is one of the most influential political figures in Argentina's history. His ideology and populism are still prevalent within both right- and left- wing political circles in the country. He started his career as a military officer, and soon became a seasoned soldier. During his military career (1913-1945), he had the opportunity to visit Europe to study guerilla and mountain warfare in the Italian Alps. While in Italy, he observed the totalitarian governmental styles then prevalent throughout Europe (Germany, Italy, Portugal, Russia, Spain, and Turkey). As well, he witnessed the early stages of the World War II before his return to Argentina in 1941 (Hedges 2011:65–66).

Juan Peron was a colonel in Argentine military at the time of the 1943 military coup d'état (the second coup of the 20<sup>th</sup> century) against conservative president Ramon Castillo. Peron participated in the military intervention and became the minister of labor in the cabinet. This was the first assignment in his political career. While he was a minister of labor, he met with several socialist groups, labor union leaders, and representatives of social movements to decide and frame labor reforms. While Peron was in the post, he had an understanding with *cabecitas negras* (literally "black heads" – lower, worker classes).<sup>26</sup> He prepared several enactments in the favor of working classes (Schiff 2009:92). He favored union rights and tried to protect the working class from chronic inflation.

These moves made him favorable in the eyes of the public. However, his legislative decisions did not please the

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<sup>26</sup> The term *cabecita negra* (black head) is a contemptuous, if not racist, naming to the social stratum of the poor. In general, it is used for the middle and lower classes in Buenos Aires, but the usage can be expanded. The term indicates a social stratification between *porteños* (people from Buenos Aires) and rural people, European immigrants and indigenous people, upper class and lower class (and today between Peronists and anti-Peronists).

conservatives, *latifundistas*, and the wealthy bourgeoisie in the country, especially the *porteños* (people from Buenos Aires). His provisions in collective bargaining -- lowering the working hours, and enacting unionist policies in favor of the working class -- made him very popular, so much so that the military government forced him to resign. By then, he had already started publicly criticizing the conservative opposition to his reforms. On September 18, 1945, he gave one of his most famous speeches in which he severely criticized his rivals both in the military government and among the business circles.

This move displeased the generals in the junta government who activated Peron's opposition. Soon after the speech, he was detained for four days by the military (Akdağ 2006:48–49). Nevertheless, failed enactments caused a growing public support favoring Peron. His most fierce supporters were the *cabecitas negras* (black heads). They campaigned for him in order to force the military government to include Peron in the cabinet. Several huge marches organized in the capital. His partner, then second wife, Eva Duarte was one of the main organizers of the demonstrations with the demand of freeing Juan Peron from his short-term detainment and pursuing his enactments.

These huge, large scale protests in 1945-1946 organized by *descamisados* (shirtless people)<sup>27</sup> signifies a turning point in Argentina's political history. This movement was one of the biggest social movements in the country, which gave birth to Peronism. People's demands forced the military government to free Juan Peron, and to

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<sup>27</sup> Like *cabecitas negras* (black heads), *descamisados* (shirtless people) is a derogatory name for the lower-class people. The label originates from the protesters' shirtless stance due to the hot weather conditions during the protests. Both *cabecitas negras* and *descamisados* refer to the same group of people.

agree to re-establish the democratic regime. In the next year, the military government accepted competitive free elections in the country. Not surprisingly, Peron and his Labor Party (*Partido Laborista*) won the elections. Peron's succession to the power signifies a mode of concordance in civil-military relations in Argentina (R. L. Schiff 2009:91). With the widespread support of the citizenry, Peron – as a former military-man and a minister in the 1943 junta government – convinced the military to stay out of politics. In the same way, his early years in power can be seen as concordance in a democratic regime but again a limited one because there was a faction both in the society and in the military opposing Peron.

After his succession to the presidency, Peron formed his own party, the Justicialist Party (*Partido Justicialista*) with his wife Eva Peron in 1946. Peron immediately started reshaping the political structure in the country by creating his own bureaucracy within the state (Elçi 2014:75). By appointing loyal bureaucrats to important posts (especially to the supreme court), he tried to secure his government. Peron had the majority in the parliament with 52% of the votes, and he used his influence to prevent the supreme court hindering his political agenda. The party became a tool for his political ambitions. In 1948, Peron changed the constitution allowing him to run in consecutive elections.

Peronist ideology was shaped around three distinctive traits: social justice, economic freedom, and political independence (Postacı 2012:123). Peron promised a strong and independent Argentina. By economic and political independence, he not only implied a developed country but also a country that can pursue independent economic policies. Hence, he implemented statist, interventionist, import subsidized economic policies.



Moreover, he conceptualized his ideas on social justice under *justicialismo* (justicialism) (Hedges 2011:129). Justicialism was an eclectic ideology. He did not prioritize the interests of one social class as socialism suggests but he also rejected capitalist individualism. Although the concept stresses the unity of the people (as a nation), it was flexible too. This flexibility opened a broad radius of action in Argentine politics.

Many scholars (Postaci 2012:124; Romero 2002:93) point out that his experience in Italy made him see democracy as a flawed form of government, and Peronist ideology received influences from contemporary Latin American political regimes (Hedges 2011:86). This important distinction supports the main argument of this chapter, that the second wave of democratization was also based, at best, on limited concordance. As a result, democracy was not an ultimate goal but a mere tool to gain power. Thus, Peron followed strong populist policies. He was re-elected in the 1951 general elections in which universal female suffrage was granted for the first time in Argentina's history (MacLachlan 2006:118). Peron proposed having his wife, Eva Peron, as his running mate. But conservative units in the Argentine military opposed to Peron attempted a coup d'état on September 28, 1951 days after the elections (see Table 4 in page 87). Although the military mutiny was suppressed, the ailing first lady had to drop her political ambitions<sup>28</sup> (Hedges 2011:145; MacLachlan 2006:119). This turbulence clearly shows that, at the time, the

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<sup>28</sup> To avoid confusion, I say that the first lady, Eva Peron, already renounced the invitation of being the running mate of her husband, Juan Peron, by the people due to her health problems and the pressure from the military. With the military mutiny following the elections, her future political career was over. Also, due to her increasing public charm, Juan Peron was uncomfortable with her assuming greater authority.

military was not ready to accept the consequences of democratic procedures.

Peron's second term in the presidency lasted until the 1955 military coup (nine years in total). Peron gradually became authoritarian, controlling every institution in the country. In Peron's early years, his economic policies were relatively successful. It was important for him to promote Argentinean heavy industry. The government helped entrepreneurs open new factories in different economic sectors but the state itself was the biggest investor. Peron wanted to keep control of the economic activities in the country. With charity organizations, the Perons gained the attachment, approval, and legitimation of the masses in the country (Romero 2002:106).

However, Peron ignored the agricultural sector, which was once internationally recognized, and was a source of wealth for the country. *Estancias* (private landholdings) started crumbling. Due to few benefits geared toward the agricultural sector in Peron's term, landowners closed their plantations/farms, and gravitated towards manufacturing industry. However, import subsidized policies failed and rapid inflation threatened the country's economy. The country's domestic market was limited to feeding the masses. To keep his hold on power, Peron needed to control the bourgeoisie. Many private means of production, factories, and lands were expropriated, and the government started running businesses in many sectors. During his first term, public investments increased 67% but due to economic instability and inflation, the percentage of public investments dramatically dropped to only 2% in Peron's second term (Lewis 1990:199).

Due to the economic failure, Peron and his party began losing popular support. Working class and

*descamisados* (shirtless people) become impatient with his promises. This time Peron's former supporters started protesting against Peron himself. Traditional bourgeoisie and *latifundistas* (big landowners) turned away and encouraged a military intervention. Cadres of Peronist personnel within the state distanced themselves from Peron and the Justicialist Party. Peron's response to the opposition was to increase authoritarianism (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013:136). Moreover, Peron's interventions in the economy backfired. A rapid increase in the wages of the working classes only caused skyrocketing inflation. It was a vicious circle for Argentina's economy. On the one hand, private manufacturing had to stop at some point due to economic instability and rapid inflation. On the other hand, public investment was a burden on state funds.

Peron's international policies and diplomatic ties were also problematic. His ideas were based on nationalism and populism, as already discussed above. Peron's corporate nationalism created a pale shadow of fascism (or at least European authoritarianism) in Latin America. Although his attitudes towards minority groups, but especially toward Jewish people, were often welcoming, his government sheltered Nazi criminals in Argentina (Cwik 2009), which ultimately lost him international support.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> It should be noted that Peron came to the power after World War II, and the international political atmosphere had a big impact on his tenure in the presidency. Peron's close ties with the Axis Powers, his corporatist ideas, and his authoritarian attitude under the Cold War conditions made him lose his international sympathy and support. To be fair, he supported the Jewish community in Argentina, accepted many Jewish people who were fleeing from the Holocaust, and he established diplomatic ties with Israel soon after its foundation. However, he also allowed many Nazi war criminals entry to the country in the hope to find shelter. He also wanted to use their intelligence, abilities, and education in Argentina's favor.

**1955 *Revolucion Libertadora (Liberating Revolution), Post-Peronism, and Cold War***

Argentina experienced frequent military interventions and political mutinies within the military in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. In Huntington's terms (Huntington 1993:16), there was a reverse wave in the country during these decades during which Argentina experienced a regime transition in a non-democratic direction. Guillermo O'Donnell categorizes the military regime in this period as 'bureaucratic authoritarianism' because unlike the previous military rules, the junta governments in this period were not based on strong figures from the military; rather the military acted within the chain of command. Moreover, civilians working in these regimes were not dependent on popular support but were mere technocrats (O'Donnell 1988:55). Next, I will outline the events that paved the way to military authoritarianism after Peron's fall.

Anti-Peronism within the military was growing during his second term. Especially after the death of Eva Peron in 1952 (months after his re-election) his popular support was diminishing too. In her late years, Eva Peron had become even more popular than Juan Peron who was overshadowed by her. When Eva died from cervical cancer in 1952, she became almost a martyr in Peronist discourse. With her absence and his growing authoritarian rule, Juan Peron became increasingly less popular (Schiff 2009:102). Each passing year, the opposition and the military became bolder in challenging Peron's presidency. On June 16, 1955, Argentine Naval and Air Forces bombed Peronist supporters gathered in *Plaza de Mayo* (May Square) and some of the premises of *Casa Rosada* (Pink House; the governmental palace). It was a massacre with hundreds of civilian casualties (Elçi 2014:76; Hedges 2011:163). This ferocious

action by the military angered the Peronist crowd, leading them to loot and burn the adjacent premises of the *Casa Rosada* (including churches) (Brown 2010:213; Hedges 2011:164). Through the radio, the government called on the people to defend democracy and the constitutional government, and loyalists in the army immediately acted against the mutineers. It was a civil-war-like moment in the capital with a conflict between different units of the military with the involvement of civilians on the side of the government. The army started shooting at its own warplanes and navy vessels, the navy shelled its own people, and aircraft from each side dueled in the air. Eventually, the mutiny was suppressed with the help of units loyal to the government but the scale of the military's discontent with Peron's presidency became observable. This incident put an end to the limited concordance for democracy in Argentina's second wave of democratization. The military started intervening in politics frequently in the following decades.

Within three months after the Bombings of May Square, on September 16, 1955, the Argentinean military, led by General Eduardo Lonardi with the help of the conservative agrarian oligarchy and traditional bourgeoisie (Schiff 2009:102) – who had never supported Peron and were terrified with the economic failure -- led a coup d'état. The coup, called *Revolucion Libertadora* (the Liberating Revolution) was an eclectic, military-civilian intervention led by General Eduardo Lonardi, but the masses did not join. Although there were some protests against him and his government, Juan Peron was still popular with the people. Coup plotters used these protests as an excuse for their actions against the democratically elected government, but the military intervention was never welcomed by the masses. Hence, instead of imprisoning Peron, coup plotters

allowed him to go into exile in Spain where he stayed 16 years.

None of the democratically elected governments after Peron finished their terms (Rouquie 1987:272). Even Peron himself could not finish his second term, after being toppled by the military in 1955. The economy was one of the biggest problems in the country, and triggered many social movements, which paved the way for so many military interventions in this era. During the absence of Juan Peron, the Peronist movement divided into factions (Snow 1965:3). The first division was between the Peronist-left and Peronist-right. Left-wing Peronists were active during the Cold War, and some of the sub or smaller divisions within the left-wing Peronist movements became involved in armed actions. The *Montoneros* and *Fuerzas Armadas*<sup>30</sup> were the main armed factions among the left-wing of Peronism, and were seen as terrorist organizations by the political right (Postacı 2012:137). Later, in 1966, by using the actions of armed groups and underground movements as leverage (or excuse), the military intervened, once again, in civilian politics. Military governments had unforgiving attitudes towards these left-wing armed Peronist groups and killed many without interrogating them or bringing them to trials.

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<sup>30</sup> *Movimiento Peronista Montonero* (MPM – shortly referred to as *Montoneros*) was a Peronist far-left urban guerilla movement in Argentina founded in 1970. The movement was inspired by Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, an Argentinean revolutionary in the Cuban Revolution of 1959, and by Juan Peron’s efforts to counter state inflicted violence, and defend the workers’ rights in the ‘class struggle’. They were active during the 1970s but were eventually destroyed by the military government during *Guerra Sucia* (Dirty War). *Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas* (Peronist Armed Forces – FAP; shortly referred as *Fuerzas Armadas*) was a smaller Peronist far-left guerilla group that applied terrorism and strikes against Argentine state and armed forces. There were several other armed guerilla groups in Argentina during military dictatorships but these two were close to Peronist ideals even though Peron himself drifted away from them.

*Desaparecidos*<sup>31</sup> are still an ongoing political wound in the country.

Traditionally, Argentina has had close ties with the Western bloc of Europe. This is, in part, due to its former place within the Spanish Empire. Modern institutions and modernization efforts in the country were oftentimes sponsored by western countries. Argentina developed economic ties mainly with the industrialized countries, and Western societies were its most important import/export partners. Although Argentina stayed neutral during both World Wars, during the Cold War, which pitted US allies against Soviet Union allies, Argentina was closer to the Western bloc, especially in 1960s and 1970s under the military regimes. The revolutionary movements (often sponsored and encouraged by the Soviet-bloc) in the region were seen as immediate threats by Western powers, and the Argentinean military governments worked on behalf of these Western interests (McSherry 2005:4).

During the 1960s and 1970s, at the peak of the Cold War, the left wing (socialist) revolutionary movements emerged, inspired by the Cuban revolution. One of the prominent revolutionaries in Cuba was an Argentinean doctor, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara who was influential in Argentina, inspiring the people, especially the youth. Ties to the Western bloc did not support democracy in the

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<sup>31</sup> The Argentine military regime systematically abducted, detained, tortured, and killed thousands of dissidents during *Guerra Sucia* (Dirty War). The fate of many dissidents remains unknown, and in Spanish they were referred as *desaparecidos* (disappeared ones). According to some estimates the number of *desaparecidos* goes up to 30,000. The bodies of the dissidents were thrown into the ocean when they died under captivity and torture. It became a social problem in the country leaving behind families and orphans. Many of the children of the captives were stolen and given to families close to the military. However, it should be noted that *desaparecidos* of *Guerra Sucia* era is not the only example in Argentine history. During 1966-1973 military junta (Argentine Revolution) the military governments exercised similar questionable methods.

country. Instead, Western powers condoned (if not supported) a notoriously authoritarian military regime for the sake of their ideological and economic interests.

The military juntas (especially the last one in 1976) in Argentina secured close ties with the Western bloc. The military regime undertook restrictive measures in the country, including seeing to it that Left-wing organizations were crushed, public demonstrations and strikes were restricted, and perceived socialists and communists were either disappeared or incarcerated. Moreover, the military regime shifted and adapted the country's economy to neoliberal economic policies. However, economy policies of the military junta failed to stabilize the economy (Akdağ 2006:6).

### *Argentine Revolution 1966-1973*

The history of democracy in Argentina was shaped by the tension between the military and citizenry. Of course, when the military acted against the elected governments, the generals sought alliances in the society. Some conservative groups (such as rural political elites, the Catholic Church, and traditional big landowners in agriculture) supported the military interventions. At first glance, it may seem that the military's anti-democratic actions were directed solely towards Peronism, but several other political groups (such as the UCR and its ramification UCRI) were also affected by the conservative orientation of the Argentinean military. The military projected a more conservative vision of society in the country as will be seen in the social engineering projects that I describe in the following pages. During this period, the military seized all power, and instituted direct military rule in the country. This move of the Argentinean military



marked a dramatic break from democratic order. In other words, it was a total collapse of the democratic concordance.

Although there was strong opposition towards Peron and Peronism on the part of social and economic elites, he and his movement were still respected and popular with the general population in Argentina. In response to the military interventions, Peron (from his exile in Spain) -- since Peronist parties were banned -- requested that his followers either cast blank votes or vote for UCRI<sup>32</sup> candidates in the general and legislative elections between 1957 and 1963. Legislative and general elections witnessed interesting turnouts in this period. People protested the exile of Peron in 1958 and the 1963 presidential elections by casting 10% and 21% of blank votes respectively (Snow 1965). Blank votes were at 25% in the 1960 legislative elections. Moreover, UCRI candidate Arturo Frondizi had a surprising victory in the 1958 presidential elections.

However, Frondizi's electoral victory led to another coup in 1962. Conservatives and the military were not happy with Peron's endorsement of Arturo Frondizi and his collaboration with Peronists. Representing the left in the country, the Frondizi government initiated close diplomatic relations with Latin American countries, especially with Cuba, even trying to prevent Cuba's expulsion from the Organization of American States (a supranational continental organization to increase collaboration between the nations) (Snow 1963:523). At the peak of the Cold War, these moves were regarded as divergences from the priorities of the Western bloc.

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<sup>32</sup> UCRI (*Union Cívica Radical Intransigente* – Intransigent Radical Civic Union) is a breakaway political party from UCR (Radical Civic Union) founded in 1957 by Arturo Frondizi. Unhappy with UCR's centrist stance, left wingers split from UCR, and founded UCRI. Endorsed by Peron, UCRI and its president Frondizi ran for presidency in the following year and won the elections against the UCR.

UCRI candidate Arturo Frondizi had a progressive stance at first, encouraging foreign investment, promoting industrialization in the country, and making reforms in education and worker's rights. Soon he wanted to exclude Peronists from his government due to conservative reactions from the military (Hedges 2011:181). To appease the opposition, especially within the military, he legislated state interventions into unions, which created frustration among the people. In a way, Frondizi intended to maintain the status quo, which was promoted by the military after the 1955 coup d'état. However, his efforts did not prevent a military intervention in 1962, which sent him into exile in Bariloche, a rural province in the country. Although the military successfully toppled the elected government, there was a faction within the military, and months after the military intervention an insurgency broke out in the Argentine Navy with a strong anti-Peronist sentiment. The insurgency did not gain much support in other branches of the military but lasted months, leaving many casualties behind (Postacı 2012:132; Snow 1965:20). In this civil-war-like incident, the Argentine military suffered heavy losses in terms of equipment (warplanes, ships, ground vehicles) and prestige after losing more than 70 soldiers.

In order to avoid possible confusion, it should be noted that each political faction had sympathetic officers within the ranks of the military. The military, as a whole, did not oppose Peronism. In fact, as is recounted above, in the rise of Peron and Peronism, some factions within the military played a role. However, some ranks and branches of the military (especially the navy) inexorably opposed Peronism. After the 1962 military interventions and following violence that suppressed the insurgency, general elections were held in 1963. Since the ban of all Peronist parties was still in effect, and UCRI government did little to

lift the ban, Peron did not support the UCRI this time but demanded his supporters cast blank votes in both presidential and legislative elections. Almost 20% of blank votes helped UCRP candidate Arturo Illia win the presidency against UCRI candidate Oscar Allende (Snow 1965:25). President Arturo Illia lifted the ban against Peronist parties, allowing them to join in elections. This move angered the military. The triumph of Peronism in the following legislative elections further infuriated the military, and with the support of UCRI and former president Arturo Frondizi, another military coup was initiated in 1966, three years after Illia's election to the presidency (Romero 2002:169).

With unending economic instability and growing armed violence from revolutionary leftists inspired by Argentinean Revolutionary Ernesto 'Che' Guevara and the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the Argentinean Armed Forces once again intervened in politics but this time the military formed a junta (Brown 2010:233; Romero 2002:169). In June 1966, the military enacted a coup d'état and named itself *Revolucion Argentina* (Argentine Revolution). This coup importantly sought to end civilian rule in Argentina. The previous military takeovers were temporary, transitional periods in which the military aimed to re-set the political game (O'Donnell 1973:155). However, General Ongania intended to establish an authoritarian military regime. The military started handpicking presidents, and military rule was supported by the media, conservatives, and business circles. Moreover, the authoritarian nature of the new regime was condoned by the international community and multinational companies, which were hoping the revisions to the economy planned by the military government would benefit them (McSherry 2005:253).

The military dictatorship aimed to transform the country and society according to their nationalistic ideals. The military took a conservative stance in this period, intervening in every political and social institution, and even daily life. Famous Argentinean political scientist Guillermo O'Donnell describes the military dictatorship in this period as an 'authoritarian bureaucratic state'<sup>33</sup> (O'Donnell 1973, 1988). According to O'Donnell, Argentina's dictatorship in this period was not based on populist politicians but technocrats with the help, and under the surveillance of, professional military officials. Immediately after taking control of state power, the military government removed autonomy from the universities, starting with the police invasion of the University of Buenos Aires (UBA) called 'The Night of the Long Batons' (*La Noche de los Batones Largos*). Police forces beat students (especially leftist groups), arrested many faculty members, and purged many academic personnel (Brown 2010:233). Due to the unwelcoming working conditions, many scholars quit their posts, some even left the country. The conservative attitude of the military dictatorship also turned against 'immorality' not only in the universities and in academic and artistic lifestyles but also in social life (Elçi 2014:81; Romero 2002:175). The church welcomed the military dictatorship since it promised to end 'immoralism' (Ruderer 2015).

One of the purposes of the military dictatorship was to control the modernization process by transforming the

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<sup>33</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell's analysis of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism is a direct challenge to Seymour Martin Lipset's modernization theory which argues that industrialization produces democracy. O'Donnell posits that the import substitution model of industrialization produces authoritarian regimes due to strong state intervention in the economic relations. As an Argentinean scholar, O'Donnell specifically focuses on Argentina. According to him, the military dictatorship in Argentina between 1966-1973 was an example of bureaucratic authoritarianism.

country's economy from agricultural dependence to heavy industrialization (O'Donnell 1973; Postacı 2012:135–36). For this purpose, the military could not trust the populist and erratic attitude of civilian politics. Hence, they took full control of the country, this time for good. However, in seven years, the military could not perform the economic transformation it promised. On the contrary, Argentina's economic problems became chronic. Even worse working conditions deteriorated (Akdağ 2006:62). With the increased guerilla activity targeting state institutions and military personnel, moreover, the military responded by increasing the level of violence, which included the kidnapping of former military president General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu in 1970 by *Montoneros* (Manzano 2015:16), a Peronist guerilla group. The kidnapping was a turning point in the counter-terrorism activities of military governments (Postacı 2012:245). The response of the military was brutal throughout 1970s.

Furthermore, public discontent had grown against the authoritarian and pseudo-moralist interventions by the military into social life. Military governments were excessively brutal towards social movements, especially leftist groups. Ideological armed conflicts became part of everyday life in the country. The military not only failed to stabilize the economy but also could not eliminate the epidemic violence. Restricting civil rights only resulted in more discontent among the populace. The military dictatorship collapsed in 1973. To exit power, the military allowed general elections with free participation of Peronist parties as well. Although Peron's participation to the election was still banned, the Peronist candidate Hector Campora won the elections with almost half of the total votes. Campora later lifted the law that had exiled Peron, which allowed for Peron's re-entrance into Argentine politics (Brown 2010:236).

**Return of Peron, Dirty Wars (Guerra Sucia), and 1976  
Military Junta**

So far, I have described the democratic development in Argentina since the first introduction of a competitive electoral regime. There was a huge resistance to the democratic order from the conservative religious, political, and economic elites. They had widespread and profound support within the military cadres, thus the military intervened and interrupted politics several times. However, the citizenry continued to be active in pushing for the democratic transformation of the country. This resistance by the citizenry made temporary democratic gains in the period I cover in this chapter, but the victories of the citizenry did not last long. After the collapse of the military rule in the seven years of the Argentine Revolution, the military stepped back and opened a space for civilian rule. However, civilian politics enjoyed this relative liberalization for only a short time, and military rule was re-established once again in 1976. Moreover, since the very beginning of the relative liberalization of civilian politics, militarism was prevalent in the country, there was no concordance at all. The military had a tutelary position during this short period.

Juan Peron returned to Argentina in 1973. However, on the very day he landed in Argentina, left-wing Peronists and right-wing Peronists clashed and many people died while many were left wounded on the scene (Postacı 2012:139). This became known as the Ezeiza Massacre, so named because it took place in the Ezeiza airport in Buenos Aires, where Peron's plane landed. Peron's supporters were waiting for him alongside the president Hector Campora at the Ezeiza International Airport. Peron was supposed to take power from Campora who had run for the presidency in the March 1973 elections in Peron's absence. The massacre still

remains controversial but was designed to force the moderate left-wing Hector Campora government to resign and put an end to the alliance of left- and right-wing Peronists in the country.

After the massacre, Campora's government resigned and led the country to another general election in the same year (September 23, 1973). This time Campora did not run for the presidency, and Juan Peron led the Justicialist Party in the elections. It was a landslide victory for Peron and his party. He received 61% of the votes (Brown 2010:236), and started his third term in the presidency on October 12<sup>th</sup>. His third wife Isabel Peron was his vice president. The Argentinean economy was on a transient recuperation but then the 1973 Oil Crisis struck global markets. With increasing oil prices and lowered foreign investment, economic development halted once again.

From his authoritarian stance, it was soon understood that Juan Peron had not changed in his exile (Norden 1996:48). He formed the Argentine Anti-communist Alliance (notoriously known as Triple A), a far-right death squad, which not only targeted extreme left organizations including left Peronists, but also moderate opposition groups. Triple A continued working under the interim-presidency of Isabel Peron after Juan Peron's sudden death in 1974 (Postaci 2012:140).

When Isabel Peron took power, the country was already in violent political turmoil that accompanied chronic economic instability. She continued using Triple A to violently suppress leftist groups, even the mild opposition in the country. The country was a battleground for far left armed groups, inspired by the Cuban Revolution; kidnappings, assassinations, and armed street shoot-outs were part of daily routine during her presidency

(MacLachlan 2006:146; Postacı 2012:140). Moreover, there were big strikes and street protests all over the country demanding social justice, seeking reduced inflation rates, and adjusted wages. Isabel Peron was unable to mediate among different groups, instead choosing to increase state oppression and to use terror against the opposition (Hedges 2011:204). She even empowered the police and the military to annihilate the leftist groups.

Her presidency was seen as weak against widespread leftist armed violence, and as part of US backed Operation Condor<sup>34</sup> (McSherry 2005), the military took the power on March 24, 1976 under the leadership of General Jorge Rafael Videla. The military junta ruled the country until 1983<sup>35</sup>, and the era between 1974 (when the Triple A was formed) and 1983 is called the Dirty Wars (*Guerra Sucia*). After taking control of the country, the military dictatorship

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<sup>34</sup> Operation Condor was a clandestine operation at the height of the Cold War sponsored by the US government in 1975. It targeted leftist groups in Latin American countries with a strong anti-communist agenda. Fearing a domino effect of leftist governments in Latin America following the Cuban Revolution, the US government and CIA took offensive and abusive action by backing militaries and/or organizing para-military groups. In some cases (like Argentina) militaries encouraged the toppling of democratically elected governments. In the case of Argentina between 1976-1983, violent operations were common, and thousands of people were arrested, tortured, and killed.

<sup>35</sup> Four consecutive military juntas ruled the country during this period. With the fractions within the military, the presidency changed hands between generals. General Jorge Videla was the head of the first junta between 1976 – 1978. Then he handed the power to the second junta which led the country between 1978 and 1981 under the leadership of General Roberto Viola. With the ongoing civil unrest, a third junta was formed by General Leopoldo Galtieri and took the control of the power in 1981, and this third junta led the country to Falklands (Malvinas) War in 1982. After the humiliating defeat against the UK, a fourth junta took the control in the same year, but this regime was weak, and by popular demand and civil unrest in the country was forced to hand power to civilians. In this period, Argentina had six presidents, all of whom were military generals. All the junta leaders were from the Argentinean Army in this period while some of the presidents were also from the naval branch of the Argentinean military.



announced *Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional* (National Reorganization Process - or simply *El Proceso*). In this violent era leftist groups were targeted in Argentina. The military junta took a merciless and brutal stance against the left-wing groups, and even the pacifist activists were affected by the military operations. Thousands of people<sup>36</sup> were disappeared by the military (Aguila 2006; Pion-Berlin and Lopez 1991).

As a response, families of the disappeared people formed a social movement known as the *Madres de la Plaza de Mayo* (Mothers of the May Square)<sup>37</sup> (Hunter 1998). They started rallying at *Plaza de Mayo* (The May Square) in 1977, gathering every Thursday to demand information about their beloved ones. During these violent years, a kind of social problem emerged too: the children of *desaparecidos* (disappeared ones). Many children were either disappeared with their parents or born at concentration camps (or at prisons). Many of these children were left parentless, and the

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<sup>36</sup> Exact numbers are not known due to lack of proper documentation but around 30,000 people were believed to be disappeared by the military. Moreover, thousands of people were arrested and tortured. Besides, as part of violent actions by left-wing movements, hundreds of people were kidnapped, and around two thousand people were assassinated by the armed revolutionary guerilla groups. For further information see: (Mallinger 2009)

<sup>37</sup> The Association of the Mothers of May Square (*Asociacion Madres de la Plaza de Mayo*) was formed by the families of the disappeared ones (*desaparecidos*) during the military regimes. Although, their main motivation was initially to learn the fate of their relatives, if possible to identify their bodies or graves, it later turned into a widespread social movement which later ramified, including Grandmothers of the May Square (*Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo*) pursuing all acts of the governments against human rights. Gathering in the May Square which is just in front of the *Casa Rosada* (Pink House – presidential palace and government's building) weekly on every Thursday, the association is an NGO, and were critical to ensuring that the government held perpetrators of these crimes accountable. It is one of the first major groups organized by women against state violence and human rights violations. During the course of its own history, the association turned into an international watch group on human rights abuses not only in Latin America but around the globe.

military government gave many children as foster children to the families close to the regime (Mallinger 2009:104). According to the Grandmothers of May Square (*Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo*) up to 172 children were either held with their parents or born in prisons. Moreover, they estimate that around 500 children were stolen. They also claim that more than a hundred children have since been located (Elçi 2014:184).<sup>38</sup>

### *Falklands (Malvinas) War and End of the Military Junta*

The Falkland Islands (in Spanish; *Islas Malvinas*) are an archipelago in the Patagonian cone of the Atlantic Ocean about 300 miles off mainland Argentina. The political situation of the islands has always been a source of conflict between the Spanish Empire (then independent Argentina) and the British Empire (then the United Kingdom) (Arquilla and Moyano 2001:742; Romero 2002:242). The islands were colonized by the Spanish Empire during the colonial era, but their strategic position enticed other colonial European empires, and many diplomatic and military crisis erupted during the course of colonial history. As I already hinted in the early pages of this chapter, the Spanish Empire and the British Empire went to war several times during 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries vying for dominance in the region. The British Empire tried to invade and takeover the Spanish colonies in the southern cone. Although these attempts eventually failed due to the resistance in the colonies, Britain achieved control over the Falkland Islands, and established a military base on the islands in the hopes of patrolling and controlling the region. The dispute was inherited by Argentina, and subsequent Argentinean governments never gave up their claim over the islands.

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<sup>38</sup> Numbers may differ in different sources.

The 1976 military junta in Argentina was struggling to combat continuous economic instability and to control social movements that challenged its legitimacy to power. The junta government was already brutal to the opposition but was not effective in realizing its promises for ameliorating the economic, political, and social problems. In fact, the military government worsened these already prevalent problems. Hence, there were factions within the military, and power changed hands in a short time. By 1981, civil unrest was growing and becoming widespread all over the country against the military junta. In order to stir nationalistic sentiment to unite people and to ease this civil unrest, the third junta started pushing traditional claims over *Islas Malvinas* (Falkland Islands) (Arquilla and Moyano 2001:746). Admiral Jorge Anaya, one of the influential members of the third military junta, proposed a takeover of the islands by a swift military maneuver. The military junta calculated that the United Kingdom would not respond to the takeover with a counter military action (Arquilla and Moyano 2001:750; Postaci 2012:146).<sup>39</sup>

Political tensions were rising between the two nations, and UN talks were fruitless. Due to the proximity of the archipelago to the Argentinean mainland, Argentina had the upper hand at the start of the armed conflict. In March 1982, some Argentinean merchants were 'deployed' by the

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<sup>39</sup> This expectation was realistic since the United Kingdom was in the midst of difficult a systemic move from a social democratic welfare state to a neo-liberal economy under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher. During this transformation, the Thatcher government had to deal with strong opposition regarding workers' rights, putting PM Thatcher in a difficult position domestically. The English government too needed a rallying cause to silence the opposition, which they found in the Argentinean military maneuver. In her famous speech, PM Margaret Thatcher stated that the British nation had no intention to give up its claim over the islands, and that the British army was ready to do whatever was necessary.

military to infiltrate the islands and raise the Argentinean flag (Arquilla and Moyano 2001:770). In response, the Royal British Navy sent a patrol ship to retake the islands. Fearing British naval reinforcements on the islands, the Argentinean military initiated a full scale military invasion on April 2, 1982 (Arquilla and Moyano 2001:752).

The war was a disaster for the Argentinean military and the military government. At first, the British government was surprised by the full-scale invasion. It was a sudden unexpected departure from previous diplomatic rounds. However, on April 6 (days after the initial Argentinean occupation) a war cabinet was formed, and the Royal Navy proposed taking the islands back. Due to controversial human rights violations by the military junta in Argentina, international support for Argentinean claims over the islands was nonexistent, with the international community remained silent.<sup>40</sup> The armed conflict lasted only two and a half months (74 days in total), ending with a decisive British victory. It was a humiliating moment for the Argentinean military with thousands of war prisoners captured by the British forces. The most serious damage was to the Argentinean Air Forces.

After the war, the military junta was in danger of collapse (Huntington 2009:56–57). It was failing in economy matters, social issues, and now, in its primary duty on the battleground (Postacı 2012:149–50). Consequently, the third

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<sup>40</sup> During the war, diplomatic talks were ongoing. The United Kingdom appealed to the UN, and the United Nations Security Council did not recognize the Argentinean takeover of *Islas Malvinas* (Falkland Islands) and demanded that the Argentinean government withdraw all military forces from the islands. Moreover, a resolution was passed by the UNSC, which called for an immediate cessation of hostilities between the two nations and favoring the British appeal. The UNSC resolution passed with ten votes in support of the UK, and four abstentions. The only country that supported the Argentinean claim was Panama.

junta resigned, replaced by the fourth junta led by General Cristino Nicolaides. Being humiliated at the Malvinas (Falklands) War, the military lost control in the country and agreed to hand power to the civilians with free and competitive elections. Moreover, some of the banned parties, including one of the oldest parties in Argentina, the RCU (or simply the Radicals), were allowed to participate in the elections since the military had no bargaining power. After seven years without democracy, general elections took place on October 30, 1983. Surprisingly, the Radical Party (RCU) candidate Raul Alfonsin won a landslide victory over Peronist Justicialist Party candidate Italo Luder.

### Conclusion

The Argentinean military has always been politically ambitious. After all, it was the military which was victorious in the battleground against the Spanish Empire in the independence war, and it defended the country against British invasions in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. The Argentinean military saw itself as the founding force of the country, claiming ruling rights during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Although civilian politicians held power occasionally in this period, the military was still highly active in the country's politics (Huser 2002:10–11).

One of the underlying causes during the independence war in 1810 was the cast system, if not a kind of racial color line, which the Spanish colonizers created. The Argentinean Republic turned out to be another government against indigenous populations. The country was founded by European settlers and their descendants, making it a fundamentally white country. After the initial stages of independence, the new republic pursued the same goal as the Spanish Empire, of persecuting indigenous populations,

which it did through the military (which was unnecessarily brutal, amounting to ethnic cleansing). The republic extended its control to Patagonia where some indigenous groups had been settled for thousands of years. The effects of the new conquests still resound in the country, and indigenous rights have been regularly violated ever since. I will address briefly in the conclusion chapter the Mapuche<sup>41</sup> problem -- which refers to the downside of the current democratic order in Argentina -- which became an international crisis between Chile and Argentina concerning minority problems and human rights (Bonelli and Mattar 2017; Warren 2009). Minority problems have always been one of the open veins of the Argentine democracy. Even in the contemporary democratic order, indigenous minority groups are discriminated against.

The chart below (derived from V-Dem<sup>42</sup> data) summarizes democratic development in Argentina in the 20<sup>th</sup> century until 1983. As can be seen in the chart, democracy fluctuated throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century due to military interventions. The position of the Argentinean military in the country's political system has left its mark on every layer of society (Norden 1996:53). As the military restricted liberties in the country, many scholars either lost

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<sup>41</sup> The Mapuche people are one of the oldest and largest indigenous groups living in the southern tip of the continent. They are originally from today's Chilean soil (the Pacific side of the Andes mountain chain) but occasionally crossed the mountain ranges and settled Patagonia in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. After Spanish conquests in the region, they lost their lands, and due to colonization, many of their social practices were eroded. However, some still engage in Mapuche practices and speak the Mapuche language. Mapuches are not the only indigenous group of people but one of the biggest one in Argentina. With the big exodus of Mapuche people to Patagonia during late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, they become a subject of an international political debate. They still lack proper identification and civil rights, which causes tension with mainstream Argentinean society.


<sup>42</sup> Variations of Democracy. See: [www.v-dem.org](http://www.v-dem.org)

their academic positions or were forced to flee the country, and tens of thousands were incarcerated, tortured, and even killed. Many politicians, activists, and scholars who stayed were silenced. Opposition groups, parties, and many NGOs were shut down. However, the most dramatic effect was the loss of trust in the military, which can be seen in the OLS table above in the introduction chapter (see p. 27). Argentina's score on the democracy index was at its lowest level just before the third wave of democratization under a total military authoritarianism (see Graph 1 below). Confidence in the military gradually eroded (Norden 1996).

The military undoubtedly played an important role in gaining Argentina's independence from the Spanish Empire, and then in forming the country, consolidating power, and building the nation. With the collaboration of traditional agrarian elites (*latifundistas*) first the confederation (between 1831-1861) and then the republic (since 1861) were ruled by semi-civilian military-men. However, this authoritarian regime was challenged by the people (citizenry) in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, and this challenge brought the first democratization movement in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Several factors should be considered. First, although the economy was based on traditional agriculture, industrialization was emerging, and one of the first industrialized sectors was agriculture itself. Second, with growing industrialization and commerce especially in agriculture, Argentina become one of the wealthiest countries in the world. This economic development fueled urbanization and attracted many immigrants from many countries, especially from Italy. Third, rapid urbanization and industrialization worked together, and workers formed many pressure groups and unions to defend their rights. The 1890s and 1900s were the ages of revolutions, revolts, and mass movements in Argentina. The conservative dictatorship was confronted by

the people on many occasions, and these currents led to a democratic transformation in the country (Rock 1975). However, the first and second waves of democracy were based on limited concordance. As I explained above, the electoral system was problematic in the first place. Women and immigrants were excluded from the elections in the first wave of democracy. Moreover, though traditional oligarchic elites and the military agreed and conceded to introduce an electoral regime in the country, they fought (in many cases together) to secure their influential position in politics, and this conservative alliance interrupted the democratic order.

**Graph 1: Electoral Democracy Index in Argentina, 1900-1983<sup>43</sup>**



Two leading causes that the Argentinean military used as leverage to intervene in politics were far-left violence and economic instability. For the former, the military dictatorships between 1966-1973, and between 1976-

<sup>43</sup> 1 is democracy, 0 is non-democracy. Source: Variables of Democracy (V-DEM) [www.v-dem.net](http://www.v-dem.net)



1983 created more violence by putting organized state violence into the equation. Both military dictatorships had fascist agendas and tried not only to suppress ideological violence but also to shape society according to their highly dubious ideals. Conservatism fed by religiosity and militarism interfered in social life on a regular basis. Speaking of religiosity, the role of the Catholic church should not be neglected. Military dictatorships used the organized church to legitimize their actions, and the church facilitated military governments' efforts, if not collaborating with the military. There are several scholarly discussions on the church's role helping the military to keep recording people's habits, militarizing the population, backing statist conservatism, and condoning state violence during the military regimes.

For the latter, neo-liberal transformation of the economy was introduced by the military, especially by *El Proceso* governments between 1976-1983. The nature of neo-liberal economy policies is a topic of scholarly concern. David Harvey (2007) argues that neo-liberalism promotes not only social inequality but also violence and militarism universally (including within Western contexts). In a way, some scholars posit, the Falklands (*Malvinas*) War was a clash of two neo-liberal transformations each of which needed a higher cause to silence the opposition to the economic transformation in both Argentina and the UK. I will come back to this point but first, I want to state that military governments failed to meet their economic promises in Argentina. It was a disaster for the country's economy, and society lost decades and generations of people under the military regimes. It was a long and bitter lesson that the military is not capable of fixing economic problems. Moreover, it was striking for Argentineans to see that the

military was a paper tiger, only able to bully its own people but weak in the international arena.

Military dictatorships in Argentina intervened in every aspect of social life during their rule (O'Donnell 1973:95). Moreover, they barely left space for civilian experts to manage problems, even in the economic life which requires expertise. While transforming the economy, the military generals wanted to control the process but had little knowledge of the dynamics of the economy. The Argentinean military juntas' economic ideology was highly anti-communist, and they did not even consider milder forms of socialism (such as social democratic, and/or Keynesian welfare state solutions) (Romero 2002:173-74). At the same time, the military distanced itself from liberal schools of the economy too, especially during 1960s and early 1970s. However, towards the 1980s, neo-liberal transformations were introduced by the military junta (*El Proceso*) (Romero 2002:286) but as already noted, the executer of the new economy policies was the military itself, and civilian inclusion, if any, was limited.

As I shall explain in the next chapter, the similarities between the military's role in the politics of Argentina and Turkey becomes differentiated at this point. While the Turkish military, although brutal and intrusive in many cases, has more or less successfully governed Turkey, the Argentinean military dictatorships and governments were failures. The Argentine military could not fix economic problems, failed to solve the ongoing violence, and failed to satisfy mass movements or even properly handle its primary duty to defend the country's interests. I do not imply that Turkish military interventions were morally right or deny the brutality of its actions in the country. I merely stress that the Turkish military was 'relatively' successful in

transforming the economy, in satisfying the public's demand to end the growing ideological violence (which once prevailed the country), and finally in managing the international political tensions caused by World War II and the Cold War. Moreover, it successfully defended the country's interests overseas (in the Korean War, and on Cyprus). However, this relative success has had its own price, or backlash, in the institutionalization of the democratic order since 1983, which I cover in the sixth chapter.

When failure was inevitable on social, political, and economic reforms, it was the Argentinean military junta which escalated the tension over the traditional claims about the *Islas Malvinas* (Falkland Islands). It was an unnecessary military aggression on the basis of British negligence and indifference but apparently, the Argentinean junta regime had no plan-B in the case of failure, and it turned out that the military itself was not capable of carrying out such a military maneuver even on a close and tiny area. With consecutive failures on all fronts, the military lost all credibility in society. However, the breakdown of the military regime opened new possibilities in the favor of a democratic shift, which I will explore in the sixth chapter, comparing Argentina to the Turkish case.



## CHAPTER V

### **Militarist Modernization and Democratization Efforts in Turkey: 1839-1983**

In the previous chapter, I investigated democratic development in Argentina along with civil-military relations and described the origins of military interventions which undermined democratic development in Argentina. In this chapter I trace the development of democracy in Turkey and pinpoint its place in Turkish modernization. The origins of Turkish modernization are vital to our understanding of the dynamics of democratization in Turkey. Unlike Argentinian citizens, the Turkish citizenry was not active in bringing democracy to the country; rather it was a top-down process. Moreover, modernization efforts in Turkey involved creating citizenry too. In other words, when the Turkish Republic was founded, the citizenry had been passive during the century-long modernization process, and it remained so until very recently. This chapter gives the reader the historical background necessary to understand the dynamics of civil-military relations and democratization in Turkey. To do so, I focus on two questions: first, 'why does the Turkish military shows guardian features?' And second, 'why does the Turkish military supervise the politics in the country but does not directly involve itself with governing the country?'

There is a colossal modernization literature in the social sciences to which many theorists of democracy often refer. As documented previously, some scholars (Acemoğlu

and Robinson 2012; Lipset 1959; Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013) see a direct correlation between modernization efforts and democratic development. Of course, there are many independent variables which determine the features of democratic regimes. Many scholars (Dahl 1971; Lipset 1959) expected that modernization efforts would eventually lead to democratization while others (Moore 1969; Skocpol 1988) posit that modernization is a much more complicated process and leads to different results in different contexts. Turkish modernization started from military reforms, thus militarism has always had a predominant place in the Turkish modernization efforts (Belge 2011).

The first parliament in Istanbul was a part of a century long Turkish modernization effort that had begun in the late 18th century. Democratization in Turkey was strongly aligned with modernization efforts. What is more, democratization processes – like modernization – were implemented top-down, in most cases against the people's will. After reaching its peak in the 16th century, the empire had undergone a long stagnation, politically, economically, culturally, and militarily (Barkey 2008; Lewis 2007). During a two century-long struggle to recover its glory, all efforts had failed, and the empire started experiencing a free fall. Consecutive military defeats on all fronts but especially against European powers urged the Sultans and their viziers to find solutions to the territorial disintegration of the empire.

The first modernization efforts in the Ottoman Empire, which started in the military, began under the reign of Sultan Selim III (r. 1789-1807) (Barkey 2008:267). Sultan Selim III's reforms in the army are known as *Nizam-i Cedid* (New Order), a series of reforms that included a new army designed according to the necessities of its era in 1792.

However, the sultan was not able to abolish the Janissary army because of resistance both within the army and the state bureaucracy. The New Order Army was meant to co-opt the Janissaries (conventional Ottoman troops), during the defense of Acre against Napoleon Bonaparte in 1799, when the new army proved itself and out-performed the Janissaries (Hale 1994:16). Nevertheless, the New Order Army (*Nizam-i Cedid*) did not last long due to power struggles within the state apparatus; it dissolved in 1807. The end of the new army was not smooth. There was a huge crack in the Ottoman state bureaucracy and this division cost the life of the sultan. After his death, the reforms were stalled for a while but when Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839) was enthroned, the reforms were re-initiated on all fronts (Barkey 2008; Lewis 1993).

**Tanzimat (Reorganization) Era and First Wave of Democratization in Turkey: 1839-1876**

Sultan Mahmud II was a reformer who took several steps to transform the traditional state apparatus into a modern one. He is a controversial figure in Turkish history, and during his reign he was called '*gavur sultan*' (infidel sultan) by the people due to his westernization efforts during his reign. However, he is also described as the 'Peter the Great of Turkey' because of his modernization efforts. Initially neither the elites nor the people were enthusiastic about the reforms within the state apparatus and in the society, and the reforms were resisted by the state bureaucracy in the early stages of Sultan Mahmud II's reign. It was international politics and complications in internal affairs that were pushing the elites to perform reforms. The empire was not only losing its prestige on the frontiers but also losing its integrity within its own territories. The territories

of the empire were roiled by ethnic unrest and the empire was not able to handle the situation (Barkey 2008:264).

The empire was under attack from all-sides. Ethnic rebellions with the aim of independence, internal conspiracies, and international wars were causing economic problems, social unrest, and declining imperial power. The Sultan decided to pursue modernization within the state after securing his position on the throne. He gradually appointed supporters of his ideas to governmental posts. After long preparations, he took a very surprising action in 1826. As part of his reforms in the military, another new army was established, and after establishing this new army, namely *Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye* (Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad), he ordered the Janissary guild, the centuries old conventional army, to disband. The Janissaries resisted the idea and revolted once again but the sultan was determined this time; he ordered the new army to shell the Janissary garrisons with cannons (Hale 1994:18). Thousands of Ottoman soldiers were killed by the new Ottoman troops in Istanbul. Following the disbanding of the Janissary guilds, Sultan Mahmud II hastened his modernization efforts.

In 1839, just before his death, Sultan Mahmud II prepared his most famous firman (edict); *Tanzimat Fermanı* (the Imperial Edict of Reorganization). However, he died of tuberculosis before the edict was proclaimed. His son Abdülmecid I succeeded him as the new sultan, and he started his reign with the proclamation of the edict. The edict was read at the *Gülhane* (Rosehouse) by the Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşid Pasha who was the architect of the reforms (Postacı 2012:60).

This imperial edict signifies a milestone in Turkish history and Turkish modernization. This era is called the *Tanzimat* (Reorganization) Era starting with the



proclamation of the imperial edict and ending with the establishment of the first parliament in 1876 (Postaci 2012:60). There were a series of reforms in politics, military, and social life during this era. The first edict of *Tanzimat* ordered by Sultan Abdülmecid I in 1839 was merely a letter of good faith from the imperial highness to his subjects. It did not enact major changes but was a framework convention. It assured the security of the subjects of all backgrounds, implied reforms in tax collection, and proposed changes in military conscription. It was also a milestone in the development of a modern citizenry. All subjects from different backgrounds (e.g., ethnic, religious, or denominational) were equal before the law. However, these reforms were not fought for by the people but rather were granted to them by the elites. In other words, these reforms were implemented from the top-down.

Interestingly enough, although some reforms were made to please the non-Muslim subjects, they were not pleased because the balance in the ancient regime was broken (Hale 1994:22). Non-Muslim subjects were paying extra taxes but in return they were immune from some of the duties such as being enlisted in the army. The empire was originally designed as a war machine, fighting in many fronts at the same time. These wars were not affecting the non-Muslim subjects as much as they were the Muslim population in the empire. Yet, foreign powers (the Russian Empire, British Empire, French Empire, Austrian Empire, etc.) were pushing the Ottomans to increase the non-Muslim population's life standards in the exchange for providing economic and political support to the declining empire. The balance was very fragile, and the pressure was high on the diplomatic arena during this period. Nevertheless, the Ottomans could not avoid devastating wars throughout the

19<sup>th</sup> century. In a way, foreign pressure hastened the modernization efforts in the empire.

After the initial reforms during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II, some national revolts erupted in the Balkan peninsula within the Ottoman territory. Interestingly, the richest portions of the empire revolted first. The initial reforms in the empire did not start because of popular demand, especially from the non-Muslim population, but when the reforms started, the non-Muslim population asked for more privileges. The frontiers of the Ottoman Empire in Europe (Balkan territory) were richer than the rest of the country (Genç 2014:317), and reforms and efforts regarding industrialization meant reducing or losing the economic advantage for the frontier regions because industrialization and modernization were shifting the economic privileges of Balkan territories.

The first revolt, which was unsuccessful, erupted in Serbia in 1813, but the first successful revolt for independence happened in Greece between 1821-1829. With the help of European powers, the Greeks successfully established an independent national state in 1832. Then an autonomous Serbian principality followed them in 1833. One by one, the Balkan nations started revolting and gaining their independence, including Muslim nations, such as Albania and Bosnia (Ahmad 2014:56).

#### *Sick Man of Europe*<sup>44</sup>

The decrepitude of the Ottoman Empire during the 19<sup>th</sup> century was of concern to European powers because of its strategic location. The Ottoman territory stretched from the strait of Hurmuz to the Adriatic Sea, from Egypt to the

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<sup>44</sup> This label is widely used in scholarly works especially by historians to define the situation in the late Ottoman Empire. The first use of the term goes back to the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century.

Caucasus, and the fate of these vast lands were important. Russia was pressuring to control the Caucasus and the Balkans, and gaining access to the ports in the warm seas (Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea) to extend its commercial network. Napoleon and then the French Empire/Republic started dominating the North African territory of the Ottoman Empire. The Habsburgs (Austrian Empire) were pushing for the Balkans too, and on the other side the Iranian Empire was clinging to the Caucasus. For the Ottomans, it was a game of balance at this point. They started balancing France with the British Empire, the Russian Empire with Austria, or when Russia and Austria created a block, the Ottomans countered with another block with the British and French Empires. And the game went on.

Losing important portions of territories on the European frontiers to nationalist revolts made Ottoman rulers consider a constitutional monarchy. Delimiting, and even reducing, the power of the sultan, according to some intellectuals, was the only option to save the empire. The first wave of democratization in the Turkey was based on saving the empire in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Constitutionalism also had an equalizing effect for the subjects/citizens, but the definition of the citizenry was another problem for the ruling elites. In the era of nationalism, traditional empires had certain difficulties finding an identity for citizenry. During the process in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the first years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Ottoman elites infused several opposing ideologies (such as Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Turkism)<sup>45</sup> to create an identity for its

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<sup>45</sup> The Ottoman elites intended to create a citizenry in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries but there were different competing approaches based on different identities implying different emphases on the intended citizenry. The first approach was territorial, namely Ottomanism which expected all subjects from different backgrounds to have equal rights before the law. The second approach

subjects (Akçura 2015; Barkey 2008:290). Creating or forming an identity for the imperial subjects was a strong deviation from empire's the ancient regime. It meant the creation of citizenry for the people, but the process failed, being interrupted several times due to wars, revolts, conspiracies, and so on and so forth.

### **Purification Policies: Turkification, Islamization, and Republicanism in Turkey**

Modern nation states are based on a homogeneous national identity and they often try to create a homogenous society because modernity is based on certainty (Bauman 2008); and the state apparatus, in the modern era, often exerts assimilatory pressure on the minority groups. This pressure coming from the state, many times, has led to the catastrophic extermination of some 'unwanted' social groups which were regarded as 'ambivalent'. In other words, to secure the integrity of the social structure, many (if not all) modern states have occasionally cleaned the 'weeds' in the society (Bauman 2016). In the Turkish case, the state apparatus tried to assimilate different identities into the

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emphasized religious identity, namely Pan-Islamism. In the late Ottoman era, the empire was but a religious confederation. Although there were different religious communities, the vast majority was Muslim, and the Ottoman elites appealed to this common identity to prevent the ongoing territorial disintegration. The last approach was based on ethnic identity: Turkish-ness. In the early stages of Turkish nationalism, the expatriates from the Russian Empire who had Turkic background helped the Ottoman Elites to develop an ideological background for Turkish nationalism. In the beginning, Turkish nationalism included other Turkic territories (such as Azerbaijan, Crimea, Central Asia) but with the heavy defeat in the World War I, Turkish elites limited the inclusivity of nationalism. These strategies were implemented respectively in the late Ottoman Empire but ultimately failed. Yet, the Turkish Republic was founded based on Turkish identity, to which I will refer again in the following pages.

Turkish identity and, when they failed to convince other social groups, did not hesitate to eliminate them (Kaya 2014).

The exile of the Armenian population is a turning point in Turkish history in terms of homogenization of society and the territory. Homogenization processes have resulted in catastrophic consequences. At first, because of the nationalistic attitude of the governing elites, some other ethnic groups revolted against the empire (such as Albanians, Greeks, Bulgarians) (McCarthy 2013). These revolts inflicted a stricter nationalistic approach, and the whole country became embroiled in ethnic conflict. During World War I and after the Independence War, both the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic employed homogenization politics quite strictly, and exiled ethnic minorities (Armenians, Greeks, and Jews).

The fate of the Armenian population is already depicted above. After the defeat in WW-I, some humiliating treaties were signed with the Allied forces and Central Powers (i.e., The Treaty of Versailles with Germany, and Treaty of Sevres<sup>46</sup> with the Ottoman Empire). Nevertheless, some of the Ottoman military officers refused to accept the indigestible conditions of the treaties which projected the unconditional surrender of the Ottoman army and featured the distribution of the Ottoman territories among allied powers including most of the mainland Anatolia. To force the Turkish side to accept the treaty, Allied forces backed further advancement of the Greek Army, which was already stationed in İzmir, deep in Anatolia (Hale 1994:60–62). Turks accepted the challenge and fought four additional years before signing another treaty to secure their independence under conditions they could dictate.

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<sup>46</sup> The Treaty of Sevres never went into effect but the negotiations on such terms were humiliating for the Turkish side.

After winning the Independence War against Greeks who were supported by British Empire, the new Turkish government and Greek government had an agreement to make a population exchange. It was one of the strangest demographic transitions between two countries in modern history. According to the agreement, the Turkish government sent over one million (around one million and four hundred thousand) ethnic Greeks living in Anatolia to Greece, and in return Greece sent around half a million ethnic Turks, and other Muslims living on the Greek mainland and islands (especially Crete) to Turkey<sup>47</sup> (Ahmad 2014:149).

With the elimination of Armenians and Greeks, the new Turkish state had its desired start in terms of a homogeneous nation state. The two largest religious minority groups were eliminated from the society, and were replaced with the Muslim population from the Balkan Peninsula and Caucasia (Akçam 2006; McCarthy 2014). However, this elimination and replacement had their own results; economically, culturally, politically, and militarily they affected the nation's future. At the time, the country was not developed, and the remaining population was mainly farmers and villagers. Since the governing elites had cleared out minorities, who were highly educated and skilled people, the country could not find a proper way to develop. Most of the Turkish and Kurdish people were illiterate, and they did not know how to trade. Their skills were limited at the time, and besides their world was limited to their villages. In other words, Turkish governing elites themselves eliminated the seasoned merchants from society. It took a century for the country to create a new elite. Until

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<sup>47</sup> There were some exceptions. The Greek community in Istanbul was excluded from the exchange as was the Turkish community in Western Thrace in Greece.

three decades ago, literacy levels were quite low, a middle class barely existed, and urbanization was below 50% (Işık 2005).

When the government 'cleared' non-Muslim minority groups, their properties were confiscated and redistributed among the Muslim population. Confiscation has always been an important part of economic life in Turkey (Genç 2014:98). Even in Ottoman times the sultan (or the central government) used to confiscate the properties of influential figures in order to prevent them from challenging the throne. Sometimes, it applied to a group of people who were rebellious to the state (Mardin 1996:178). In this way, the sultan not only prevented any challenge from influential figures to his hegemony in the empire but also prevented a middle class (bourgeoisie) from flourishing. The Turkish Republic followed the same trajectory with several adjustments. New Turkish elites were aware of the importance of an economic middle class, but they wanted to control it. Therefore, they created their own middle class within the Turkified Muslim population that was loyal to the new regime. When the Armenian population was exiled, and after the population exchange, the belongings of both groups were distributed among these newcomers. Some important properties were either given to the elites or confiscated by the state.

After the 1929 Great Depression, which happened on a global scale, the Turkish economy experienced shrinkage too. It was not a promising economy in the first place, and the global crisis made it worse. Moreover, there was growing tension in the world, especially in Europe during 1930s. Under these circumstances, the world went to a second global war in 1939. Turkey stayed neutral but the country's location was crucial for both sides, and the

government felt great pressure from the combating sides to join the war (Hale 1994:81, 2011:196). But Turkey managed to keep its neutral position for the duration of the war. However, in case of occupation by any country, the army was kept ready. The healthy Turkish male population was already mandated to serve in the military for two years but during the World War II the term was extended to four years. It was hard to feed such a big army in a country already experiencing economic hardship. Thus, taxes were raised for everybody but especially for the remaining non-Muslim population. A Wealth Tax (*Varlık Vergisi*) ruined the Turkish non-Muslim population financially, and many rich families lost their assets. Their prominence in the Turkish economy came to an end, and their assets were transferred to the Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie created by the government<sup>48</sup> (Lewis 1993:296).

### *Militarism and Civil-military Relations in Turkey*

Applying Rebecca Schiff's concordance theory in civil-military relations to the Turkish context, Nilüfer Narlı (2000) observes that the autonomy of the Turkish military has always been high. The military has traditionally been heavily represented within the National Security Council in Turkey, and the position of Defense Minister has often been lower than Chief of Staff. Moreover, in Turkey the Chief of Staff has, until recently, controlled and coordinated all

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<sup>48</sup> There were other forms of a Wealth Tax in the country during World War II. The non-Muslim population was also seen as a potential threat in case of eventual entry into the WW-II. Many non-Muslim male populations were sent to labor camps because of being unable to pay the heavy tax. The Wealth Tax was not based on any kind of reality but arbitrariness. It was against the secularist nature of the new republic, and the founding elites overrode their own principles. The tax was implemented over two years between 1942 and 1944, and eventually repealed under the pressure of international community, especially the United States and the United Kingdom.



military branches.<sup>49</sup> To understand the military's role in Turkish politics I will go back to the early foundations of the Turkish Republic.

The signature of the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) still has great influence in today's Turkey as in the past. Intentionally, or unintentionally, their actions shaped the country's foundation. Initially, the CUP movement was a reactionary intellectual movement determined to find remedies to the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. However, soon after the initial phase, the military officials took over the movement's initiative, and it became a heavily militarized political party. The nationalist militarist nature of the movement not only affected the fate of the late Ottoman Empire but also was influential in the Turkish Republic (Belge 2011; Lewis 1993; Zürcher and Atabaki 2012).

The new republic was formed by former military officers after several consecutive wars. The struggling Ottoman Empire went to war with different nations between 1911 and 1918. Starting with the Italian invasion of Trablusgarp (Tripoli, today's Libya) in 1911, the Ottoman army fought exhausting wars in different regions of the world. In 1912, the First Balkan War was fought between Ottomans and the Balkan League (Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece). It was a humiliating defeat for the Ottomans, who lost to their former subjects, and resulted in the loss of a large portion of the Balkan territory. The Ottomans barely stopped the enemy at the gates of Istanbul, and the conquest of Istanbul was embellishing some Balkan nations' dreams. A year later, the Second Balkan War was

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<sup>49</sup> Until recently, gendarmerie and coastal guards were also under the responsibility of the chief of staff. After the 2016 coup attempt, the government separated these units from the main part of the military by attaching them to the interior minister to balance the military.

fought between the Balkan League nations. Some of the countries were not satisfied with their shares and attacked each other. The Ottomans seized the moment and went on the offensive against their neighbors. This time the Ottomans were on the winning side and offset some of their previous territorial losses.

When the First World War erupted, it was inevitable that the Ottomans would join the war, but they wanted to choose their side carefully. The Triumvirate (Enver, Cemal, and Talat Pashas) were eager to seize the moment, especially Enver Pasha who saw the Great War as the turning point of the empire's fate. They first appealed to the allied forces (France, Russia, Italy, and the United Kingdom) but colonial powers had interests in the Ottoman territory and refused the appeal. Subsequently the Ottomans fought the war alongside Germany, the Austrian Empire, and Bulgaria. The Turkish army was modernized by the Germans, and many German generals were already serving in the Turkish army (Avcı 2016; Ortaylı 2001; Özgüldür 1993).

The war was disastrous for the Ottomans. Although they had local victories (such as the Battle of Gallipoli, the Battle of Kut-ul Amare in Iraq, etc.), overall the territorial integrity of the empire was lost. Even the heartland of the empire, Anatolia, was invaded by Italian, Russian, Greek, French, and British troops. Under these circumstances, the remaining free officers of the Ottoman Empire gathered the vestige of the imperial army.<sup>50</sup> While their allies surrendered one by one to the Allied Forces, the Turks fought four more years for independence and to recuperate some of the lost

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<sup>50</sup> Many intellectuals and military officers were in captivity at Malta by Allied forces. Moreover, the Ottoman army was dismissed and disarmed according to the Armistice of Mudros in 1918.

territories. Thanks to help from the Soviet regime,<sup>51</sup> and with the inadequacy of the Greek forces during the Turkish independence war, Turkish persistence prevailed.

### One Party Rule and Kemalism in Turkey

Militarism marked the initial period of the Turkish Republic. The founding fathers of the new Turkish Republic were former CUP members, including Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) (Lewis 1993:203; Zürcher 2010:x). Many of them were former military officers. Thus, the control of the military was at the hand of the ruling elites in the initial phase of the republic (Hale 2011:195). Later, Mustafa Kemal made former military officers who were willing to engage in civilian politics resign their posts (Hale 2011:193) but many of them remained influential within the military ranks even after their resignations.

After the War of Independence, the Treaty of Lausanne secured Turkish independence, and the Turks finally experienced peace after long devastating wars. Only three months after the Treaty of Lausanne, on October 29, 1923, The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*) -- which was formed during the Independence War on April 23, 1920 -- declared the Turkish Republic with the Abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate. This was a turning point in Turkish history. The Ottoman Empire had already de facto ended but now it was official. The capital was not Istanbul anymore, but now Ankara, the headquarters of Turkish resistance. After the abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate, the royal family was allowed to leave the

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<sup>51</sup> After the October Revolution in the Russian Empire, the Bolsheviks left the occupied Ottoman regions, hence the Turkish independence movement did not need to focus much on the eastern border. Furthermore, new Soviet regime supported the Turkish cause against 'imperialist' powers.

country. In the next year, the parliament abolished the Islamic Caliphate too. By doing so, Turks gave up their leading role in the Islamic world.

When the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was formed in 1920, the parliament solely focused on wiping the enemy from Turkish soil. Therefore, the civilian parliament worked in unison with the national army (*Kuvayi Milliye* – the Turkish Revolutionaries) during the ongoing independence war between 1920 and 1922. However, at the end of the war when the victory was certain, but the treaty was not yet signed with the remaining invading forces (Greece and Britain), some groupings emerged within the Turkish parliament. There were no official parties but groups. The first group was united around Mustafa Kemal and his government but the second group had no clear leader, yet Kazım (Karabekir) who was then a seasoned soldier and liberator of the Eastern Front was the most prominent member of the second group (Hale 2011:182–83). The second group had more liberal ideas than the first group which were prone to a conservative statist ideology. Mustafa Kemal did not want to sign the treaty and needed to have the support of the parliament for his detailed future revolutionary reforms in the country. Thus, with a sudden move, he dissolved the parliament and led the country to general elections. Before the elections, he formed the RPP (*CHF* later *CHP*, *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası/Partisi* – Republican People’s Party, founding party of the Turkish Republic) while the second group in the dissolved parliament had no official party. After the general elections held in the summer of 1923 (months before the Lausanne Treaty which recognized the independence of Turkey), Mustafa Kemal had undisputed control of the renewed parliament (Lewis 1993:259–60; Zürcher 2004:233–34). Except for some independent deputies, all members of the parliament were

from Mustafa Kemal's RPP. Thus, the opposition was weak and Mustafa Kemal made the parliament legislate any law he provisioned.

Mustafa Kemal who had already resigned from his military position became the first president of the new republic. His first move was to remove his opponents, and possible threats to his political career within the military and civilian politics. Former PUP members were arrested, sent to exile abroad, and/or sentenced to death. His party, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP – Republican People's Party – RPP), founded days before the proclamation of the new republic, captured all the power in the country. There was a tiny opposition in the renewed parliament (in Turkish, *İkinci Meclis* – The Second Assembly), yet some opposition figures were sentenced to death for alleged treason and hanged during their service in the parliament (Hale 1994:75).

The country rapidly drifted away from a democratic regime. After taking control of the power in the country, Mustafa Kemal started implementing his reforms in every aspect of the political and social life, including controversial dress reform, language reforms, surname reforms, and so on. It can safely be said that his fifteen years of rule was an age of reforms.<sup>52</sup> But his biggest reforms were of people's social mentality. He wanted to unite the people around a single identity which can be formulated as Secular – Turkish – Sunni – Muslim (Aslan 2015:56). Since most of the non-Muslim population was eliminated from the society during consecutive wars between 1911-1923 by forcing them migrate, it was not that hard to unite the society around Muslim identity. However, the Sunni part of the identity was challenged by the Alevi minority, so was the Turkish-

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<sup>52</sup> In Turkish, these reforms are referred as *inkilab*, which in English can be translated as revolution.

ness by the Kurds (Kirişçi 2008:179–80). Although many people did not share the Turkish ethnic background, almost one third of the population were war refugees who fled to Turkey from the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Balkan Peninsula. They were imbued with Turkish nationalism, and easily accepted the Turkish identity (Kuru 2009:210; McCarthy 2014).

Secularism (laicism) was the biggest challenge for Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). It was a conservative society and only a tiny portion of the society (Istanbulites and Izmirians) were more or less familiar with the idea. The rest of the country resisted but the resistance was suppressed with a brutal response. Cities were bombed, religious scholars who opposed the new order were hanged, intellectuals and journalists were silenced. The army was in control of the government and played an important role in transforming society. The army's role was not limited to suppressing insurgencies against the reforms but also included infusing the reforms into the people via military conscription. Government employees served as the carriers of the new order. In Benedict Anderson's terminology (Anderson 2006), by creating a class of government employees, it was possible to create an 'imagined community' in Turkey. Consequently, by opening schools in every corner of the country a new consciousness was created and spread.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> I want to clarify one thing: Alevi (or, Alawites) were discontent with the stress on Sunni identity but after several insurgencies they saw that the new regime needed a secular fraction within the society, which may play a role as the carrier of the secularist ideology that the regime wanted to create. Thus, Alevi have sided the Kemalist/secularist regime since 1940s. However, the Kurdish population in the country resisted imposed ethnic identity. Turkey's Kurdish problem goes back to the early 20<sup>th</sup> century (Rustow 1959:525). After the foundation of the republic, there were several Kurdish insurgencies which were suppressed by brutal military responses. Hundreds of people were killed, and many people were dislocated and sent to exile within the country.

After the independence, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) gradually distanced the country from the Soviet Union and socialist ideology (Lewis 1993:364), and became closer to the Western societies. He was a seasoned soldier in the battle ground, and visited several Western countries as the aide-de-camp of the late Ottoman Sultan Vahdeddin in 1918 (Rustow 1959:523). He stayed in Austria, France, and Bulgaria as part of his military diplomatic missions, and found an opportunity to observe Western societies. He was fluent in French, and heavily influenced by the French Revolution. His reforms included promoting a Western style of life, Latinizing the alphabet, introducing the Gregorian calendar, changing the measurement system from a traditional one to the metric system, and so on so forth. One of the biggest reforms was to the judicial system. He adapted the Swiss civil code to the country, the Italian penal code, and a French style unitarian government (Köker 2010).

During its one party regime (even after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's death) Turkey kept its close ties with Germany (Avcı 2016; Ihrig 2014). As already indicated above, Turkey (then the Ottoman Empire) allied with Germany during the First World War, and on some fronts, fought side by side. The Ottomans sent soldiers to Galicia helping Germany, and German generals served in Turkey during the war. As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, Turkey's army was formed German style by German generals, and the logistics were supplied by Germany. Even after the war, they continued helping the Turkish state by sending engineers to build infrastructure (and maintain the Turkish military). With these close relations, Turkey played an interesting role in European politics, and in the Second World War. Stefan Ihrig (2014), a German scholar posits that Turkey's resistance to the winning countries after the First World War inspired Adolf

Hitler and Nazis. During the tenure of Adolf Hitler in Germany, Turkey and Turkish officials were respected and highly esteemed.

### *Democratic Shift in 1950 and Age of Military Interventions*

Like the first wave of democratization in Turkey (during the late Ottoman Empire), the second wave of democracy was not based on popular demand. In other words, the citizenry was passive during the process. Again, it was a top-down process. Democracy was re-established by the political elites of the one-party rule because they wanted to side with the western bloc facing an immediate Soviet threat on the eastern borders of the country. Once again, there was no concordance about the second wave democratic regime. It was a necessity not a choice.

After World War II, the RPP (Republican People's Party - ruling one party) elites wanted to stay in line with the winning countries. At the very end of the war, just one month earlier, came the German surrender and the end of the war on the European soil, when Turkey declared war against Germany to show its support to the Allied cause (Lewis 2007:11; Postacı 2012:157). Immediately after the war, Turkey announced that a democratic competitive multi-party system would be restored and re-installed. In 1946, for the first time in more than 15 years,<sup>54</sup> the first competitive elections were held. However, these elections were highly controversial due to regulations. The 1946 General elections in Turkey took place with open voting and secret counting regulations which caused many speculations. Unsurprisingly, the ruling CHP won the elections, but the

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<sup>54</sup> There were elections for the parliament during one party rule, but the only participants would be the RPP (ruling one party), and its candidates who were chosen by the RPP headquarters.



international community severely criticized the regulations in the elections.

Turkey wanted to be close to the Western bloc in the post-war period (1945 onward) because of the immediate Soviet threat, and due to economic necessities. Joseph Stalin, then the president of the Soviet Union, was openly threatening Turkey on usage of the Turkish Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles) (Elçi 2014:50), furthermore demanding the return of Kars and Ardahan,<sup>55</sup> frontier cities on the eastern border between Turkey and the Soviet Union (Lewis 1993:312). Turkey was not able to challenge the Soviet Union on its own at the

**Table 5: List of Military Coups, Interventions, and Insurgencies in Turkey, 1960-2016**

Date	Nature	Leader(s)	Engagement	Result
1960	Direct military coup d'état	National Unity Committee with 38 members under the leadership of General Cemal Gürsel	Secularist – Nationalist	Successful
1962	Military mutiny	Colonel Talat Aydemir	Hardline secularist – Nationalist	Failed

<sup>55</sup> Due to their proximity, these cities had changed hands several times between Ottoman, Russian, and Iranian Empires. During the First World War, the Russian Empire invaded the territory that belonged to the Ottoman Empire against which Russians were fighting. However, when the October Revolution took place in the Russian Empire and Bolsheviks controlled power, they ceded the territory to the Turkish side. Joseph Stalin tried to revoke the agreement claiming it was a provisional agreement with the Ottoman Empire. There was a considerable Armenian population in the region, and Armenia was part of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Joseph Stalin was of Georgian origin, and these cities bordered the Soviet Republic of Georgia with its population of Muslim Georgians.

1963	Military mutiny	Former Colonel Talat Aydemir	Hardline secularist – Nationalist	Failed (Talat Aydemir was sentenced to death)
March 9, 1971	Secret junta (exposed before action)	No clear leadership	Revolutionary leftist, socialist, secularist	Failed (exposed before action)
March 12, 1971	Coup by memorandum	Military memorandum issued within chain of command	Unspecified (concerned with the growing violence in the country – possible anti-communist sentiment)	Successful- The civil government resigned
1980	Direct military coup d'état	General Kenan Evren	Secularist – Nationalist – Pro Western	Successful – Military took the power and ruled the country for 3 years
1997	Indirect military intervention	General Çevik Bir was the face of the coup	Hard line secularist – Anti- Islamist	Successful – The civil government resigned
2007	Military memorandum	General Yaşar Büyükanıt	Secularist	Failed – The civil government resisted the demands of the military
2016	Military mutiny	A clandestine religious group secretly infiltrated in the military	Unspecified (possible nationalist – religious ideology)	Failed

time, and Turkish governing elites sought alliance with the Western bloc. Due to its strategic location,<sup>56</sup> and its influential background in the region with an exemplary modern and secular stance among other Muslim countries, Turkey was an important, and almost indispensable partner for Western Powers against Soviet expansionism. Consequently, the Truman doctrine came to the aid of Turkey (Lewis 1993:312, 2007:10–11). The Truman doctrine was an American foreign policy based on countering Soviet Union's power expansion at its borders by helping Greece and Turkey. It was proposed to the American Congress by the US President Harry Truman, and it became the founding and defining ideology of the formation of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). It was also influential in the expansion of the Marshall Plan.

Joseph Stalin's post-war ambitions and Harry Truman's proposal to stop Soviet expansion was one of the starting points of the Cold War, according to many scholars (Belge 2011; Hale 1994; Lewis 2007). And Turkey sided with the Western bloc with a firm dedication. As part of Truman Doctrine, an economic assistance plan, namely the Marshall Plan (officially European Recovery Plan-ERP), was initiated by the US government in 1948 to help European countries rebuild their economies in the post-war period. Turkey was not part of the plan at first but considering its importance in the region, the plan was extended to cover Turkey as well.

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<sup>56</sup> Anatolia has always been a natural bridge between cultures and geographic regions. There are several other appellations for the region, such as Asia Minor (for Anatolian Peninsula) and Eurasia (referring the connection point of Europe and Asia). Modern Turkey is located on two continents (Europe and Asia), and thanks to its proximity to Africa, connects three continents. It also lies between the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkan Peninsula. Moreover, Turkey is a vital player on the Aegean, Mediterranean, and Black Seas. It controls the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits which connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea. I will refer its geographical importance again later.

In return, Turkish elites were encouraged to transform the regime from one-party rule to a multi-party competitive democratic regime. As already pointed out above, in 1946, general competitive elections were held in the country, but the regulations were far from democratic. Four years later, on May 14, 1950, general elections were held in Turkey, this time with reliable democratic regulations, and the Democratic Party (DP), which was the main opposition party founded in 1946, won the elections with a landslide victory under the leadership of Celal Bayar, former CHP member, and one of the first Prime Ministers during the presidency of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. With these elections, Turkey had shown its willingness to operate as a democratic regime and proved, with popular elections, the possibility of changing of the power.

Nevertheless, Turkish elites were still feeling unsafe against the Soviet threat at the dawn of the democratic regime. The new democratic government's very first action was to apply for NATO membership. The US government was waging a war with the help of its allies in the Korean Peninsula at the time to control that area against communist expansion. Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes responded to the US demand and accepted sending troops to the Korean War.<sup>57</sup> During the war, in 1952, Turkey was accepted into NATO, along with Greece. With membership in NATO, Turkey secured its position in the Western bloc against Soviet expansion. However, with NATO membership, the military strengthened its position in the country. In other words, as we will see in more detail later,

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<sup>57</sup> Turkey's relations with Korea were quite limited until joining the Korean war. Turkey sent troops at the brigade level (numbers varied between 4,000 and 6,000 personnel). The government did not consult the parliament when the cabinet decided to send troops to the war.

joining NATO did not secure the fate of democracy in the country as we will see in more detail later.

### Democratic Party Era

It was a smooth transition to democracy from an authoritarian one-party regime. Many top rank politicians in the Democratic Party (DP) were former members of RPP (CHP). In 1946, it was allowed to form opposing parties in the country, and dissidents of RPP, including Celal Bayar, formed the Democratic Party (Hale 1994:88–89). The star of the DP rule was the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. He was coming from a notable family in *Aydın* province on the Aegean shores of the country. He was intelligent and witty, and swiftly ascended the stairs in politics. He was the face of the Democratic Party and, under his guidance, the DP won three consecutive elections with landslide victories between 1950 - 1960. The DP did not give a chance to other parties, especially to the RPP, in the elections. After long years under an authoritarian one-party regime, the people favored the one who heard them the most.

Nevertheless, the economic performance of DP governments was not satisfactory, although the initial years of Democratic Party rule was promising with the help of Marshall Plan aid. But aid from the USA was already running out in 1955 (Postacı 2012:78). There were many rumors about cronyism and nepotism (Zürcher 2004:334–35). In order to secure its position, the DP elites were distributing the resources to their supporters. There was a great unprecedented migration to the cities from the rural areas (Işık 2005) but the problem was that Turkey was not a fully-industrialized country, able to endure these migratory movements within the country. Some cities, especially Istanbul, grew uncontrollably larger and larger each passing year.

September 6-7 (1956) saw a pogrom-like incident directed against the Greek community residing in Istanbul during this period<sup>58</sup> (Elçi 2014:52). There was a growing diplomatic tension with Greece over Cyprus. Both nations were members of NATO at the time. Cyprus was about to gain its independence from the United Kingdom but the negotiations were stumbling due to the dispute between Greece and Turkey over influence on the island (Zürcher 2004:345). The island was mainly populated by Greeks and Turks with 75 percent and 20 percent respectively, and both Greece and Turkey wanted to gain influence over the island due to its strategic importance for controlling the east-Mediterranean Sea.

In the meantime, the DP government and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes were setting their own agenda and making progress in transforming the country. Shutting down Soviet-like village institutes (*Köy Enstitüleri*), reversing Turkish call-to-prayer laws were among some of these changes. Adnan Menderes and the DP understood the people's demands, and they were responding to voters. However, these steps made the previous elites, the seculars, and the military uncomfortable (Zürcher 2004:338–39). After ten long years, the military was convinced that it was impossible to compete with the DP on the ground of popular elections. The founding principles were in danger with a populist leader in the power. There was a junta among

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<sup>58</sup> There is no direct evidence support that the government was behind the pogrom-like looting in Istanbul against the Greek minority. However, most likely, the DP government condoned the looting to intimidate the Greek side in the negotiations over Cyprus. The police did not stop the looters, the perpetrators were not punished, and the Greek owners of the shops and houses were not compensated for the damage. After the incident, many Greeks in Istanbul left the country, and their belongings were redistributed among Turkish citizens, most of them highly valued places, lands, factories, and premises. For further information see: (Zürcher 2004:336)

junior officers who saw the elected government as a counter-revolutionary movement against which the military should have acted.

### 1960 Military Coup D'état

Turkey was a NATO country, and the tension of the Cold War between Soviet bloc and the Western bloc was rapidly escalating. Turkey's foreign policy was becoming erratic due to economic hardship. The money that came with the Marshall Plan was long gone, extravagant public spending of the government to satisfy its supporters not only emptied the national treasury but also boosted inflation in the country (Zürcher 2004:332–34). The government was looking for immediate solutions, and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes visited several capitals in the Western bloc but could not find any help due to distrust of his economic policies, growing authoritarianism, and the unwelcoming attitude toward the remaining minority groups in the country. The country was too risky to invest in, even for developed NATO countries.

Former secular elites and the military were not happy with the changing characteristic of the republic. There were many rumors shaking the capital, and the leader of the main opposition party, RPP, former president İsmet İnönü warned the government to be careful. He clearly stated that even as a former military general and president, he might not be able to save them if something unwanted happened, implying a military action towards the government (Hale 1994:112; Harris 1965:174). But the government was sure of its control in the country. The bureaucracy was directed the government, and major generals in the military were close to the government. The government did, however, really underestimate the ability of junior officers in the Turkish

military and their discontent with the increasingly non-secular emphasis of the government.

On May 27, 1960, junior officers under the name of the National Unity Committee (NUC - *Milli Birlik Komitesi-MBK*) took action and started controlling every governmental institution in the capital, Ankara, and in Istanbul. Many deputies from the ruling party, the general staff of the military, ministers, and even the prime minister Adnan Menderes and president Celal Bayar were arrested (Hale 1994:110–11). Colonel Alparslan Türkeş declared the coup to the nation by reading the manifesto by a radio broadcast via the national broadcast institution (TRT – Turkish Radio and Television Corporation). In the coup manifesto, the military clearly stated the anti-communist nature of the coup, and their dedication to the relationship with NATO and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization)<sup>59</sup> (Hale 1994:120). The next day, General Cemal Gürsel,<sup>60</sup> who was the face of the coup and became the next president of the county, announced the good will of the National Unity Council towards democracy.

It has always been rumored that NATO and the Americans intervened in Turkey's military coups but there is no clear evidence to support this claim. However, NATO and the US have always been hesitant to distance themselves

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<sup>59</sup> The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), also known as Baghdad Pact, was a military alliance between the UK, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. It was formed in 1955 in the Cold War circumstances and lasted until 1979. It is usually referred the British NATO.

<sup>60</sup> To be fair, General Cemal Gürsel did not get involved in the coup at first. He was just retired from his post days before the coup, and he was close to the government. He was quite a likeable character and was a respected figure in the military. Even the NATO circles respected his fatherly, easygoing personality. He did even write a farewell letter to the defense ministry indicating his goodwill and respect to the government. However, the junta which consisted of junior officers needed a top figure to convince other ranks to their action. He was promised to be the president, and he joined the coup (Hale 1994:107).



from the coup plotters in Turkey. Moreover, some of the most influential members of the National Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi) were NATO officers trained by the US, especially the most renowned nationalist leader Alparslan Türkeş. He had announced the military intervention over the radio. Considering the timing of the coup, days after the visit of the prime minister to Moscow in the hope of finding economic help, it is reasonable to suspect NATO encouragement of, if not direct support for, the coup.

The 1960 military intervention was a milestone in Turkish history. It opened a Pandora's Box in Turkish politics. It was the first military intervention in the republican era, and the consequences were dire and tragic. There was a major purge after the intervention. Many generals, including the chief of staff Rüştü Erdelhun, thousands of military officers, judges, prosecutors, civil bureaucrats were purged (Lewis 2007:14). The junta also touched academia, and many faculty members in universities were arrested, purged, or forced into retirement. The junta arrested ministers Namık Gedik, Hasan Polatkan, and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu of the Democratic Party government. Minister of Interior Namık Gedik committed suicide (Hale 1994:128) while he was in custody in the military academy. The rest of the top members of the government including president Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes were put on the trial on an island called *Yassıada* in the Marmara Sea. The Yassıada Trials were one of the most notorious trials in the Turkish political history. In order to defame still popular members of the democratically elected government, the prosecutors brought everything about the defendants to the trials, including the most private issues. Interestingly enough, although the government and PM Adnan Menderes were still popular among the people, the

public stayed silent during and after the trials (Hale 1994:127).

After the trials PM Adnan Menderes and two ministers, Minister of Foreign Relations Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan, were sentenced to death for treason. President Celal Bayar was expected to be one of them but he was close to the founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the opposition groups mediated his punishment. In particular, İsmet İnönü, one other founding father of the republic and the second president of the nation used his personal relations and charisma to save Celal Bayar. President Celal Bayar's sentence was commuted to life imprisonment (Zürcher 2004:362) but due to his health conditions, he was released in 1964. Next year, on September 17, 1961 PM Adnan Menderes was hanged on İmralı island in Marmara Sea. Despite the efforts made by influential figures of Turkish politics, including former president and respected soldier İsmet İnönü and then president of the military junta Cemal Gürsel, his sentence was executed<sup>61</sup> (Lewis 2007:15). His execution was a breaking point, and his ghost still haunts Turkish politics.

*Military Tutelage, Cold War Politics and 1970 Military Memorandum*

So far, I have tried to explain under what conditions democracy flourished in Turkey. The international political balance played an important role in the first and second waves of democratization processes in Turkey.

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<sup>61</sup> The junta was so dedicated to executing the sentence, so much so that even world leaders could not save the former PM Adnan Menderes. The US president John F. Kennedy, Queen Elizabeth II, French President Charles de Gaulle, and some other world leaders pleaded with the junta to commute the sentence to something else than a death sentence, but the junta executed all three convicted members of the democratically elected government.

Democratization was part of modernization efforts as well as of securing the country's place in the international relations. The Turkish modernization occurred in a top-down manner -- in many cases against the will of the people -- with a strong militarist emphasis. The military played an important role in spreading the ideals of the new Turkish state and in securing and protecting the founding principles of the country. The people were inactive during the democratization processes but when they had the opportunity to make a choice, they voted for conservative political parties which were perceived as counter-revolutionary movements by the military. The first military coup in 1960 was a secularist protective reaction of the military towards right wing/conservative politics. This self-positioning of the military continued until very recently.

The National Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi – MBK), as promised, brought the country to elections following the execution of Adnan Menderes. Before jumping to the re-establishment of democratic order in Turkey, it should be noted that the order in the military became upside down with the junta because the members of the National Unity Committee were predominantly junior officers, and this fact caused chaos within the ranks (Harris 1965). Some of them were in the major or lieutenant level but they were able command to the generals in the military. This chaotic environment in the military naturally caused discontent. There was a faction within the junta too. Hawkish officers called *Ondörtlüler* (Fourteeners) wanted to prolong the junta rule but the majority sought the reestablishment of democratic order after re-setting the politics (Hale 1994:131). İsmet İnönü, one of the founding fathers of the republic and former president who led the country to democracy after World War II, insisted on handing power to an elected government. The Fourteeners resisted the idea, wanting a

prolonged military rule, but they were forced to resign from the military and were sent on overseas missions. Disposal of the hawkish wing of the junta was a turning point for the military regime. The military gradually handed power to the civilians after re-setting the political scenery.

One of the most interesting actions of the military junta was to change the constitution. Strangely enough, the constitution, which was imposed by the military in July 1961, was one of the most progressive and liberal constitutions in Turkish history (Lewis 2007:17). It provided a bicameral legislative system (Hale 1994:137) and, for the first time in the republican era, a senate was formed. After the coup, a constitutional assembly was formed to write a constitution, and after imposing the constitution general elections were set. On October 15, 1961 (days after the execution of Adnan Menderes) general elections were held. Former Democratic Party members formed the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi – AP) but many former Democratic Party deputies were banned from the elections.

Here, I want to describe the Senate of the Republic to show the Turkish military's tutelary position in politics. The senate was formed after the 1960 coup and served almost two decades until the 1980 military intervention. The members of the senate were in three groups. The first group was the elected senators (150 of them). The second group of senators (15 senators) were appointed by the president who was a former military general. And the third group was composed of the members of the National Unity Committee (22 senators) and former presidents as 'natural members' (Hale 1994:137–38). With this composition, the military stayed in power regulating and observing the politics in the country. The power of the senate was limited. The vote of confidence in the government was not held in the senate but

in the parliament. The senate was not able to call interpellation (general questioning of the members of the government). This was the duty of the parliament as well but the very existence of the senate with its 27 military members signaled the willingness of the military to intervene if necessary. To be clear, all members of the parliament were democratically elected, and the parliament was responsible for the legislation. The senate was, rather, the sword of Damocles above the civilian politics.

After the 1961 general elections, since none of the parties won a majority in the parliament, the RPP and the JP (Justice Party – *Adalet Partisi/AP*) formed a coalition government. However, the inclusion of the JP which was the natural successor of the closed and banned Democratic Party (DP) caused discontent among the hawks in the military (Elçi 2014:55). Colonel Talat Aydemir, who served in Korea as a Turkish military representative after the Korean War, started lobbying against the democratically elected government and the National Unity Committee. He was close to the Fourteeners (*Ondörtlüler*) but since he was in Korea during the coup, he slipped under the radar of the junta and stayed in the country. He formed another secret junta called the Unity of the Armed Forces (*Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği – SBK*). He had a promising career as staff colonel and was appointed to an important position as the commander of the military academy in which he coordinated the military cadets. He thought that the military ‘revolution’ deviated from its course due to the political ambitions of the moderate members of the junta.

The RPP-JP coalition under the leadership of İnönü was well-aware of the discontent within the military, and PM İnönü appointed Colonel Aydemir and some of his friends to different posts away from the capital. However,

Colonel Aydemir saw the move, and initiated his counter-move against the government and the junta (Postacı 2012:84). On February 22, 1962 he set in motion his troops comprised of military cadets; some of the troops supported him but the main body of the armed forces backed the government and Colonel Talat Aydemir surrendered. Surprisingly, he was not put on trial but only forced to retire from his post. Possibly, the government was afraid of spreading discontent by punishing hawkish officers (Hale 1994:161–62). The soft attitude of the government to Colonel Aydemir and his friends encouraged them to plot another coup just months after their release in 1963. However, Prime Minister İnönü resisted the uprising of military cadets, and the insurgence failed. Former Colonel Aydemir and his close friend Major Fethi Gürcan were captured, put on trial, and sentenced to death. With the approval of the death sentences by the parliament, both of them were hanged in the following year, on July 5, 1964 (Birand, DüNDAR, and Çaplı 2007).

After these two failed coup attempts, the general elections were held in 1965 in which -- under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel,<sup>62</sup> one of the most colorful personalities of the Turkish politics, the Justice Party (JP - *Adalet Partisi - AP*) won in a landslide. The JP got 52% of the total votes, and the coalition ended. The JP under the leadership of

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<sup>62</sup> Süleyman Demirel as six-time Prime Minister and the 9<sup>th</sup> President of Turkey put his indelible mark on Turkish politics. He came to power after the 1960 coup, and when 1971 Coup by Memorandum happened, he was the head of the government and had to resign. After the 1980 coup d'état, he and his party were banned from politics but in the 1987 referendum, people voted in his and other banned leaders' favor granting them a return to active politics. When, as I will explain in the next chapter, the 1997 Military Memorandum was given to the civilian government, he was the head of state. He was well-known for his witty remarks and loquacity. He suffered frequently from military interventions. In one of his most famous remarks, he stressed that 'he was overthrown six times, but he came back seven times'.

Süleyman Demirel started ruling alone. The results were an open challenge from the conservatives to the military's tutelage.

Soon after the elections, the president Cemal Gürsel passed away, and the chief of the general staff of the Turkish Military Cevdet Sunay was elected as the new president by the parliament in 1966. Although the military was not happy with the electoral results, both the government and the military had a common concern: the Soviet threat. Anti-communism was the common ground for both sides, and as a NATO member country, Turkey was dedicated to fight against Soviet influence. In 1968, a social movement started in France with a leftist/socialist emphasis commonly referred as the May 1968 events in France, or the 68 Generation (*68 Kuşağı*). During the civil unrest in France, demonstrators went on general strikes, occupied universities and factories, and closed the streets, resisting the government for nearly two months. The movements soon spread all across Europe. Turkey and Turkish unions, students, and leftist parties and organizations closely observed the social movements in France and Europe (Birand et al. 2007; Cemal 2016).

The 1968 movements and protests soon sprang to Turkey. Several strikes organized by left-leaning unions occurred in Istanbul against the capitalist oligarchy in the country. The left wing was not happy with the presence of NATO forces in the country. When American soldiers from the Sixth Fleet stepped into Istanbul, protesters gathered and started chasing American soldiers and beating them up. Many soldiers ended up in the cold waters of the Bosphorus (Cemal 2016:95). The anti-American and anti-NATO movement caused a conservative reactionary movement, and both sides occasionally fought each other on the streets. Moreover, several relatively small leftist factions started

arming themselves, and committed some armed actions in the country (Birand et al. 2007; Cemal 2016).

Being geographically close to the Soviet Union and having strategic importance, Turkey was under the Soviet radar. However, as already mentioned, Turkey sided with the Western bloc during the Cold War, and become a NATO member. Yet, Turkey was one of the most complicated conflict areas between the Warsaw Pact and NATO during the Cold War. Turkey was a neighbor of the Soviet Union (Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani Soviet Republics), Bulgaria, a socialist country, and Syria which was close to the Soviet Union under the Baath regime. The only geographical connection Turkey had to the Western bloc was Greece. In the East, Iran under the Shah's regime, and Iraq with another Baath regime, were allies too but there was a reliability problem. After all, the Shah's authority was tottering in Iran, and Saddam Hussein took control of the regime in Iraq and the country effectively became a dictatorship.

Proxy states and organizations of the Soviet Union in the region had important effects on the development of leftist movements in Turkey. Many leftist militants were inspired by Latin American revolutions (such as the Cuban and Nicaraguan Revolutions) and the October Revolution in the Russian Empire, and they often went to Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine to get trained in guerilla warfare. The Palestine Liberation Front (PLO), a left wing armed organization fighting against the Israeli occupation of Palestine, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat provided weapons and guerilla training to Turkish revolutionaries<sup>63</sup> (Cemal 2016:16–17).

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<sup>63</sup> I do not imply any agenda against the sovereignty of the Israeli state but merely describe the situation. The official description of PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) is to liberate the land of Palestinians from Israeli occupation. Many people from Turkey went to Lebanon where a prolonged



Since these groups helped spread violence on the streets of Turkish cities, they lacked popular support. Conservatism was on the rise again in Turkish politics, and the majority of the population in Turkey was conservative. Towards the 1970s, conservatism became more aggressive in the country. In 1970, an Islamist party, *Milli Nizam Partisi* (MNP -National Order Party – NOP) -- under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, a seasoned engineer who had worked in Germany -- was formed. Public criticisms and rejections of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (the founding father of the republic), and Kemalism (the founding ideology) articulated by the party officials infuriated the armed forces and seculars in the country (Ahmad 1995:222). Although his party was banned from politics a year after its foundation, the 1960 military coup failed in stopping the conservative resistance to the top-down modernization.

To understand the path of the March 12, 1971 Military Memorandum in Turkey, the opposite side of the story should be examined too. As part of countering Soviet expansion, a secret operation strategy was formed in Europe by NATO, named Gladio.<sup>64</sup> Although the Gladio operation did not fully include Turkey, there were some clandestine operations undertaken by NATO, the CIA, and the Turkish

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civil war was fought at the time and was a haven for underground armed organizations which found shelter on Syrian and Jordanian soil as well. Many educated leftist people from Turkey including scholars, journalists, and business people also joined these camps to get trained. It may seem contradictory when I say business people but Turkish left ideologies have their own uniqueness. Socialism is a middle-class ideology in Turkey rather than working class. A prominent Turkish journalist who was close to the left-wing organizations at the time well documents these relations in his memoirs. See: (Cemal 2016)

<sup>64</sup> Gladio (or, Operation Gladio) was a clandestine organization to prevent Soviet and Warsaw pact expansion especially in NATO countries. The term is especially used for the branch located in Italy but became a generic term for such organizations orchestrated by the same center. It can be considered as the European counterpart of Operation Condor in Latin America.

Intelligence Agency (*Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı* – MİT) collaboratively. The operation bureau for these type of clandestine jobs was Counter-Guerilla (*Kontrgerilla*)<sup>65</sup> (Cemal 2016:168–70; Zürcher 2004:377–78), and it was semi-officially acknowledged by left-wing Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit in 1973 in an interview. The leftist movements were countered by nationalist right movements. Especially Grey-wolves (*Bozkurtlar*), a far right nationalist movement under the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş a former military officer who orchestrated the 1960 military coup, were working against leftist movements on the streets (Elçi 2014:57). The right-wing groups (mainly nationalist groups) started arming too, and street clashes, shoot-outs and assassinations based on ideological motivations became an average daily routine in the country.

Under these circumstances a leftist junta was formed among the military. Leftist movements in the country had already clearly understood that with democratic elections they had no chance of taking the control in a right-leaning conservative society. Thus, they started seeking a back-up within the military. The junta was supported by intellectuals, journalists, and former military generals too. Doğan Avcıoğlu, a prominent journalist, was the civilian mastermind and ideologue of the junta but they did not have a clear leader. His writings in the weekly *Devrim* (Revolution) newspaper comprised the ideological background of the idea of *Milli Demokratik Devrim* (National

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<sup>65</sup> Operation Counter-Guerilla (in Turkish, *Kontrgerilla*) has different names and involved many notorious operations that I cannot list here. It was first named as the Tactical Mobilization Group in the 1960s, then became Special Warfare Department. After the Cold War, the department evolved to Special Forces Command in 1994, and still serves with this name. It is always claimed that Turkey never dissolved its own Gladio. Special Forces Command played a controversial role in the failed military coup d'état in 2016 plotted by the biggest religious community in Turkey whose leader lives in the US in self-exposed exile.

Democratic Revolution) (Cemal 2016). According to him and his group, a possible revolution in Turkey should have two legs. According to Avcıoğlu, to bring a socialist revolution to Turkey first a military intervention favoring socialism was necessary. Only then, a democratic socialist establishment would be possible (Cemal 2016; Elçi 2014:57–59).

The Commander of the Turkish Air Force, Muhsin Batur, was eager to make a leftist, Baath-like intervention but was vacillating due to lack of support from the land forces, the strongest and the most effective portion of the military. General Faruk Gürler (who later became Chief of the General Staff) was expected to back the junta but later he withdrew his support (Akyaz 2002:295; Birand et al. 2007; Cemal 2016). The junta moved quickly and decided to intervene in civilian politics. They were about to act on March 9, 1971 but the National Intelligence Agency (*Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı* – MİT) exposed the junta. All junta members, including their civilian supporters, were arrested. Three days later (after exposing the left-leaning small junta within the military), on March 12, 1971, the Turkish Army -- under the Chain of Command -- gave a military memorandum to the civilian government forcing it to resign (Akyaz 2002:301–2). The military blamed the government for creating a chaotic atmosphere and contributing to the growing economic disparity in the country. This was a coup by memorandum instead of by force, implying the firm stance of the military against the government. Interestingly, one of the signatory generals of the memorandum was the Commander of Turkish Air Forces Muhsin Batur. It was an astounding surprise for the leftist junta – which had aimed to make a military coup days earlier -- to see one of the prominent soldiers, whose support the junta sought, changing sides (Birand et al. 2007; Cemal 2016).

After the military memorandum, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and his government resigned. The military chose Nihat Erim as the new PM, a professor and deputy in the parliament who was an acceptable figure for the conservatives who dominated the parliament. Prime Minister Nihat Erim led a government which was carefully chosen to be above any political affiliation (Ahmad 1995:211). The military wanted to avoid any conflict with the population by contradicting their choice in the parliament. Instead of dissolving the parliament, this time the military wanted to collaborate with it (Ahmad 1995:210). However, after the military memorandum and forming an 'apolitical' government, a new wave of ideological/revolutionary terror started ruling the streets, which led to another military coup d'état in 1980 (Brown 1989:390). Civilian governments were unable to stop this wave of terror in the country.

### *Age of Terror and 1980 Military Coup*

As a member of NATO, Cold War politics were affecting Turkey's political environment. During the 1970s, the economic and political atmosphere of the country was not promising. Governments had short lives due to the high tension in the country. Both left- and right-wing armed groups stormed the streets of the cities. Ransom kidnappings, armed revolutionaries, gun battles on the streets, and bank robberies were quite prevalent (Nasser 1998:8).

On international politics, Turkey was cornered too. In the 1973 general elections, the center left Republican People's Party under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit had a victory but they did not have the majority in the parliament. In a surprising move, Bülent Ecevit formed a coalition government with the conservative-Islamist Necmettin Erbakan and his National Salvation Party (Demirel

2003:259). The coalition was derisively baptized the 'Watermelon Coalition' (*Karpuz Koalisyonu*) referring to the colors red and green (the colors of socialism and Islamism). Immediately after the coalition was formed, the Cyprus crisis erupted. The Turkish military entered Cyprus to protect the Turkish minority from Greek attacks in 1974.

An armed conflict between two NATO members alarmed the Western bloc, and diplomatic pressure was put on Turkey. The US government applied an arms embargo on Turkey, and in return Turkey closed the American military base in *İncirlik* (on the Eastern Mediterranean coast). The American (and partly Western) embargo on Turkey had devastating effects on the Turkish economy. Considering the global oil crisis in 1973, there was double pressure on the Turkish economy after the Cyprus operation caused severe damage. A common scarcity appeared in the country for daily products and consumer goods. In the following month of the military operation over Cyprus, the 'watermelon coalition' resigned and dispersed with the resignation of PM Bülent Ecevit. RPP's leader Bülent Ecevit was hoping to gain a greater ground in snap elections due to his good reputation in dealing with the Cyprus issue but his electoral expectations backlashed (Zürcher 2004:380).

Between 1975 and 1980, Turkey experienced huge oscillations in politics. Short lived governments, political terror, economic instability, and ethnic and religious sectarian violence were rife in the country. Even though the RPP under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit was the biggest party in the parliament, it did not have a majority to form a government. Moreover, conservative parties ostracized the left-wing RPP, and formed the First Nationalist Front Government (*Birinci Milliyetçi Cephe Hükümeti*). However, this government also failed to stop the violence and to invigorate the economy. Two years later, in the 1977 general

elections, Bülent Ecevit and his RPP received 41% of the total votes. This was the biggest electoral victory of any left-wing party in the country, and remains so. But he, again, lacked the majority in the Turkish Parliament. Conservative parties did not support him, and the Second Nationalist Front Government (*İkinci Milliyetçi Cephe Hükümeti*) was formed under the PM-ship of Süleyman Demirel (Zürcher 2004:380–81). Bülent Ecevit appealed to some right-wing deputies in the parliament, and 11 deputies from the conservative Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) sided with him. With the joining of these 11 deputies, he was able to remove the National Front Government from power. Hence, he started serving his second term as PM. However, his service was short-lived due to everyday violence (and even pogroms against Alawite<sup>66</sup> minorities) (Hale 1994:225) and severe economic problems.

The death toll during the 1970s was estimated in four digit numbers (Zürcher 2004:383), with approximately ten assassinations/murders each day (Hale 1994:224). After massacres happened in several different regions, martial law was implemented in 1978. Moreover, inflation rates skyrocketed due to the 1973 Oil crisis and the US embargo on Turkey after the Turkish intervention into Cyprus. The economy was still not well-integrated with the global markets. Hence, there was limited foreign investment. Since the import subsidized economic model failed due to energy dependency and political instability, the country was experiencing a kind of impasse. The government released some cautions, commonly referred as 'January 24 Resolutions' (*24 Ocak Kararları*) regarding the economic conditions. However, this resolution could not be imposed

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<sup>66</sup> On several occasions, Alevi (Alawite) minorities in different cities experienced pogrom-like incidents. The best-known examples are the Maraş 1978 and the Çorum 1980 pogroms.

due to the chaotic environment in the country. Under these circumstances, the military criticized the civilian governments (Narlı 2000:114) and wrote several reports on the problems of the country (Brown 1989:390). Politicians were aware of an upcoming military intervention, but they had few options to prevent it.

After the end of presidency of Fahri Korutürk (a former general), the parliament was unable to elect a new president. Five months after his retirement, and despite multiple efforts in parliament, the country still lacked a president. This situation added insult to the injury in Turkish politics. The assassination of former Prime Minister Nihat Erim on July 19, 1980 in Istanbul by a radical leftist group, precipitated the military intervention (Ahmad 1995:211). Chief of the General Staff Kenan Evren decided to make a coup d'état on September 7, 1980, and five days later, on September 12, 1980, he orchestrated the most violent top-down military coup d'état in the country.

In the next chapter, I examine the 1980 military intervention of Turkey in detail, but I want to give a brief summary about the reader about the aftermath of the coup. The results of the coup were dramatic. More than a half million people were arrested, thousands were tortured, the country experienced one of the biggest and most wide-ranging purges in all sections of the society, newspapers were closed, NGOs were oppressed, civilian politicians were arrested and banned from politics, and so on and so forth. The military was dedicated to stopping this wide-spread violence by promoting state violence. Consequently, many artists, intellectuals and academics left the country for self-imposed exiles abroad. Due to the migratory wave, the European Union put cautionary limitations on Turkish passports. The military stayed in the power for the three years between 1980-1983, which was the longest period the

Turkish military directly ruled the country before handing the power back to the civilians. Yet, interestingly, even the most merciless military junta in Turkey handed power willingly to the civilians. This is important and I will come back to this fact later because it helped the military to pursue its tutelary position in Turkish politics.

The most significant impact of the 1980 military intervention was on the economy. The military government employed Turgut Özal, who became the elected PM of Turkey, to impose the January 24 Resolutions. He strictly pursued neo-liberal transformation of the country. The limitations on foreign currencies were lifted, import subsidized economic policies were abandoned, and IMF (International Monetary Fund) was invited to the country to observe, guide, and help finance the economic transformation (Postacı 2012:93).

### Conclusion


The history of democracy in Turkey goes back to late-19th century in the late-Ottoman Empire. When Sultan Murad V was dethroned because of his mental problems, Sultan Abdülhamid II was designated as the new Sultan, and he promised to establish the first parliament in Istanbul, the capital city of the empire. The agreement between the governing elites and the sultan meant a new era in the empire; in the constitutional monarchy, the sultan would have limited power, and elected and appointed deputies would have voice in the governing circles as the representatives of the populace. The peoples of the empire from different ethnic origins were no longer subjects but citizens. However, the first attempt at a parliamentary system did not last long. After a sounding defeat against the Russian Empire between 1877 and 1878, Sultan Abdülhamid II decided to abolish the parliament, and gradually



centralized power in his hands (Belge 2011:559–60). The first parliamentary rule (constitutional monarchy) lasted only fourteen months (between December 23, 1876 and February 14, 1878).

There are several defects with the Turkish modernization. First, like Argentina, the main problem in Turkey in terms of democratization is institutionalization, or lack thereof. Democratic processes have constantly been interrupted by the military. Interestingly enough, though the military interrupted the democratization process several times in Turkish history, the military was the main carrier of modernization processes in the country (Ferneer 2012:81). The very first modernization efforts started within the military. In other words, Turkish modernization has always shown authoritarian features just like in Argentina.

**Graph 2: Electoral Democracy Index of Turkey between 1900–1983<sup>67</sup>**



<sup>67</sup> 1 is democracy, 0 is non-democracy. Source: Variables of Democracy (V-DEM) [www.v-dem.net](http://www.v-dem.net)

Modernization efforts within the military inevitably fed militarism in Turkey (Belge 2011; Zürcher and Atabaki 2012). The Turkish state was already a heavily armed war machine but with the introduction of modern armies in the country, given the nature of modern governing, the whole population became militarized. Ultimately, the military was used, in the early republic, as a nation building tool by governing elites who used to be military officers. Indoctrination in the military was equally effective in the society as well, and the populace became heavily militarized (Sarigil 2015). However, the Turkish military, in the republican era, never took direct control of the government. Unlike its Argentinean counterpart, the Turkish military, although intervening in politics many times, handed power to civilians intentionally, and preferred an observatory/intermediary, if not tutelary, position in politics. However, as I try to show in this study, it was this relatively respectful attitude<sup>68</sup> to the democratic establishment which prevented the democratic order from being institutionalized.

Unlike Argentina, the creation, development, and transformation of citizenry were more problematic in Turkey. Democracy did not emerge in Turkey as part of class competition or civil-rights movements like in Argentina. On the one hand, the elites were trying to create a nation(al identity) from the society but on the other hand, they did not allow any kind of social movements within the society. Rather, a competitive electoral system was granted to the society by the elites rather. The citizenry was always inactive during transition periods, and the modernizer elites requested that the people (i.e. the citizenry) be passive and

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<sup>68</sup> I do not say neither imply that the Turkish military has a democratic stance within the politics. What I mean is that in comparison with the Argentinean military, the Turkish military may be seen as having a reasonable stance but in fact this is an illusion.

obedient. This occurred mostly because when the republic was established, a good proportion of the population consisted of Muslim immigrants from the Balkan Peninsula, Caucasia, and Turkic countries (then parts of Russian Empire, and later Soviet Union). Turkey was the last shelter for these people, and they had bad memories of the lands where they were born. They felt gratitude and tried hard to find their places in the society as soon as possible. According to Justin McCarthy (2014:359), an American scholar, millions of people came from the aforementioned regions to Turkey. According to the 1927 national census the total population was 13 million, and some estimates indicate that at least 5 million of them were immigrants, nearly 40% of the total population (Barkey 2008:287). Some of them were already Turkish speaking people from Turkish or Turkified backgrounds but some of them were from different ethnic backgrounds (Muslim Georgian, Albanian, Bosnian, Circassian, and Arab). However, when the young republic implemented heavily nationalistic policies, these immigrants did not hesitate to follow it, and eventually accepted being called Turk.

Islam as a civilization created a very rich environment once, but the civilization gradually lost its power. From the 18<sup>th</sup> century, under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, intellectuals began questioning what went wrong (Lewis, 2002). Being backward was agonizing for the Ottoman elites because once upon a time they ruled the known world, but now the glorious past seemed very far away. To catch up with the modern times, the Ottomans introduced numerous ideas borrowed from Western countries into the country in which Islam has historically been a dominant figure. Modern understanding had not always fit into or been accepted easily by Turkish society; but society, somehow, had accommodated itself to the

introduction of modern ideas. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the society went through a very bad and poor economic condition. The new republic -- after the empire -- has tried to establish a modern state, and shape society according to modern ideals.

Turkey has its own modernization experiment, and this experiment is a non-Western modernization with its own unique patterns. At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Ottoman Empire had been through several severe battles, and after these battles the empire collapsed. The new Turkish state was established as an heir to the empire, which had a great history; but the new state ignored this huge, impressive historical heritage. In other words, the new Turkish state was based on a denial of the Ottoman past. The founding fathers of the new republic tried to transform Turkish society, and in most cases, they used military force to suppress the opposition. The young republic was based on security because the governor elites were highly sensitive about losing power and territory. During the collapse of the empire, countless lands had been lost. Because of this sensitivity, sometimes, the new republic behaved towards its citizens in a very cruel and oppressive manner. The major issue for the government of the new republic was to transform the society and the state in such a way that it could compete with their contemporary counterparts, both militarily and economically. To achieve this goal, the state elites worked hard despite the public opinion: 'for the people despite their will'.

In particular, the religion, Islam, had been deemed outdated by the governing elites. They tried to change its role in the society and infused a new paradigm into the society: secularism (*laiklik*). This behavior triggered a struggle between the citizenry and the state apparatus. Islam

became an identity for many people, and people found and/or created their own leaders. Religion was and still is a very important determinant of most eastern societies, and western style mainstream modernization movements have viewed Islam as an anti-modern understanding. Having adopted a Western modernization ideology, the new state's founding fathers considered religion to be a hindrance to establishing modern institutions and even the state. So, because of this, they had chosen to suppress it as well. (To some extent, this tendency still exists amongst Kemalist groups). *Adhan* (calling believers to pray) was translated into Turkish, the traditional way of dress was changed (in some cases, the state used force), the traditional *madrasa* (higher education) system was canceled and banned, religious institutions (*takkah*) were also dispensed with, etc.

Yet, the very first problematique of Turkish modernizers on the brink of civilizational shift was to preserve and maintain the originality of Turkish culture. The writings of Ziya Gökalp, the most prominent ideologue of Turkish nationalism and the new Turkish Republic, were dedicated to finding a solution to this problem. The question may seem simple but it has deep roots: How to change the civilization by preserving the originality of Turkish culture? (Gökalp 1999) Is it even possible?

Turkish modernizers, and especially the founding fathers of the Turkish Republic, were fervent secularists. However, religion was still an important determiner in the society, and ironically, it was secularists who completed the Islamization process in the country. Because of the homogenization processes, the country was not able to open its gates to the world until recently. I will not articulate this here in detail, but the country still has difficulty in facing its past. When the world public calls the government to accept

the country's past ill-doings, the whole country perceives the call as a direct conspiracy against the country.

Turkey is still a developing country in various ways: democracy, economy, diversity, integration to the world, etc. If we examine the past and present of the country, the progress is promising. People became active agents in the society, considering their having been mere subjects at the beginning of the first modernization efforts (Narlı 2000:110), and they are more open to new ideas, to different people, and to different cultures of the world. The demand to democracy is increasing but they still need to be convinced to face the past of the country.

## CHAPTER VI

### **Towards a Concordance for Democracy: Contemporary Democratic Order in Argentina and Turkey, 1983-2018**

In this chapter, I trace the origins of the differentiation between the two nations in the contemporary (third wave) democratic installation. This chapter covers the decades between 1983 and 2018. In 1983, both Argentina and Turkey initiated a new democratic order but the nature of these two democracies was entirely different, and thus, these differences led to different outcomes. First, I analyze the transformation of the military itself in both contexts. Second, I focus on the civil-military relations in the contemporary politics of both countries. And, finally, I investigate the nature of democratic establishments in contemporary Argentina and Turkey. Throughout the chapter, I stay in correspondence with the previous chapters, and moreover, I utilize and apply the related previous literatures which I summarized in the introduction chapter.

In this study I propose that the concordance in civil-military relations, that Schiff suggests, should consider and be extended to consider democracy. In other words, the military, political elites, and citizenry should reach a concordance to ensure the perseverance of democratic order. Civilian control over the military is an important component of democracy but certainly not enough. In fact, this phenomenon comprises the main contrast of this study: Argentina transformed into a stable democracy after the failure of military rule, in contrast Turkey became a 'non-

free' country when a civilian government finally gained control over the Turkish military after the failed coup attempt in 2016. Argentina and Turkey have followed different paths in the third wave of democratization since 1983. In Charles Tilly's conceptualization, as mentioned before, Argentina has gradually become a high-capacity democratic regime while Turkey followed a high-capacity undemocratic regime path. According to Tilly (2007), regime capacity is an important element of a functioning democracy. Without proper state mechanisms democracy would not satisfy the citizenry, and this situation eventually undermines the democratic order. On the other side of the equation, Tilly posits, if a high-capacity regime lacks democratic features, it would end up with autocracy. Tilly observes four categories in the relation of state capacity and democratic rule in the contemporary world (Tilly 2007:18) into which I have placed Argentina and Turkey:


- A) High-capacity undemocratic: Kazakhstan, Iran, (Turkey)
- B) Low-capacity undemocratic: Somalia, Congo-Kinshasa
- C) High-capacity democratic: Norway, Japan, (Argentina)
- D) Low-capacity democratic: Jamaica, Belgium.

Argentina and Turkey have solid, working state machineries. The state apparatus has no sign of failing in the third wave of democratization in either country. The difference between the two countries emerges in their democratic performance. In the third wave of democratization, Argentina established a working democratic order, and the quality of the democracy gradually increased, but Turkish democracy post-1983 shows a performance similar to the pre-1983 era. Thus, I



categorize Turkey as ‘high-capacity undemocratic’, and Argentina as ‘high-capacity democratic’ regimes (see above). The places of both countries (in Tilly’s chart, the one I used in the introduction chapter on p. 13) variation in regimes is shown in the figure below:

Figure 2: State Capacity and Democracy in Argentina and Turkey



As can be seen in the figure, Argentina and Turkey both enjoy a high-capacity state apparatus but on opposite sides of the equation. Moreover, while Argentina has been steadily increasing its level of democracy, Turkey has gradually taken a more authoritarian stance. In Argentina, the three actors (the military, political elites, and citizenry) have reached a concordance for democracy but in Turkey a concordance has not been constructed. There are several reasons hindering democratic development in Turkey, and interestingly the main obstacle was, throughout 2010s, the elected government. In Chapter 3, I briefly investigated several competing major modernization theories related to

this study. One of the main discussions in the literature concerns whether democracy follows modernization efforts, or democratization leads to modernization (Acemoğlu and Robinson 2012; Moore 1969; O'Donnell 1973). Seymour Lipset argues that while countries develop, democracy accompanies. In the same track Robert Dahl reasons that with the growing educational level of society, the demand for more rights grows as well. Moreover, Dahl asserts, when individuals get richer, they tend to protect their investments, and the best regime to do so is a democratic one (Dahl 1971, 1998:98). However, there are many examples of countries in which modernization did not lead to a democratic order. On the contrary, many modernizations happen through militarization. Different dynamics of modernization in individual countries determine the future of democratic establishment (Belge 2011; Elias 1996; Lewis 1993, 2007; O'Donnell 1973; Skocpol 1988; Zürcher and Atabaki 2012).

As I show in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the foundations of modernization and democratization in Argentina and Turkey have different dynamics. However, these differences have led to similar processes in civil-military relations for a long time, and the tension between the civil politics and the military hindered democratization. In the Argentinean modernization, the citizenry was active, and played its role at every turning point of the country's history. In contrast, in Turkey, modernization was a top-down process, and the citizenry was confined to a limited space. This difference has several historical roots. First, as implied in Chapter 5, urbanization was limited in Turkey until the second wave of democracy (1950 and onward), and the undereducated rural masses did not have the educational background to express their demands and defend their rights. Even so, although there was a huge population flow to the cities from rural areas, urbanization is

still ongoing in Turkey (Işık 2005). Table 6 below clearly shows the urbanization gap between two countries.

**Table 6: The Proportion and Growth of Urban Population in Argentina and Turkey 1983-2018**

Years	Argentina			Turkey		
	Total Population	Urban Population (%)	Urban Population Growth (%)	Total Population	Urban Population (%)	Urban Population Growth (%)
1983	29,262,047	84.2	2.1	47,073,472	48.8	6.0
1985	30,216,279	85.0	2.0	50,664,458	53.0	5.6
1990	32,618,651	87.0	1.8	56,473,035	59.0	3.9
1995	34,828,170	88.2	1.4	58,486,456	62.1	2.4
2000	36,870,787	89.1	1.3	63,240,194	65.0	2.3
2005	38,892,931	90.0	1.2	67,903,469	67.8	2.2
2010	40,788,453	90.8	0.9	72,326,988	70.8	2.2
2015	43,131,966	91.5	1.2	78,529,409	73.6	2.3
2018	44,494,502	91.9	1.1	82,319,724	75.1	2.1

Source(s): World Bank<sup>69</sup> and Şevket Işık (2005)

Second, the Argentinean bourgeoisie was an organic/independent class since the independence of the country. Hence, they developed independent from government support. In contrast, the governing elites in Turkey tried to create a bourgeoisie which depended on the state (Göle 2011a:56). The traditional organic bourgeoisie (non-Muslim minorities such as Armenians, Greeks, and Jews) was eliminated during the nation building processes in both the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. In

<sup>69</sup><https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS&country=ARG,TUR> (last seen: 10/10/2019)

contrast, the rural people had no experience in commerce (Pamuk 2008:275–76). There were many Muslim immigrants from former Ottoman territories who had experience in commerce but had no capital. The state supplied capital to handpicked people by re-distributing the confiscated lands and wealth from eliminated groups (Kirişçi 2008:177) but in return demanded loyalty to the new regime. Third, Turkish modernization was based on an attempt to save an empire (The Ottoman Empire). In contrast, Argentinean elites freed themselves from an empire (Spanish Crown). Moreover, the introduction of a competitive electoral regime in Argentina emerged from a social movement; but in Turkey the transformation of the regime from a sultanate to a republic was a decision of a small group of political elites, and they dictated the transformation. Even the transformation of the one-party regime to an electoral multi-party regime in 1946 was a decision to protect Turkey from a possible Soviet expansion. The Turkish elites sided with the Western bloc after World War II in fear of Soviet threats (Pamuk 2008:281). Similar to the previous patterns, the third wave of democracy (since 1983) in both countries was based on dynamics similar to the post-1983 period. Urbanization was higher in Argentina than Turkey, the bourgeoisie was more independent in Argentina and backed the democratization process, but Turkish re-democratization had security concerns. Turkey did not want to depart from the Western bloc, and soon after the military re-structured the politics, the junta handed power to the civilians. Although the citizenry was again active in the transformation of the military regime in Argentina, the Turkish people did not have much space (i.e. had limited opportunities) in the transformation process. In fact, as I already noted, in the 1982 Constitution Referendum, Turks approved the military backed constitution with 92% of the vote. Yet, this does not

mean that the Turkish citizenry did not show its demands to both military and civilian circles. As I indicated in Chapter 5, the main tension between the modernizers and citizenry in Turkey emerged within the mode of modernization. That is to say, the modernization was a top-down process in Turkey. The citizenry was never consulted about the reforms and changes. Moreover, some reforms (such as western style dressing, introducing French style secularism, abolishing the Caliphate, etc.) were implemented against the will of the citizenry. The same tension has still been tangible in the third wave of democratization. In order to understand democratic establishment in both countries, we should delve into the power transition in 1983 simultaneously in both Argentina and Turkey. Table 7 above is designed to give the reader a concise chronology of political developments in these countries. As can be seen in Table 7, Argentina rapidly established a democratic concordance while Turkey long remained under military tutelage. Even after the military tutelage was not an issue, Turkish democracy deteriorated under an authoritarian government.

**Table 7: Major Political Developments in the Third Wave of Democratization in Argentina and Turkey in terms of Democratic Concordance**

Date	Argentina	Political Situation	Concordance	Turkey	Political Situation	Concordance
1976	Military takeover	Military rule	N/A			
1980				Military takeover	Military rule	N/A
1982	Falkland War	Military rule continued	N/A	Constitutional referendum	Military rule continued	N/A
1983	Military rule collapsed	Democracy	Yes	Military handed the power	Democracy under military tutelage	N/A
1987-1990	Carapintadas Revolts	Revolts failed – Concordance established	Yes			
1997				Military forced the government resign	Military tutelage	N/A
2001	Economic crisis	Democracy survived	Yes	Economic crisis	Democracy under military tutelage	N/A
2002				JDP won elections	Democracy	N/A
2007				Military memorandum	Democracy without concordance	N/A
2008 - 2014	Expansion in civil rights	Democracy	Yes	Lawsuits against the military	Military tutelage over	N/A
2013				Gezi Park Protests	Authoritarianism rises	N/A
2014				Corruption scandal	Erdoğan survived – Authoritarianism continued rising	N/A
2016				Coup attempt	Coup failed – Erdoğan consolidated more power	N/A

*Democratic Shift in Argentina and Turkey in 1983*

The civil-military relations in Argentina and Turkey in the post-1983 period was determined by the deeds of the militaries in the previous era. As I already documented in the fourth and fifth chapters, both Argentinean and Turkish militaries have always been politically ambitious, and intervened and interrupted the democratic order many times. However, the Argentinean military tried to grasp all the power while the Turkish military positioned itself, with a tutelary stance, as the guardian of the founding ideals of the republic (Demirel 2003:255). During the republican era, the Turkish military never directly ruled the country even though it toppled several elected governments. After each coup d'état, the Turkish military -- instead of ruling the country on its own -- willingly handed the political power to the civilians by giving them democratic elections. Democracy was a game the rules of which were decided by the military in Turkey. It is hard to say the same for Argentinean military. Military interventions were not only more frequent in Argentina than Turkey but also more brutal and lasted longer. However, longer periods of military rule worked against the Argentinean military in the long run. As things went wrong in the country, the military lost its prestige. After the defeat in the Falklands (Malvinas) War, the military junta lost its credibility even in its primary duty: defending the country. Before the war, consecutive military governments in the country had already failed in countering economic instability and easing social unrest. They also continuously escalated the violence. The defeat in the war was nothing but insult added to the injury. The public pressure on the military governments was unbearable as a result the military was in a stalemate.

For the sake of democratic order, however, the Turkish military's strategy, in the long run, undermined the democratic establishment. In other words, civilian governments, until recently, have had difficulty controlling the military in Turkey. This is an important distinction between the two countries. On the one hand, after the ultimate failure of military rule -- the ambitious stance of the Argentinean military to grasp the political power in Argentina -- gave an opportunity to democratizers to establish sound civilian control over the military. The contrary developed in Turkey. Since the Turkish military never directly ruled the country, political and economic failures could never be attributed to the military. Hence, the military kept its position within the politics. Samuel P. Huntington (1993) tries to explain this difference by categorizing the mode of transitions in the third wave of democracy. According to Huntington, after replacing authoritarian rule with a democratic order in Portugal in 1975, the world started experiencing a new wave of democracy. Democratic values had been on the rise globally, and this trend affected many countries. However, Huntington further posits, the mode of transition in every context is different and these differences also affect the nature of democratic installations.

As already documented in the previous chapters (see Table 3 in page 58), Huntington categorizes three types of transitions in the third wave of democracies: Replacement, Transformation, and Transplacement. According to Huntington's categorization, the transition in Argentina was a replacement while Turkey experienced transformation. In other words, the Argentinean military regime collapsed after the Falklands War and was replaced with a democratic regime in 1983. But in Turkey the military handed the power to civilians willingly. The Turkish military – before handing



over power – secured its tutelary position in Turkish politics by re-designing the political set-up and creating several exit guarantees which rendered the military elites who plotted the military coup in 1980 immune from being held responsible in the courts. Thus, it was possible to make reforms for democratizers concerning the military in Argentina while Turkish political elites stayed passive in civil-military relations since the Turkish military was unified and kept its operational integrity.

*Democratic Development and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina*

To remember the accounts documented in previous chapter, I want to outline the situation in pre-1983 era. Considering that the Argentinean military took the power in 1976 due to ongoing economic and political instability in the country with the promise of establishing stability, it can be better understood why the Argentinean opposition had the upper hand during the transition period in 1983, at the end of the military rule. First was the abysmal economic performance of the military governments, and the military's failure to fulfill its primary duty of securing the country from external threats during *El Proceso* (1976-1983). The military tried to extinguish widespread violence with escalating state violence and took harsh actions against its own citizens. Violence surged in the country, leaving thousands of deaths behind, perpetrating numerous human rights violations (Mallinger 2009). Additionally, the military governments could not perform well economically. Adding insult to injury, the military government also gambled on Argentina's long- lasting claim on *Islas Malvinas* (Falkland Islands) and pushed an armed conflict with the UK. The motivation of the military government, aside from obvious ambition to take control of the islands, was to divert the public focus from

their failing policies in Argentina to something that could stir nationalistic sentiment so that the opposition would not be able to raise its voice and could not gain wide support within the society (Tothill 2001). Nevertheless, the gamble backfired. The Falkland War only served to prove that the military was not only incapable of governing the country but also unable to fulfill its primary obligation. Moreover, the failure on the battleground made the opposition stronger, more valiant, and encouraged them to raise their voice against the military rule.

With the collapse of the military junta in Argentina in 1983, civilian governments started implementing a series of dramatic reforms that entirely changed the institutional formation and political affiliation of the national military in the country. This series of reforms can be seen as a post-modern transformation as Moskos suggests (Moskos 2000). I see the reforms that were implemented by the Argentinean governments as three-fold: one is institutional, the second is political, and third is institutional-political. By institutional, I refer the structural reforms regarding the formation of the military as an institution, and by political, I refer to the place of the military within the decision-making processes. Institutional-political reforms intersect both areas.

After the transition of power from the military junta to elected civilian government in Argentina, President Raul Alfonsín and his government implemented a series of reforms concerning the military. Here, I will examine these reforms dividing them into two categories as institutional reforms and political reforms.

First and foremost, the government reduced the total number of the military personnel, and cut the military budget (Norden 1996). This move shows us that the government had control over the institutional decision-

making processes related to the military. Furthermore, the civilian governments abolished compulsory military service, and started transforming the military into a more professional force. This also overlaps with Moskos' (1977) the conceptualization of the institutional/occupational model of the military. The salaries of the officers were adjusted by the government according to the current market values. This meant a relative decrease of the military service salaries and caused discontent among the military personnel but the Argentinean government stayed firm and pursued reforms.

Another reform was implemented in relation to the military installations (Akdağ 2006:89). The Argentinean military, as many modern militaries do, had many enterprises to run. Moreover, the military used to offer its personnel housing, on-base social clubs, military hospitals, and other social benefits. The civilian government, with a strong privatization policy, started reducing these social benefits offered exclusively to the military personnel. Military-owned factories, houses, and enterprises were either sold or transferred to the private sector. In Moskos' conceptualization, the Argentinean military started following more of an occupational model in the new era. This reductionist policy was also related to the neo-liberal understanding of governing. Argentinean political elites wanted to restructure the state apparatus according to the new economic model which was based on a smaller state structure.

Moreover, the Alfonsín government (1983-1989) halted expensive weapons development programs inherited from the previous junta regimes. After World War II, the Argentinean military employed many former German soldiers and engineers to utilize their experience and knowledge in developing the military's combat abilities in

the field and spectrum of its weapons. Some of these projects included developing projectiles and even warplanes. These expensive weapons programs were a burden on the state budget, and the military had failed in the battlefield anyway. Hence, the civilian government decided to shut down the projects for the sake of the state's treasury (Akdağ 2006:83).

As part of political reforms, the civilian governments in Argentina changed the ideological set-up of the military. In other words, military doctrine was revised (Elçi 2014:158). Prior to the reforms, traditionally, the military placed itself as the guardian of the country and nation, and as shown in the previous chapters, this position led the military to have an interventionist attitude in Argentinean politics. With the replacement of the military in the decision-making processes within the state organization, the intention was to create a strong civilian control over the Argentinean military and make the military elites accountable for their actions. The military was no longer the guardian of the regime but merely an institution in security matters in Argentina.

Revisions of its military doctrine were not the only changes regarding the political reformation of the military in Argentina. The organizational formation of the military was changed by the civilians as well (Elçi 2014:157-58; Huser 2002:55). The autonomous nature of the military units was abolished. Previously in the reforms, police forces were part of the military, and the Chief of the Staff of the military was directly responsible to the president. But the Alfonsín government first separated the police forces from the main body of the military. Then, the government brought the main body of the military (Navy, Army, and Gendarmerie) under the control of the Ministry of Defense; the police forces were tied to the Ministry of Interior.

Moreover, the orientation of the military was revised (Huser 2002:135–39). When ideological concerns were erased at the end of Cold War, Argentina started actively using its military in overseas humanitarian missions. The Argentinean military increased its diplomatic ties and started collaborating with other national armies as well as international organizations rather than being a regional contestant. By introducing humanitarian missions to the agenda, Argentina became a considerable soft power in the region. This new attitude of the country relieved the tension in the region to some degree, and long-lasting arms-races between the regional countries stopped.

Additionally in regard to the organizational changes under the political reforms, the hierarchical formation of the military was also redesigned (Huser 2002:57). An Anglo-Saxon model was adopted, and German military style was abolished. In the traditional German model of the military, the Chief of Staff was responsible for all units of the military (army, navy, gendarmerie, air forces, and -in the Argentinean case- police). In the German hierarchical model, ground forces (army) are traditionally privileged compared to other branches, and the Chief of the Staff is usually appointed among the army generals. However, the Anglo-Saxon model treats the branches more independently. None of the units within the military body has a privileged place. The Joint Chiefs of Staff does not interfere in the decision-making processes within the units but rather acts as a moderator among all units, playing the role of advisor to the civilian governments regarding military actions of all kinds. During the presidency of Raul Alfonsin (1983-1989), the Argentinean military adopted the Anglo-Saxon military style.

Finally, as part of institutional-political reforms, civilian governments enacted several supplementary changes. The war colleges and military schools were run by the military directly previous to 1983 during the consecutive decades of military rule. The Alfonsín government tied these military schools to the Ministry of Defense, and moreover, many civilian instructors as well as graduate students were allowed to serve in the military colleges. This change allowed the civilian government to break the isolationist nature of these colleges and made democratic and transparent control of the cadets and personnel possible.

The government also excluded the military generals from the National Security Council in which the military was traditionally heavily represented and was previously considered as a natural part. In the new formation of the National Security Council, the military representatives were allowed to participate in discussion of matters, but only with the invitation of the Minister of Defense of the cabinet, and only with needed personnel joining the discussions. In other words, only related military experts are now invited to participate in the meetings to utilize their expertise.

Another important topic is the trials of the junta governments and military officers for their actions related to human rights abuses during *El Proceso* between 1976-1983. Traditionally, military officials were subject to special military jurisdiction in Argentinean state organization (Norden 1996:87). After the authoritarian *El Proceso* (military junta), with the prevalent human rights violations of the military governments, there was a strong demand for justice among the public. The people were already showing their discontent with the military rule and there were street rallies

against the junta government on a regular basis<sup>70</sup>. President Raul Alfonsín owed his unexpected success against the Peronist Party in the 1983 general elections to his radical stance against military rule. He promised, during the election process, the public to bring justice. Immediately after the elections, the Argentinean Congress passed a law concerning the trials of the military junta (Akdağ 2006:87). As explained above, El Proceso was a total disaster for the country. The military was not able to fix the long-lasting chronic economic problems of the country, to prevent civil-war-like prevalent violence within the country, and to defend the national interests on the international level. But the most outrageous act the military performed during El Proceso were kidnapping people, torturing, and eventually disappearing them without allowing their relatives to know about the victims' fates. The military also kidnapped countless children of the disappeared people and handed them to military people (or to the people close to the junta governments). Hence, there was a huge expectation for justice among the citizenry from the elected government (Akdağ 2006:87; Hunter 1998; Norden 1996:89).

The Argentinean Congress, in 1984, changed the Code of Justice concerning the military. This law separated human rights violations from military-related jurisdiction. In other words, if the military officers were involved in coups, torture, and other human rights violations, the law allowed civilian jurisdiction to be involved in proceedings with the trials held in civilian courts. After passing the law, many junta members -- including former presidents General Jorge Rafael Videla, General Roberto Viola, General Leopoldo Galtieri, and Admiral Emilio Massera -- were put on trial in

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<sup>70</sup> The silent resistance of the Mothers of the May Square (Madres de la Plaza de Mayo) was taking the lead in the protests. Their unyielding stance against the brutality of the military inspired the rest of the people in peaceful protests.

the civilian courts for human rights abuses committed during *El Proceso* governments, and by the end of 1985, received sentences of different degrees (Hunter 1998:305).

Last but not least, Argentina became one of the most liberal countries for LGBTQ communities. Although the transition was relatively smooth, reforms related to LGBTQ rights did not happen as swiftly as the other reforms listed above. As I explained previously, gender politics were based on religious and military conservatism, especially under the military rule of 1960s and 1970s. Collaborating with the church, the Argentinean military juntas tried to impose masculinity, and encouraged and bolstered a patriarchal structure within the society (Encarnacion 2011:106-7; Manzano 2015). The pressure on LGBTQ communities was even more oppressive. Many gay men were murdered, and the military actively used paramilitary groups to suppress LGBTQ individuals and organizations (Encarnacion 2011:106-7). Priorities of the civilian governments in the new democratic era after 1983 were different, but neither the Alfonsín nor Menem governments addressed gender liberation. However, with the new economic transformation in the country women became more visible in the job market. The repercussions of this change also affected the military. The percentage of women officials and female soldiers in military-related institutions, security installations, and within the ranks has dramatically risen. In 2009, the Argentinean Parliament legitimized a reform package which includes enabling LGBTQ individuals to serve in the military. The law also clearly states that any kind of discrimination related to sexual orientation of an individual is prohibited within the military. In 2010, Argentina legitimized same sex marriages, and an anti-discrimination law was passed outlawing hate crimes against LGBTQ communities (Encarnacion 2011:113; Grazina 2010).



*Democratic Transformation and Continuing Military Tutelage in Turkey*

Unlike Argentina, in Turkey, the military – three years after the 1980 military coup -- handed power to the civilians willingly in 1983 and supervised the transition period to a democratic order. Before doing that, as indicated above, the military secured its tutelary position in Turkey by designing politics and having several exit guarantees which rendered the military elites who plotted the military coup in 1980 immune from being held responsible in the courts. The first thing the military did was to change the constitution in 1982. The new constitution was by all means stricter in terms of civil liberties than the 1961 constitution which was, interestingly, supervised by another military junta that toppled the Democratic Party (DP) government in 1960. The new constitution also allowed the military to be the observer/arbitrator component of the political arena. In other words, the military took back what it had granted previously. It should be noted here that the new constitution written by the military junta in 1982 was put on a referendum in the same year, and over 90% of the people approved it (Hale 1994:256). Although the referendum process and the political atmosphere under the military regime were highly questionable, this high rate of approval shows us that the perception of the military and its deeds were (if not entirely positive) not as negative as one would expect (Hale 1994:269).

Following the approval of the new constitution, in the next year, the Turkish military agreed to transfer power to the civilians and held general elections. But beforehand, the head of the military junta General Kenan Evren was

appointed as president.<sup>71</sup> Moreover, many political leaders and parties that were effective prior to the coup d'état were banned from participating in the general elections. Only three parties were allowed to participate in the elections in 1983. One was the Nationalist Democracy Party led by Turgut Sunalp, a former military official. He favored the junta regime, and vice versa (Hale 1994:268). However, his party became the third party in the elections. Overcoming all odds, Turgut Özal's -- a civilian technocrat of the Motherland Party -- received the majority of the votes and won the majority of the seats in the parliament as well. Turgut Özal became the first elected PM of the country after the 1980 coup in the new democratic order.

Turgut Özal, as the PM of the country, ruled Turkey until 1989. He successfully transformed the country's economic structure from import subsidized industrialization to neo-liberal open market (Zürcher 2004:413). Although, the initial periods of this transformation were chaotic, he managed to stabilize the economy, and the country enjoyed a high level of economic growth. Nevertheless, his sole focus was on the economic transformation of the country, and he did not even try to employ structural reforms within the military, let alone put the coup plotters on trial in civilian courts (Hale 1994:290-91). Still, in 1989, when the president Kenan Evren retired from the post, Özal made his bid for the presidency and was elected as the president by the Turkish

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<sup>71</sup> The Turkish political system was traditionally based on a parliamentary system until recently (2017). The presidents had limited power but were mere mediators in the system as in many parliamentary systems. The parliament was responsible for the legislation whereas the prime minister and his/her cabinet had the executive power.

Parliament. He was the second civilian president of the country with no military background.<sup>72</sup>

During the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the agrarian conservative Turkish society was passive in the transformation of the regime from a sultanate to a republic. In fact – unlike its Argentinean counterpart – Turkish modernization and democratization processes have never been prompted by social movements but were top-down transformations of the society and the state apparatus made to save the country (Kuru 2009:204) and secure its position in the modern world (first the Ottoman Empire, then the Turkish Republic) (Lewis 2007:11). There has always been a tension between the citizenry and the modernizer elites in the country (Kuru 2009). With the rapid urbanization during the second wave of democracy (1950-1980), the tension became visible in politics. Conservative parties started dominating the elections and the politics (Taşkın 2015). This wave of conservatism made modernist groups (including the military) take a protectionist attitude toward the modernization process they had been fighting for. This tension continued in the third wave of the democracy in the country after 1983. Another conservative party (*Anavatan Partisi* – Motherland Party) with a conservative leader (Turgut Özal) dominated the initial periods. Özal was a pragmatist leader and did not have much difficulty in collaborating with the military elites. But in the 1990s, another conservative party was on the rise, Necmettin

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<sup>72</sup> The first civilian president was Celal Bayar, elected in the 1950 General Elections which were the first free elections in the Turkish Republic. Yet, even Celal Bayar was an active member of *Kuvayı Milliye* (Turkish Revolutionaries) during the Turkish Independence War between 1918-1922 and organized the secret service of the Turkish forces under the name of Ankara Government. Except him, other presidents until the election of Turgut Özal, including the founding fathers Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü, had military backgrounds.

Erbakan's Welfare Party, and this Islamist party and its movement had a more radical stance. They started winning local administrations (even in big cities) one by one. And eventually became the leading party in Turkish politics in the December 1995 general elections by getting 22% of the votes. Erbakan became the PM for the first (and only) time in his long political career but the military and the secular groups within the state organization were not happy to see him in the post nor to work with him (Kuru 2009:161–62).

The military responded to this choice by the people and became vigilant in politics forcing an Islamist government to be more secular. In 1997, the tension between the civilian government and the military was at its height. In February 1997, the regular meeting of the National Security Council was longer than usual. During the meeting, the military generals articulated their concerns about rising Islamism, and forced the PM Erbakan to sign decisions made by the council during the meeting regarding the secular nature of the state, including educational reforms (Ahmad 2008:258–59). This meeting started the process of PM Erbakan's resigning under heavy pressure from the military and is today referred to as the 28 February Process – or, due to its non-violent nature, the Post-modern Military Coup.

The 28 February Process (or, as it is called in the English literature, the 1997 Military Memorandum) was an enlightening event for the people and civilian politicians. They realized that the military was still effectively keeping its tutelary position in politics. During the following years, the military kept stressing the importance of the secular foundations of the republican ideals and pushed civilian politicians to keep religious symbols out of the state institutions. In particular, the headscarf became the most important indicator for both secularists and conservatives in

the country.<sup>73</sup> The military stayed vigilant in its position as the guardian of founding ideals; several times generals stressed their concerns about the religious conservative transformation in the country.

The actions of the military during and after the 1997 military intervention (a.k.a. February 28 Process) triggered a chain reaction within Turkish society and politics. After the 1997 military intervention, the Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*) was closed in 1998 by the Constitutional Court (*Anayasa Mahkemesi*). Many of its leaders and several other religious opinion leaders were prosecuted by State Security Court (*Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi*) -- which was first established in 1973 and re-introduced by the military in 1982 -- and were banned from political activities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a rising star of Welfare Party and the mayor of Istanbul, the financial capital and the biggest city of the country, was prosecuted as well (Ahmad 2008:259). He was imprisoned for four months in 1999, stripped of his title as the mayor of Istanbul, and banned from politics (Kuru 2009:162; White 2008:373).

The country's economy was suffering from instability due to populism, political frailty and corruption. The military's intervention added insult to injury, and in 2001 the country went through a severe economic crisis. The 2001 economic crisis was a repercussion of economic recession of developed countries (the USA and European Union). The recession had a limited effect on the developed countries but developing countries (including Argentina and Turkey) suffered the most. Turkey appealed to the IMF, and

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<sup>73</sup> I do not want to be lost in details but this discussion (wearing headscarf in educational outlets – high schools or universities) remained one of the hottest topics in the country for so long. Many girls were banned from universities because of their headscarves, and many public servants were forced to either quit their jobs or take off their headscarves.

Kemal Derviş, a Turkish technocrat who was working for World Bank, returned to Turkey to supervise the structural reforms imposed by IMF in the country. Although the economic program worked to re-structure the country's financial system, the political burden of the economic crisis was huge. In the following general elections, the conservative Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) founded by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won the elections with a landslide victory. The JDP (or, *AKP* in Turkish abbreviations) obtained the majority in the parliament in 2002 elections and the 1990s age of coalitions had come to an end.

Although Erdoğan openly abandoned his Islamist political ideology before the elections, the military and secular elites stayed suspicious of his motivations. One of the main discussions in his early PM-ship was the usage of headscarf in public areas. Nearly half of the population was conservative, and the majority of women wore headscarves; but they were prevented from serving in state institutions, and even attending universities with their headscarves. This French style<sup>74</sup> understanding of secularism caused huge discontent among the conservatives in society. In 2007, just before the presidential elections in the parliament,<sup>75</sup> another discussion emerged between seculars and conservatives on the use of headscarves (whether the First Lady may be allowed to use headscarf while she is in the office, or not)

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<sup>74</sup> In France, *laïcité* (secularism) has a stricter application than in the US or in the UK. The government insists on excluding any kind of religious symbols within governmental institutions, scripts, and ceremonies. The headscarf debate is also a big discussion in France, and even in countries that follow French style secularism (such as Tunisia), these kind of discussions can be seen (for details, see: (Kuru 2009; Scott 2007)).

<sup>75</sup> Turkey had a parliamentary system prior to 2017. The executive power was at the hand of Prime Minister. The presidents used to be elected by the parliament for one 7 years term.

(Kuru 2009:183). The military involved in the discussions, and the Office of General Staff released a memorandum on its website concerning the issue (presidential election in the parliament) siding with the hardline secularists (Cizre and Walker 2010:94; Kuru 2009:184). Moreover, to prevent the election of a conservative nominee (namely Abdullah Gül, then a close friend of Erdoğan and one of the founding members of the JDP), the Constitutional Court decided that there must be at least 367 deputies to vote in the parliament at present during the presidential election.<sup>76</sup> Then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did not accept this dictate and threat coming from the military. He also challenged the court by declaring snap general elections in July 2007 (Kuru 2009:184).

2007 was a turning point in the JDP rule of Turkey. Since then, Erdoğan has focused on gradually consolidating more power which eventually led him to being the most powerful man in the Turkish politics. His first motive was to eliminate the military tutelage in the politics; he was successful. However, contrary to the expectations, civilian control over the military did not result in expanding civil rights and elevating democracy in Turkey. Rather than a participatory and/or pluralistic order, the Turkish democracy has turned into an illiberal democracy. What is more, Turkey became more authoritarian as its economy flourished in contrast to the expectations of previous

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<sup>76</sup> This requirement was effective for only the early rounds of the presidential elections in the parliament. If no candidate gets elected in the first and second rounds, in the third round a simple majority rule was used (one more than half of the votes of the deputies at present). Previous presidents were elected following this regulation but Sabih Kanadoğlu -- then General Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeal -- argued that 367 was comprehensive for all rounds. Hence, Abdullah Gül, the candidate of JDP could not be elected in the parliament due to secularist resistance.

democratization and modernization theories as Przeworski (2006) once posited.

**Theory vs Practice: The Role of Citizenry in the Third Wave of Democracy in Argentina and Turkey**

Here, before explaining the authoritarian shift in Turkey, I would like to pause in accounting developments in my cases and return to modernization theories. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) posit that democracy is a self-sustaining regime. Unlike Lipset (1959), they argue that democracy does not follow development but once democratization happens, the economic performance of the regime determines the fate of the democratic regime. In other words, democratic survival has a chance when the country gets richer. Thus, economic crisis is the biggest challenge to democratic regimes (Diamond and Linz 1989). Similarly, Peter H. Smith (2012) says that democratic regimes may transform to illiberal or semi-democratic regime but absolute authoritarianism has no chance once democracy is installed. However, as I will show below, the Turkish case proves these assertions wrong. Turkey became increasingly authoritarian ('non-free' as Freedom House categorizes) under an elected government after securing civilian control over the military. What is more, Turkey also disproves Przeworski's (2006) equation saying economic performance secures democratic order (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016; Brownlee 2016) since Turkey became an illiberal democracy after surpassing the income threshold that should protect democracies from failure as Przeworski claimed.

Even in his article revisiting his previous theory, Lipset (1994:17) insists that democracy and economic development are correlated and expects to see democracy develop when the economy flourishes in a country. But



Turkey stands as an exception to this theorizing too. In Przeworski's framework, Argentina's GDP stands at the threshold (which was around \$8,000 as of 1975), with (Przeworski and Limongi (1997) saying if a democracy exceeds a certain point (\$8,000) in GDP, there is no turning back to authoritarianism. Argentina may stand as evidence for both theories but Turkey disproves the previous literature. The Turkish economy has been flourishing since the initial years of the JDP government and exceeded the \$8,000 threshold as of 2008, peaking at \$12,000 in 2012. Yet, the country became a non-free country according to Freedom House (see Graph 3 and Table 8 below).

### *Democratic Concordance in Argentina*

Prior to 1983 (the third wave democratization in Argentina and Turkey), in both countries, there was a fine line between the state and government (Huser 2002:16). In this equation, while the state implies continuity, the government was seen as ephemeral. In Alfred Stepan's description, the state is more than government, having also a 'continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic, and coercive system that not only manages the state apparatus but also structures relations between civil and public power and many other crucial relationships within civil and political society' (Stepan 2009a:4). The distinction between the state and the government was more salient in Turkey than in Argentina. One political saying indicates that elected governments may 'be in the power but not capable'.<sup>77</sup> When the elected governments in the first and second waves of democracy in Argentina and Turkey wanted to pursue their own agendas

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<sup>77</sup> In Turkish '*iktidar olmak ama muktedir olamamak*'. This balance is somewhat similar (but not the same) to the tension between the establishment and presidents in the US politics.

and transform the institutions and apparatuses of the state, they were blocked and many times toppled by the militaries with the support of some economic and political groups (such as *latifundistas* in Argentina and the secular state bureaucracy and bourgeoisie in Turkey).

In Argentina, this pattern changed after 1983 in the third wave of democratization with the failure of military juntas in the previous era. Elected governments have managed to control and transform the military in the country. However, I argue that the citizenry's role in this transformation is equal, if not bigger, in comparison to the role of the political elites. During the election process in 1983, Peronist party elites -- which were expected to ascend to power in the election -- were prone to have a reconciling attitude towards military. However, the people made a surprising choice for many observers, and the underdog Radicals won the elections. The Radical Party candidate, President Raul Alfonsín, was aware of the public demand against the past military regimes, and initiated the reforms concerning civil-military relations, and allowed civilian courts to pursue trials of human rights violations of the junta regime (Akdağ 2006; Huser 2002). There was of course some resentment within the military, and some groups (*Carapintadas*/Painted Faces<sup>78</sup>) in the army revolted several

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<sup>78</sup> The name of the group comes from using facial paint of soldiers used as part of camouflage during a military operation. Within three years, between 1987 and 1990, the *Carapintadas* faction in the army (with little and temporary support from the navy) launched four insurrections under the command of Lt. Colonel Aldo Rico and then Colonel Mohamed Ali Seineldin. The first three mutinies occurred at the end of Raul Alfonsín's presidency, while the last and the most violent one occurred at the beginning of Peronist Party candidate Carlos Menem's presidential term. It was a historical turning point for the country in terms of civil-military relations. Both presidents stayed firm against the demands of the mutineers, though showing a pardoning attitude towards them after suppressing the mutinies. The civilian governments' insubordinate attitude towards military insurrections was supported by the citizenry. The

times between 1987-1990, but being aware of the public sentiment which was expressed not only in the ballot box but also in the street rallies, the military, as an institution, never supported these consecutive revolts at the end of 1980s. The Argentinean citizenry successfully formed strong NGOs to urge the government to pursue judicial processes; in fact, as documented in Chapter 4, Argentinean civil society (NGOs, labor unions, etc.) has always been strong and active in political mechanisms. Moreover, although the revolts in the army made civilians more cautious and slowed down the reforms, civilian governments (President Raul Alfonsín and then President Carlos Menem) stayed firm against *Carapintadas* revolts, and reformation continued (Fitch 1998:xii–xiii).

Raul Alfonsín's presidential term was not brilliant in its economic performance but he managed to see the last year of his term successfully (even though he had to resign due to economic instability prior to the inauguration ceremony after the 1989 General Elections), and for the first time since 1952 (the end of Perón's first term) an elected president successfully handed over power through elections in 1989. A Peronist candidate Carlos Menem ascended to power, and he continued the reformations, not only in civil-military relations but also in economics. Economic transformation of the country in the new democratization process was quite painful. Since the Alfonsín government could not meet expectations, people voted for a Peronist candidate once again. However, Menem's administration was often dubbed as 'Peronism without Perón's ideas' (Akdağ 2006:76). Argentina went through rapid internationalization in economics by quitting an ISI (Import

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people immediately reacted against the military and took the streets in the support of civilian governments. Some radical groups even went on further, and caused some dramatic scenes in the capital, Buenos Aires.

Substitution Industrialization) model in the new democratic era. In fact, the military junta in El Proceso first tried to transform the economy but since the military was involved in the economy more than they should be, it ended with a catastrophe for the country's economy. In the new democratic era, the Import Subsidized Industrialization model was totally dropped. Instead, many structural reforms were made to attract foreign investment in the country (Levitsky 2005:75). Nevertheless, the country's industry was not able to compete with global capital, hence the current deficit started accumulating. This accumulation later caused consecutive severe chronic economic crises during the 1990s and 2000s. Still, democracy survived during these periods of economic instability. When some groups (*Carapintadas*) within the military revolted (four times between 1987-1990), the citizenry sided with the civilian government.<sup>79</sup>


The military, political elites, and citizenry have reached a concordance concerning the democratic order in Argentina. Argentina had to deal with several severe

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<sup>79</sup> During the consecutive *Carapintadas* (Painted Faces) revolts, there were growing anti-militaristic sentiment in the society. Some radical groups, in the seeking of revenge from the military, organized several violent events. The biggest and bloodiest one was the 1989 Attack on La Tablada Barracks by *Movimiento Todos por la Patria* (MTP) a far-left organization under the leadership of Enrique Gorriaran Merlo. In January 1989, the armed group assaulted the military barracks located in La Tablada, a small town in Buenos Aires Province not so far from the capital, Buenos Aires City. The group claimed that they organized the attack to put an end to military insurrections, and to prevent a possible *Carapintadas* coup. Opposing *Carapintadas*, MTP demanded the government to continue the investigations and trials related to the human rights abuses in *Guerra Sucia* (Dirty Wars) and *El Proceso* (the Process – last military dictatorship) between 1974 – 1983. Elected President Raul Alfonsín responded to the attack with force in the hope preventing the spread of the violence which may have led to an expanded civil war. During the incident many people, including civilians, lost their lives, and many were left wounded. The attack lasted two days and suppressed by the government. The leader of MTP Enrique Gorriaran Merlo was captured and sentenced imprisonment after his trial.

economic crises after 1983 but even in the most severe economic crisis democracy has managed to survive with no major concessions. Moreover, civilian politicians did not try to convert the democratic order to an authoritarian regime. Even the Kirchner family -- who ascended to the power after 2001 economic crisis in the 2003 elections and ruled the country consecutively for more than 12 years through elections -- from a Peronist tradition had to hand over power via elections. As can be seen in Graph 3 below, Argentinean democracy has remained stable since 1983.

**Graph 3: V-DEM Comparative Electoral Democracy Index for Argentina and Turkey: 1983-2018<sup>80</sup>**



### Authoritarian Shift in Turkey under Civilian Government

In contrast to Argentina, as I have explained above, the Turkish military was successful in transforming the country, and it observed the transition period in the third wave of

<sup>80</sup> 1 is democracy, 0 is non-democracy. Source: Variables of Democracy (V-DEM) [www.v-dem.net](http://www.v-dem.net)

democratization. Thus, the military successfully kept its tutelary position in politics until recently. However, even after instituting effective civilian political control over the military, civilian control did not lead to more democratic rule.

On the contrary, when the Erdoğan government was left unchallenged, Erdoğan became more authoritarian, and the country became 'non-free' for the first time since 1983, according to Freedom House (see Table 8 above).

**Table 8: Freedom and Civil Liberties Ratings of Argentina and Turkey: 1983-2018 (Freedom House)<sup>81</sup>**

ARGENTINA					TURKEY			
Year	Status	Freedom Rating	Political Rights	Civil Liberties	Status	Freedom Rating	Political Rights	Civil Liberties
<b>1983</b> (transition year)	Partly Free	N/A	3	3	Partly Free	N/A	4	5
<b>1985</b>	Free	N/A	2	2	Partly Free	N/A	3	5
<b>1990</b>	Free	N/A	1	3	Partly Free	N/A	2	4
<b>1995</b>	Free	N/A	2	3	Partly Free	N/A	5	5
<b>2000</b>	Free	1.5	1	2	Partly Free	4.5	4	5
<b>2005</b>	Free	2	2	2	Partly Free	3	3	3
<b>2010</b>	Free	2	2	2	Partly Free	3	3	3
<b>2015</b>	Free	2	2	2	Partly Free	3.5	3	4
<b>2018</b>	Free	2	2	2	Not Free	5.5	5	6

<sup>81</sup> [https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#\\_U90B9mO\\_CII](https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#_U90B9mO_CII) (last seen: 10/10/2019). 1 is the best and 7 is the worst score for each indicator in the table. (For methodology of the survey see: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2019>)

Adam Przeworski's conceptualization of self-sustained democracy started being questioned (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016) because Turkey show a brilliant economic performance during the first years of JDP governments under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and GDP per capita reached around \$12,000 in the 2010s (Brownlee 2016; Sarfati 2017:400). Nevertheless, democratic performance dropped dramatically in the same years, and the country gradually lost its position among democratic countries as explained in the following pages. In Fareed Zakaria's words (1997), the country became an 'illiberal democracy', if not a dictatorship.

The military's position in Turkish politics was the biggest threat to its democratic order, and to the institutionalization of democracy. To recap the political situation in the late 1990s and early 2000s; the generals forced an elected government to resign in 1997 but the citizenry backed civilian politics at the ballot box in the following years. After Özal, Turkish politics were already fragmented (Bekmen 2014:55), and the February 28 Process (or, 1997 Military Memorandum) deepened this fragmentation. The Welfare Party was shut down by the Constitutional Court with the ban of several of its deputies from politics after the military memorandum, and there was huge pressure on its successor the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*) to become more compatible with the secular foundations of the state by simply quitting using vaguely radical Islamist discourse. In the 1999 General Elections, the Virtue Party became the third most popular party with 15% of the total votes but since one of its deputies, Merve Kavakçı, attempted joining the gatherings with her headscarf, pressure on the party peaked (White 2008:373). For fear of a possible military intervention, none of the parties in parliament dared to form a coalition with the

Virtue Party -- even the traditional right wing conservative parties distanced themselves from the Virtue Party (Lewis 2007:26). There were also two factions within the Virtue Party known as the 'Traditionalists' and 'Reformists'. Reformists (including future presidents Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) split the party and formed the Justice and Development Party (JDP -*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/AKP*). In 2001, the Constitutional Court banned the Virtue Party from politics<sup>82</sup> (White 2008:374).

Turkey experienced economic instability throughout 1990s (Bekmen 2014:55–56), and the military's political involvement paralyzed civilian politics (Lewis 2007:25–26). In 2001, as indicated above, the country was in deep economic and political crisis. Due to the severity of the economic and political crises, a general election was set at the end of 2002. Surprisingly, the newly founded Justice and Development Party under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won a great electoral victory in 2002 by winning the majority in the parliament. Due to the 10% election threshold only two parties (Erdoğan's JDP, and Republican People's Party) entered parliament (Bekmen 2014:61). At the time, Erdoğan was still banned from politics but the new parliament lifted the ban that had been hindering his political career, and in the next year (March 2003) he was elected as a deputy in the renewed elections in Siirt province, and became the prime minister of Turkey.

Erdoğan's and JDP's start in power was promising. Erdoğan pursued economic reforms infused by IMF

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<sup>82</sup> Throughout the text, I have referred Necmettin Erbakan's political career with different party affiliations. To avoid confusion, it should be noted that the Islamist Necmettin Erbakan has formed 5 political parties (namely; National Order Party, National Salvation Party, Welfare Party, Virtue Party, and Felicity Party) throughout his career but 4 of them were closed and banned from politics by the Constitutional Court of Turkish Republic (Çağlar 2012:23).



preferences but secular suspicions about him and his party were prevailing. In order to balance the military's tutelary position in politics, Erdoğan's government developed close ties with the European Union (EU) to gain full membership (Cizre and Walker 2010:94). Simultaneously, Erdoğan government made many liberal reforms concerning the institutionalization of the democratic order because the EU expected the Turkish Government to fulfill several requirements concerning democratic institutionalization in the country (Akça, Bekmen, and Özden 2014b:2). With the international pressure, the Turkish military condoned these reforms, and lifted the pressure on the civilian politics temporarily. However, the 2007 Military Memorandum was a turning point for these reforms. As I already described above, the presidential elections in the parliament caused another quarrel about secularism within the society. The military -- in backing the secularist side -- was involved in the discussions. JDP's nominee was Abdullah Gül whose wife was wearing a headscarf. With the application of the rule requiring 367 votes<sup>83</sup> by the Constitutional Court for all rounds of presidential elections in the parliament, the election process ended in a deadlock (Akça 2014:36). Erdoğan declared snap elections in July 2007, which resulted in a landslide victory for the JDP with almost 47% of the total votes but the party lost 10 seats in the parliament because of Nationalist Movement Party's election success.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> See footnote number 7 on page 20.

<sup>84</sup> The military set a 10% election threshold after 1980 coup which is still effective in the electoral process. If a party cannot exceed the threshold, its votes become null, and the seats in the parliament are distributed among the parties which climb over the threshold. This controversial and non-democratic threshold has not been lifted, or at least reduced, since it serves major parties. It also hindered minority groups' representation in parliament. Recently, with collaboration of other parties and attracting strategic votes, the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (PDP) exceeded the threshold in consecutive elections.

However, being aware of the demand – which was repeatedly expressed in the ballot box -- among its conservative voters, the Nationalist Movement Party decided to support the candidacy of Abdullah Gül, and he was elected as the 11<sup>th</sup> president of Turkey. In the same year, a referendum took place concerning future elections of the president of the country. In the referendum, people voted to change to the election of the president by popular vote in the future instead of elections in the parliament. This move would have serious effects in the near future.<sup>85</sup>

Immediately after the elections, several lawsuits opened regarding clandestine activities within the military to topple the civilian government (Akça 2014:36; Balci 2010). Allegations were serious, including a coup attempt, serious treachery, and organized crime (collaborating with terrorist groups, extrajudicial punishment, kidnapping, storing weapons, etc.) (Gürsoy 2011; Kaya 2012). The government had popular support, and international organizations (such as European Union) were closely watching the court processes (Cizre and Walker 2010). Thus, the military complied with the court, and did not use force as it had in the previous decades. Many lawsuits followed in the following years. The civilian courts started new lawsuits to face the militarist past. After three decades, the generals of 1980 Coup were brought to the courts in 2011.

With these lawsuits, the government started controlling the military gradually, and dominating politics. With the control of the military in the political arena, the expectation was to have extended civil rights. However, contrary to these expectations, reforms were halted,

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<sup>85</sup> The referendum also allowed the president to be re-elected for a second term (reducing the term duration from 7 to 5 years each). In the past, the presidents were elected by the parliament for a single 7 year-term. I will refer the consequences of 2007 Presidential Referendum in the following pages.

negotiations with the European Union with the goal of full membership were slowed, and Erdoğan gradually turned to authoritarian rule. It should be noted that in the lawsuits facing the military tutelage in the country, judicial processes were heavily criticized by both national and international organizations (European Commission 2012:7). Between 2007 and 2013 many generals, low ranking officers, civilians, and academics were detained for long periods without ‘habeas corpus’ or having an indictment. The long-term trials themselves became punishment. Some of the arrestees committed suicide, and some of them died in prison before any verdict. Slow procedures, mass detainment, the style of collecting evidence (planting evidence, anonymous witnesses, falsification of reports/documents, etc.), and the involvement of the Gülen Movement<sup>86</sup> caused unrest among the people, especially secularist groups, and eroded the credibility of the lawsuits (Akça 2014:39). In 2013, with the growing authoritarianism of the JDP government under Erdoğan’s leadership, mass protests erupted in Istanbul and then spread to all major cities in the country. The Gezi Park Protests in 2013 in Istanbul originally started with the environmental concerns of city dwellers who wanted to

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<sup>86</sup> The Gülen Movement is a religious community inspired by a Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen who lives in a self-imposed exile in the US since 1999. After 1997 Military Memorandum (28 February Process) he and his religious community were prosecuted. The movement allied the conservative JDP government under the leadership of Erdoğan to push the military back to the barracks, to render conservative demands against the Jacobinist organization of the state apparatus and French style assertive secularism visible in the society, and establish a civilian control over the military. The Gülen Movement also used this alliance as an opportunity to infiltrate state institutions, especially the military and police forces. Later, following the Gezi Park protests Erdoğan and the Gülen Movement fell apart, and Erdoğan government outlawed the movement by accusing them having installed a ‘parallel state’ within the state. In 2016, the followers of Fethullah Gülen in the military attempted for a military coup d’état against Erdoğan. The coup attempt failed but many people died, and many others were left injured.

protect the gradually eroding green spaces from the greed of industry. But because of the excessive use of power by the government, protesters soon displayed discontent with the growing authoritarianism of the JDP government and Erdoğan himself (Letsch 2013). Although, the major component of the protests was from secular middle class citizens, many people from different backgrounds also joined the protests (Akça, Bekmen, and Özden 2014a:247). The Gezi Park Protests lasted more than a month, and -- especially in Istanbul -- were marked by police brutality. Despite messages--from local governors, the president, and several high level JDP officials (including the interior minister)--to reduce the level of government repression, PM Erdoğan took a hard-line position and crushed the protests with force.

The Gezi Park Protests were not the only incidents in which Turkish citizens became active participants. People in Turkey sided with democracy by filling the streets on behalf of the elected government when the military attempted a coup d'état in 2016. By 2013, with the retreat of the military from the politics via lawsuits, Erdoğan and the JDP government became the only playmakers in Turkish politics. But this time conservative groups which had allied Erdoğan government started bidding for power. The Gülen Movement wanted to extend its influence within the state organization (Bekmen 2014:68) but Erdoğan opposed this demand. The early signs of disagreement between the Gülen Movement and JDP were seen in 2012 but became fully visible after the Gezi Park Protests. At the end of 2013 (months after the Gezi Park Protests), prosecutors close to the Gülen Movement opened corruption lawsuits against high-level bureaucrats and several ministers in the cabinet. After parrying the first shock, Erdoğan's response was to

outlaw the Gülen Movement by declaring it a parallel state within the state.

The most tragic event of this separation between the long-term allies was the military coup attempt on July 15<sup>th</sup>, 2016. Gülenist cadres within the military plotted a coup d'état to topple the government and secure their position within the state organization. The military did not join the coup attempt as a whole (Kingsley 2016), and the civilian government resisted the coup plotters. For the first time in Turkish history, many top-level governmental officials appealed to the public, and millions of the people filled the streets against the military and in defense of democratic rule. Around 250 people lost their lives after facing open fire by the coup plotters (Kenyon 2017), and thousands of people were left injured. The citizenry showed its democratic demands by stopping the military with peaceful protests.

Still, the failed coup attempt in 2016 gave the government a unique opportunity to implement serious reforms concerning the civil-military relations (Yetkin 2018) – similar to Argentina. Left unchallenged and having popular support, the Turkish government first divided the gendarmerie from the military and tied it to the interior minister. Second, the chief of the general staff, who was directly responsible to the PM, was tied to the defense minister. Moreover, the weight of the military in the National Security Council was reduced. Additionally, the government shuttered many military high-schools, hospitals, and academies. Military related training and education were redesigned. Article 35 of the Inner Service Act of the Turkish Armed Forces, which used to enable the Turkish military to justify its interventions in politics, had already been abolished in 2012. Mainly for their alleged support for the Gülen movement thousands of officers were

purged from the navy, air forces, army, gendarmerie, and even from the police forces (Kenyon 2017). As of 2019, by reducing the period of service and making it possible for individuals to buy-out of military service, the government also changed the conscription style with the aim of creating a more professional military. In short, civilian political control of the military had finally been established in Turkey following the coup attempt. These reforms mark a new era in civil-military relations. These reforms may still not be seen as institutionally transformational as Charles Moskos (1977; Moskos et al. 2000) proposed but are important changes toward constructing concordance in civil-military relations as Rebecca Schiff (1995, 2012) suggests.

However, although civilian control over the military is a necessary process for democratization it certainly was not sufficient (Akça 2014:36; Desch 1999). Thus, as this study shows, civilian control did not elevate the quality of democracy in Turkey. In fact, the government's approach following the coup attempt was far distant from democratic values. Erdoğan used the coup attempt as an excuse to consolidate more power and to justify his already undemocratic stance. After the coup attempt, Erdoğan implemented emergency rule for 2 years. During the emergency rule period (between July 2016 – July 2018), Erdoğan's government used 'decree laws' (in Turkish; *Kanun Hükmünde Kararname*, or shortly *KHK*) to purge thousands of people from governmental posts within the state organization. Not only Gülenist soldiers in the military and police, but also alleged civilian Gülenist supporters, who did not join or even know about the coup attempt, were purged. More than 150,000 people – including journalists, academics, and politicians (Amnesty International 2018:368–69)- lost their jobs, thousands of people ended in prisons, many people left the country in search of asylum mainly in

European countries (Hansen 2019). Turkish prisons had the largest number of journalists in the world (Hong 2018).<sup>87</sup> There are many allegations of torture, mistreatment in the prisons, and that judicial processes are too long (Amnesty International 2018:370). People are in custody for years without habeas corpus or even a proper indictment. Not only Gülenists but also many other groups experienced a purge too. All academics, who signed a petition called 'Academics for Peace Manifesto' (*Barış için Akademisyenler Bildirisi*) to urge the government to use smoother language regarding Kurdish problem, also lost their posts in the universities (Amnesty International 2018:369). Those people who lost their jobs during the purges have been ostracized from society and are having difficulties in finding jobs and pursuing their daily lives. The government also canceled their passports to prevent them from leaving the country (HRFT Academy 2019:17). Today, these purges have become a social problem but Erdoğan still insists on his strict position.

The very first indicator of democratic concordance I proposed in this study is security of the ballot box. However, electoral security in the country has gradually deteriorated. In 2014, Erdoğan took the presidential post as Turgut Özal once did but the difference was Erdoğan was elected through presidential elections by popular vote (due to the constitutional change in 2007). Moreover, learning from Özal's mistakes, Erdoğan kept his power within the JDP. He handpicked his successor, Ahmet Davutoğlu, a prominent academic in political science and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, to keep controlling the JDP. However, in the June 2015 General Elections, the JDP lost the majority in the parliament because of strategic votes by the people to help

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<sup>87</sup> As of 2019, China took over this position from Turkey.

the People's Democratic Party (PDP - *Halkların Demokratik Partisi/HDP*), the pro-Kurdish party which advocates minority rights in the country. It exceeded the 10% election threshold and joined the parliament.<sup>88</sup> None of the opposition parties wanted to form a coalition with the JDP and the Nationalist Movement Party also refused to form any kind of coalition government with the involvement of the PDP. In the meantime, President Erdoğan, against all previous practices and regulations, refused to give permission to any party other than the ruling JDP to form a government. Thus, coalition negotiations entered a deadlock, and president Erdoğan used this political environment to renew the elections in the same year (November, 2015) (Yeginsu 2015).

Before the renewed elections took place, a wave of violence surged throughout the country. The terrorist organization PKK (Kurdistan Worker's Party) declared self-autonomy in some cities and started digging trenches around the areas of self-proclaimed autonomy. Moreover, the PKK killed several state officials. The response of the government was brutal. The army, with the help of the special operations of police forces, crushed the PKK in several Kurdish majority cities and towns (Letsch 2016). Some of the towns were heavily damaged, and many civilians lost their lives. This sudden surge of violence both

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<sup>88</sup> Turkey uses the D'Hondt system in elections, and if a party cannot exceed the 10% election threshold, its votes are extracted from the equation. Thus, parties which cannot exceed the threshold cannot have representatives in parliament, even from their strongholds. This system may cause representation problems. In the November 2002 elections, the JDP received 34%, and RPP got 25% of the total votes. Since other parties stayed below the 10% threshold, only around 60% of the votes were represented in the parliament. In order to prevent such a distribution, and to increase the representation percentage in the parliament, some groups (mainly the opposition groups with the condoning attitude of opposition parties) were organized to use strategic votes to help the PDP to exceed the threshold.



stirred nationalistic feelings and frightened voters. In the renewed general elections five months later in the same year (2015), the JDP earned nearly half of the total votes. However, the clashes continued after the elections as well. The government announced that more than 10,000 terrorists were 'neutralized,' while nearly a thousand police and soldiers lost their lives during these civil-war-like clashes (Cumming-Bruce 2017). Many people lost their houses, becoming refugees in their own lands, and cities were destroyed.

Following the elections, the military crackdown continued in the region. The coup attempt in July 2016 happened during this turmoil. As already documented, for the first time in the history of the country, in response to the government's pleas, ordinary Turkish citizens filled the streets, and successfully stopped the military with their bare hands. Ordinary people from every stratum of society, without using weapons and without using major violence, put their lives on the line for the sake of democracy. However, civilian casualties were numerous. During the night of July 15<sup>th</sup>, Turkish soldiers killed nearly 250 civilians (Kenyon 2017) and wounded hundreds more by shooting them with heavy weapons, and by bombing them from planes and helicopters (Haugom 2019:1). Non-violent demonstrations against the coup attempt continued for days. Later, the government announced that the coup plotters were those loyal to the cleric Fethullah Gülen who was once a longtime ally to the president Erdogan. It turned out that followers of the religious movement that was created and inspired by Fethullah Gülen secretly infiltrated military posts over time (Haugom 2019:2), and when the alliance between the government and the religious movement came to an end, they attempted to seize control of the Turkish government. Fethullah Gülen now resides in a small town in

Pennsylvania, United States, and has for almost two decades now.

After the “mutiny” was suppressed with the help of the public, the military came under control of the democratic government for the first time in Turkish history. On April 16<sup>th</sup>, 2017, Turkish people voted in a referendum to change the basic political system, and Turkey experienced a regime change; from a parliamentary system to a presidential system. This change effectively eroded the importance of parliament and gave Erdogan additional power. One of the first areas in which Erdogan used his new executive power was the restructuring of the military.

To summarize the situation, thousands of military officials were either suspended or fired. Many generals who attended and organized the coup plot were imprisoned. Military schools were closed, and the role of the military in Turkish society has been questioned (Haugom 2019:6). However, civilian control over the military has not resulted in a satisfactory democratic regime. The government has done more than fire insurgent military officers from their posts. Since the day the military uprising was suppressed, the Erdoğan administration became stricter, and Erdoğan’s power became uncontested since judicial autonomy was diminished, and the parliament became ineffective. The country lost checks and balances, the idea of separation of powers eroded, and the government used the coup attempt to justify its actions.

Democracy -- previously a powerful rallying cry -- is now all about propaganda. Human rights abuses have become prevalent all over the country. Employees of state institutions have been under attack. More than 150,000 people were purged from the state institutions; including judges and public prosecutors (Gall 2019; Pope 2017:20).

Around 50,000 people have been jailed; including civilians, journalists and people from private sectors, and the number continues to rise. People are uncomfortable complaining about the policies of the government because of the possibility of losing their privileges, positions, jobs and more importantly their freedom. Many people remain incarcerated without seeing a judge (habeas corpus), and without even knowing what they are accused of (Abramowitz 2018:7; Amnesty International 2018:368). In sum, civilian control over the military did not end with a full-fledged democracy. On the contrary, Turkey was listed among the non-free countries by Freedom House consecutively in 2018 and 2019.

The citizenry in Turkey have successfully stopped the military by showing their stance favoring democratic order, and by facilitating civilian control over the military. However, civilian politics have used the citizens' legitimation in favor of consolidating power and missed the opportunity to enhance Turkey's democratic order. The citizenry, which already demands further enhancement in democratic order, should convince the civilian political leadership to share power, and to employ policies to open the way to democratic institutions. However, Turkey followed another path. After the military coup attempt, the citizenry and political elites of the opposition parties supported the elected government as a whole against the coup plotters. This support emboldened the government to change the political system. In the following year, another referendum took place changing the system from a parliamentary to a presidential one. Erdoğan's government heavily endorsed the changes but it was a slight victory with 51% of the votes (Esen and Gümüşçü 2017). Especially people in the biggest cities (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir) voted against the changes. It was only with the support of the conservative rural population that the presidential system

was introduced in the country. The presidential system, which was accepted through the referendum, eroded the importance of the parliament and has allowed Erdoğan to consolidate more power. Unlike the previous parliamentary system, the president now can have a party affiliation.<sup>89</sup> The new system also allows the president to use presidential decrees. In the following year, 2018, general elections were set, and Erdoğan won the elections with 52% of the votes. However, on the election day, the Higher Election Committee announced that the paper ballots without official seal would be counted as well.<sup>90</sup> This decision caused controversy, but the opposition accepted the results. It should be noted that both the referendum in 2017 and the general elections in 2018 took place under the state of emergency conditions, and the People's Democratic Party (PDP) candidate Selahattin Demirtaş had been in jail without any conviction for nearly two years (Esen and Gümüşçü 2017:312).

Moreover, even though the coup attempt failed, and civilian control was established over the military, militarism has been on the rise since 2015, when the government started suppressing mobilizations in Kurdish-majority cities after the electoral failure in the June 2015 general elections as I described above. The government did not stop there. In August 2016, immediately after the coup attempt, the

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<sup>89</sup> In the past parliamentary system, the president was not allowed to have a party affiliation for the sake of political neutrality. Learning from his predecessors' mistakes, Erdoğan changed the rule and kept holding control of the JDP. By doing this, he did not lose any of his power. On the contrary, he consolidated more power. He also annulled the PM-ship seat in the government – a possible contestant to his power.

<sup>90</sup> During the elections, every bill (ballot paper) that is distributed to the ballot boxes by the Higher Election Committee should be sealed by polling clerks. Unsealed bills (ballot papers) used to be counted as null but this rule was changed on the election day (for more details see: (Esen and Gümüşçü 2017)).

Turkish military entered Syrian soil in a ground operation called Operation Euphrates Shield (*Fırat Kalkanı Harekati*) against terrorist organizations (Osborne 2017). In the next year, the Turkish government extended coverage of the operation to Kurdish-majority towns in Syrian territory with Operation Olive Branch (*Zeytin Dalı Harekati*) (McKernan 2018). These cross-border operations escalated militarism in the country, and the government used these military operations as cover for its undemocratic actions.<sup>91</sup> The democratic concordance once again could not be achieved but this time it came with the resistance of the civilian government.

The last empirical evidence that clearly shows that the civilian government hinders concordance for democracy in Turkey took place in 2019. Turkey went to local elections in March 2019. The opposition was consolidated this time, and the opposition formed its own coalition called *Millet İttifakı* (National Alliance). Erdoğan and his JDP lost support among the people but when Erdoğan's JDP lost major cities - - which are important for economic benefits for cronyism, clientelism and favoritism (Çeviker Gürakar 2018) -- the government did not acknowledge the election results for Istanbul, and reset the elections for Istanbul only.<sup>92</sup> This last

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<sup>91</sup> This is not the place to discuss the legitimacy of these operations. I merely focus on the repercussions of Turkish military activity in Syrian soil in Turkish domestic policy. Indeed, Turkey had plausible reasons to conduct such operations but the focus here is how these operations were used by the government to enhance and justify its authoritarian tendencies.

<sup>92</sup> To better understand the unlawfulness and unjustness of the incident I must add that Istanbul is the biggest city in Turkey and it is the economic capital of the country. The city produces one third of the total GDP of the country alone. Thus, it is very important for Erdoğan to control this huge economic share to feed his adherents. In the March 2019 local elections, people voted for metropolitan municipalities, district municipalities and city councils. It is important to note that voting ballots were put in one envelope. Erdoğan's JDP lost the metropolitan municipality but secured the majority of the districts. Moreover, JDP candidates constituted the city council after the elections.

incident itself is enough to prove that the last bid for democratic concordance in Turkey is lost under Erdoğan's presidency. Argentina already has a stable democracy but as I suggested in this study, the survival of Turkey's democracy depends on how successful the citizenry can be in convincing the military and political elites to build a concordance for democracy.

### Conclusion

Democratic consolidation is one of the biggest challenges for democratizers in new democracies. Once democracy is established in a country, the institutionalization of democratic order is vital. By institutionalization, I do not refer only to electoral processes but also other means of self-expression for the citizenry. As Charles Tilly (2007:13) aptly put it, 'a regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected, and mutually binding consultation'. The disintegration of a democratic regime could have other means than military interventions. Civilian politicians too, once they seize power, can display an arbitrary/authoritarian governing style. Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl (2006) draw attention to the fact that electoral regimes which are based on majority rule can easily form a political set-up which regularly harms other minority groups. In Dahl's (Dahl 1971:7) words inclusiveness in competition promotes the quality of a democratic regime. In the times of crisis (of

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However, with the pressure of JDP officials, Higher Election Committee canceled only the ballots for the metropolitan municipality due to alleged falsification but acknowledged other election results which were in favor of the ruling JDP even if voting ballots were put in the same envelope. Erdoğan's move drew significant backlash and people grew angry towards the ruling JDP. The opposition party RPP's candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu won the vast majority of the votes in the elections re-set two months later.

all kinds; economic, political, etc.) democratic order may face disruption (Diamond and Linz 1989). As I have shown in the previous chapters, the militaries of Argentina and Turkey used economic and political instabilities to justify their interventions throughout their respective histories.

As can be seen, citizenry in Argentina actively guided the military institution and civilian politics not only through elections but also via street protests and pressure groups (NGOs and unions) and contributed to the democratic development in the country. Neither the military nor the civil politics could neglect the people's demands for justice and more civil rights. However, in Turkey, the citizenry has traditionally been given limited space to express itself. Modernization in Turkey followed a top-down process; thus, the government supervised every level of modernization and suppressed any kind of discontent (often brutally) at their early stages. Industrialization too happened in Turkey with the state governing, and genuinely preventing the formation of working class solidarity by constantly pressuring unions and NGOs and/or excluding them from the decision-making processes. This pattern did not change in the JDP era. Erdoğan's governments did not allow autonomous pressure groups to affect government policies, participate in decision-making processes, or represent themselves but consecutive JDP governments since 2002 created their own government affiliated organizations (GONGOs – Government Oriented Non-Governmental Organizations) (Akça 2014:43). Moreover, as I documented in the previous chapter, when the republic was founded, more than one third of the population within the country were refugees from former Ottoman territories who complied with state politics. Additionally, only around ten percent of the total population was city dwellers, and the

rural masses were not able to push the bureaucracy and political elites towards a more inclusive regime.

I argue that in the third wave of democratization, the three agents of the polity (the military, political elites, and citizenry) in Argentina formed a concordance that suggests: 1) There are free elections taking place on a regular basis for parliament, presidential posts, and local administrations; 2) democracy is the sole means to conduct politics even in the time of crises of all kind; 3) all groups agree on civilian control over the military, thus the military does not try to intervene the civilian politics forcefully; 4) elected governments try to consolidate and institutionalize the democratic order by extending civil-rights with open and inclusive discussions. And finally; 5) the governments are held accountable for their actions with transparent processes. Argentinean democracy has never been interrupted again by the military; civilian politics effectively controls the military. There is no challenge to the civilian control over the military since 1983 in the third wave of democratization. Moreover, civil rights are gradually expanding in the country, and politicians are subject to transparent inquiries. I do not depict a perfect political establishment, free from problems, but Argentinean democracy shows no major defect currently.

Democratization in Turkey was part of an operation to find a solution to the country's (Ottoman Empire's) inevitable decline. Even the second wave of democratization in the young Turkish Republic, starting in 1946, was an act to secure the country's position in international politics. To prevent Soviet influence in Turkey, political elites sided with Western powers and changed from a one-party regime to a more inclusive, competitive electoral regime. When the military and modernizer elites were dissatisfied with the



performance of elected governments, they did not hesitate to intervene in politics. These continuous interventions restricted further the citizenry's already limited influence. These conditions have been the same in the third wave of democratization too.

Yet, the citizenry has shown its ability to force the military and political elites to hear its needs and concerns. The biggest tool given to citizenry in Turkey is the right to vote (rather than mass mobilization and organized pressure through NGOs). Hence, Turkish people have learnt to use it wisely. Voter turnouts have always been high in Turkey because Turks know that, unlike Argentina, blank votes and/or boycotting the elections is not an option against the state apparatus. Thus, voter turn outs are traditionally high in Turkey (usually above 80%). It is interesting to observe how Turks balance military and civilian politics in the ballot box. When the military intervenes, the citizenry traditionally chooses to comply without resisting the intervention. However, in elections, they sided with the conservative groups who were seen as counter-revolutionary towards the Turkish modernization by the military which has been determined to protect the founding ideals of the republic. In 1962 and then 1982, in Constitutional Referendums (written, imposed, and set by the military), people accepted both constitutions imposed by the military by voting 62% and 92% respectively. However, in both cases in the following elections, they voted for the parties which were undesired by the military juntas. In the 1983 general elections, General Kenan Evren (then the president) openly endorsed the Nationalist Democracy Party the leader of which was a former military official. He was -- considering the results of the constitutional referendum in the previous year -- confident with the election results. But contrary to the expectations of the junta, Turgut Özal's conservative

Motherland Party won a landslide victory in the elections. This time it was the Turkish military which complied with the citizenry's choice and allowed him to ascend to the power. In fact, Özal had already been working with the military junta since the beginning of the military rule in 1980 to transform the economy of the country.

The Turkish citizenry's choice was not blind support for the Özal government. People also guided PM Turgut Özal with their voting patterns. Traditional parties and political leaders were banned from politics in the country in the early years of the third wave of democratization. Özal used this opportunity for his ambitions to consolidate more power but his attitude backfired in the ballot box. He and his party gradually lost the majority in both the parliament and local municipalities. When he died while still president, his party had already lost the majority rule all over the country, including the parliament.

The same pattern happened during and after the February 28 Process (Military Memorandum) in 1997 when the military pushed out the Islamist Welfare Party and its leader Necmettin Erbakan, and the citizenry showed little resistance seeing little support in the society and politics against the military pressure. Although the vast majority of people were upset with the strict understanding of secularism, they did not show much resistance to the military, and the military successfully imposed several secular policies (closing some religious institutions, ousting many religious people from governmental posts, banning the headscarf from state institutions and even from educational institutions including universities, implementing several reforms in the education system to secure secular education, and so on and so forth). However,

this kind of intervention caused more trouble for the country's already unstable politics and economy.

Secularism has always had an important place in Turkish modernization in the republican era (since 1923), and the idea of secularism (*laiklik* in Turkish) – like other reforms – was implemented top-down – the citizenry was once again passive. Secularist understanding of the Turkish modernizers is coming from the French style of 'assertive secularism', in which the state regulates the public sphere by excluding any kind of religious symbols and rituals from it (Kuru 2009:11).

When a former Islamist figure, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, came to power, secularists and the military were not happy with the electoral results. Immediately after the elections several discussions erupted concerning the secularist nature of the state apparatus. Learning from the previous experience, the conservative JDP government did not directly confront the military and traditional economic and bureaucratic elites. Instead, Erdoğan started approaching the European Union with an ambitious reform package underlining the will of the government to be a full member of the union. This move eased the already vigilant military for a while because the military did not want to be seen on the international stage as an obstacle to the democratization process. However, the secular portion of the society was active in opposing the Islamist government, and as I already depicted above, when it came to the election of the new president in 2007, the Chief of the General Staff published an official online memorandum stressing the secular concerns of the military. It was a warning message to the government to nominate a more moderate candidate. Once again, the citizenry backed the civilian government in the snap elections and following referendum. JDP candidate

Abdullah Gül ascended to the presidency. And, since then, Erdoğan, as the head of the government, started consolidating power in the country.

Once the military tutelage was over, Erdoğan used this power vacuum for his own agenda to consolidate more power (Akça 2014:36–37). Checks and balances were already weak in Turkey historically, and Erdoğan never intended to institutionalize the democracy in the country but has focused on ‘conquering the state’ apparatuses and consolidating more power (Akça 2014:37) – especially since 2007. It is interesting to observe that Turkey became more authoritarian parallel with growing civilian control over the military. Even more, the military was pacified but militarism prevailed in Turkey. After the failed coup attempt in 2016, Erdoğan saw an opportunity to change the political system for his benefit and introduced the presidential system in which he became the dominant player without accountability. People signaled their concerns and discontent with Erdoğan’s ambitions in the elections but Erdoğan used the ongoing Kurdish problem (i.e. Kurdish-Turkish Conflict) and Syrian crisis to mobilize nationalistic sentiment and suppress the voice of opposition. He brutally crushed the Kurdish populated towns<sup>93</sup> (Cumming-Bruce 2017), purged thousands of people after the failed coup attempt, and made military maneuvers on Syrian soil.

Erdoğan genuinely used referendums concerning changes of the political system to consolidate more power but he only set up referendums when he felt powerful. In other words, he avoids playing a game that he knows he cannot win. Since 2014, Turkey has experienced 2 general

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<sup>93</sup> This study is not designed to question the legitimacy of a military action in the region against terrorist activities. I merely focus on the accountability of government for its deeds during the conflict in terms of civil-liberties, human rights, and democracy.

elections, 3 local elections (including consecutive local elections in 2019), 2 presidential elections, and 2 referendums but the electoral process itself has become meaningless in Turkey. After Erdoğan became the president of the country, he handpicked his successor for the PM-ship but when his party lost its unchallenged place in the parliament in the June 2015 elections, Erdoğan did not allow his successor to form a coalition, and instead led the country through another general election 5 months later (Yeginsu 2015). In the meantime, a sudden surge of violence occurred in the country, especially in the Kurdish populated areas (Letsch 2016). Frightened and alerted with the violence, increased nationalism led the people vote for JDP once again. Erdoğan and JDP started using heavily derogatory language towards the opposition, even dubbing them as ‘terrorists’ and/or ‘accomplice of terrorism’ (Tisdall 2016). This language consolidated the opposition but this time Erdoğan made it possible to hold elections between political fronts that include different sets of parties. He approached the nationalist party, and formed a front called *Cumhur İttifakı* (People’s Alliance), and with this maneuver, he managed to secure his place in power.

As can be seen in Table 6 (p. 167), urbanization is still an ongoing process in Turkey. With growing urbanization, the demands of the citizenry have become more visible each passing year, and as I documented above in this chapter, the Turkish citizenry became more active in the last decade. Although the degree of mobilization among the citizenry (especially among the conservative groups; i.e. nationalists, religious people, and right-wing voters) for democratic development and civil rights may not be adequate, there are good reasons to be optimistic. This study does not imply that the Turkish citizenry have always been inactive or indolent. Of course, Turks occasionally protested against governments

in the past but a) people never directly raised their voice against the military, and b) these protests never turned into a long-lasting movement. Turks still value the military (Sarigil 2015) and in the Turkish political discourse, militarism has always had an important place (Belge 2011). Thus, in the third wave of democratization, although the citizenry occasionally protested the governments, it never directly targeted the military (not even when the elected government was forced to resign in 1997 by the military) until 2016, the failed coup attempt. However, this tendency is changing and the future of the democratic order, I argue, depends on how successfully the citizenry would convince both the military and the political leaders to establish a concordance for democracy in the country.

## CHAPTER VII

### **Conclusion: Towards a Concordance**

Democracy in Turkey and Argentina has been interrupted several times by their militaries during 20<sup>th</sup> century. Civil-military relations in both countries have long been problematic due to the military's political ambitions. While Argentina's democracy has been interfered with six times by Argentinean military, Turkish democracy was suspended three times. Moreover, Turkey has experienced three failed military coups in 1962, 1963 and 2016, one indirect military intervention in 1997, and one military memorandum (an official statement of Chief of Staff released on its website) in 2007.

In this work, I propose that in a regime change process (democratization) in a certain context (from military rule to democracy) democratization has a higher chance when the three partners of the polity (namely the military, political elites, and citizenry) construct a concordance for democracy. In other words, all these three actors must acknowledge that democracy is the only game in the town. One of the cases (Argentina) in this study has achieved democratic concordance but the other comparison country (Turkey) has failed to produce concordance since 1983. The idea of concordance on democracy comes from Rebecca L. Schiff's (1995, 2009) Concordance Theory in civil-military relations but Schiff's theory does not involve democracy. This study expands Schiff's Concordance Theory to include democracy because establishing concordance in civil-military relations does not, on its own, secure democracy. I

propose in this study that the aforementioned three actors should also construct a concordance for democratic development. In this study, I argue that democratic concordance among the military, political elites, and citizenry should regard five indicators:

- Security of the ballot box
- Democratic procedures of conduct in the times of crisis (economic, political, etc.)
- Concordance in civil-military relations
- Transparency of the institutions and accountability of the government.
- Institutionalization of democracy

These indicators are not arbitrary selections. They have been grounded in the previous civil-military relations and democratization literature. Robert Dahl (1971) insists that although elections are an integral part of a polyarchy (i.e. democratic regime), polyarchy is more than just electoral processes. Electoralism is a common fallacy in daily politics, and many scholars (Dahl 1982; Schmitter and Karl 2006; Tilly 2007; Zakaria 1997) point out that if democratic regimes are solely based on electoralism, it may easily lead to a majority rule, and that a 'properly assembled majority' can 'harm some minority' groups (Schmitter and Karl 2006). There are many countries in the contemporary world that struggle to consolidate democracy even though there are elections on a regular basis. These regimes often oppress and even harm minority groups due to a lack of proper transparency and accountability.

According to Charles Tilly, democracy is defined in a context where the citizens' rights are protected in broad, equal, and mutually binding consultations. Tilly (2007:2) uses Freedom House's checklist for Political Rights and Civil



Liberties -- adapted by Karatnycky (1998:573) and based on Dahl's (1971) conceptualization of polyarchy -- to identify a regime's democratic capacity (see: Figure 1 on page 12). Tilly posits that there are four categories of state capacity and democratic rule in the contemporary world: High-capacity undemocratic, Low-capacity undemocratic, High-capacity democratic, Low-capacity democratic (Tilly 2007:18). Since Tilly's categorization supplies a comprehensive conceptualization, I use his approach while evaluating democratic development in Argentina and Turkey in this study.

Because of the nature of the transformation (to democracy from a military rule), this study is highly related to the civil-military relations but the role of the citizenry in both contexts is an integral part of this investigation. Establishing civilian control over the military has always been a subject of theoretical discussions in social sciences (Feaver 1996, 1999). Subordination of the military by the civilian actors is universally a crucial problematique for the democratization process. As Dahl posits (Dahl 1971:50, 1998:149), polyarchy (democratic regime) is impossible without properly established civilian control over the military. A genuinely designed civil-military relations is vital in protecting civil-rights and preserving democratic order during and after the democratization process (Feaver 1999; Serra 2009; Stepan 1988, 2009b). Until 1983 (re-establishment of democratic order in Argentina and Turkey simultaneously) historical developments of civil military relations in Argentina and Turkey show similar features in many aspects:

A) The military has always been an important component of politics in both countries. Considering the founding forces of both countries were their militaries, it is

not a surprising fact to see influential military men in politics. Most of the presidents in Argentinean and Turkish history were generals and on many occasions they held their military posts even after becoming heads of state. This tendency dramatically changed in the republican era in Turkey. When military officials attained governing posts (such as presidency, prime ministry, etc.), they started resigning their military posts. However, this tendency might be deceiving for an observer because the military stayed within the central governing circles as I described in the previous chapter.

B) Lack of civilian control over military was the main feature of the regimes in Argentina and Turkey. Argentinean and Turkish militaries have always been the game-changer (or, playmaker) in their polities. In Argentina, the military toppled democratically elected governments on many occasions. Moreover, the military directly ruled the country for decades. Similarly, democracy was interrupted by the Turkish military three times in Turkey. Although, the Turkish military never directly ruled the country, it institutionally established itself as the play-maker in Turkish politics.

C) The unwillingness and/or incompetence of the political actors (military, civilian politics, citizenry, etc.) in determining to protect democratic order prevented democracy from flourishing. By its nature, militaries are non-democratic institutions with a strict hierarchical formation, but civilians have shown little resistance favoring democracy, especially in Turkey. Coup plotters remained unpunished in Turkey.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> As I documented in Chapter 5, Colonel Talat Aydemir tried coups d'état in 1962 and 1963 but he failed in both and was sentenced to death but he was trying to topple military junta not because he favored democracy but thought

Nevertheless, these first sight similarities might be deceptive because modernization processes had totally different bases in Argentina and Turkey. In Turkey, modernization was a process which occurred with a top down implementation while Argentinean modernization had a common support among the populace. As I already articulated in the fourth chapter, the citizenry has always been active in Argentina. The independence movement against the Spanish Colonial rule was, on its own, a sign of active citizenry. They refused to be subjected to a polity determined not by the people but by a close-knit group of people who were thousands of miles away. Regime changes in the country always had a common basis in civilian support. It was possible to change the authoritarian regime in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century to a competitive electoral regime with the help of social movements. The people had challenged the government with street rallies, general strikes, and even in open rebellions. In contrast, Turkish modernization did not take place with the demand of the people but was implemented by elites who were trying to save the empire (where people were mere subjects with limited rights, and the populace mainly lived in rural areas). Civil rights, abolishing the sultanate, establishing a republic, and democratic transformation were not the people's choice but granted to the people by the elites. However, governing elites did not transform the country just because they valued democracy; they were adapting themselves and the country to the changing international conditions.

Yet, no matter how modernization (including nation building, industrialization, democratization, etc.) happened, both countries developed along similar paths until 1983. In

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the 1960 military junta was not stern enough to protect the republic against corrupted civilians. Consequently, it was the military which prevented his hawkish maneuvers, and eventually the military junta punished him.

the post-1983 period, in the contemporary era, Argentinean and Turkish democratic orders stopped showing similarities, and started differentiating. This differentiation is multifaceted. First, civil military relations in Argentina are different from those in Turkey primarily due to the nature of the transition processes. In Argentina, the military was forced out of power in 1983 after its consecutive failures in economics, governing, and defending the country's interests. But in Turkey, the military willingly handed power to the civilians in the same year by allowing competitive electoral regime change. Second, the military style and institutionalization of the militaries effect differences in the contemporary establishment of democracy in both countries. When civilians gained power in Argentina, they immediately implemented dramatic reforms within the military. The size of the military was reduced, a reliable civilian control over the military was established, and the military activities were changed to more humanitarian missions. These changes allowed the civilian political elites to control the military and construct concordance in civil-military relations. However, in Turkey the military continued with sizeable army and budget. Moreover, the Turkish military did not undergo a post-modern transformation. Thus, the Turkish military remained an important actor in Turkish politics. Third, the foundations of the democratic order in both countries are different. The social compositions of Argentina and Turkey were different. As I implied in the previous chapters, Turkish society has been predominantly rural while urbanization in Argentina has been higher. Moreover, traditionally Argentina has had a high level of socio-economic development, and large and educated middle-class but Turkey was a devastated poor country in the initial years of the republican era, and because of the concentration of the population in the rural areas, the

middle class was traditionally weak, dependent to the state, and less educated. In this regard, Argentinean military interventions are often seen as 'reverse development' by some scholars (Levitsky and Murillo 2005b:13).

After the last military regimes in both countries, Argentina and Turkey have been struggling to establish a proper democratic rule in the political arena. During the transition periods, Argentina has achieved a functioning rule of law, and initiated successful civilian control over its military. On the other hand, Turkish Armed Forces (TAF – *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri* – TSK) have had a dominant position and had the upper hand vis-a-vis the civilian political environment until recently. Hence, Turkish democracy is still fragile, and the rule of law is at stake. According to a Freedom House Report in 2018, Argentina is a free country with some democratic flaws but Turkey is a non-free state with strong inclinations to authoritarian rule (Abramowitz 2018:7).

The last military regime in Argentina (*Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional*/ National Reorganization Process—shortly *El Proceso* / The Process— 1976 – 1983) lasted seven years, and failed to fulfill its promises by economic, political or security means. Thus, after their defeat by the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands (*Islas Malvinas*), the Argentinean military lost power and had no ability to bargain. After the fall of military rule in the country, the elected president Raul Alfonsin had been able to put the military under civilian control for the sake of democratic establishment. Although there were several attempts by the junior military officers in the late 1980s and early 1990s to influence the democratic processes and the judicial prosecutions of the military generals for their misuse of the power, Argentinean civilian politics has achieved a stable

democracy. In short, civilian control over the military has resulted in a stable democracy in Argentina.

However, the same is not true of Turkey. The military took power on September 12, 1980 by promising a return to democracy after securing order in the economy, internal security, and politics. After three years, the Turkish military kept its promises, and started transferring the power to the civilian politicians by establishing elections. However, since the military had the upper hand, and was relatively successful in ruling the country, the military and members of the junta dominated the transition period and regulated the means of transition to democracy. Thus, civilian control over the military in Turkey has been weak and fragile until 2009.

In April 2007, the chief of staff of Turkish Armed Forces declared a memorandum against the civilian government related to the ongoing debates on secularism in the country. The government resisted the military and a conservative president, Abdullah Gül, was elected by the parliament. After the memorandum, several lawsuits opened in the civilian courts accusing a secret clique within the army of attempting to force the government to resign. For the first-time civilians took action to prevent the ambitions of the military. Although the lawsuits led to civilian control over the military, they also heightened the ambitions of then prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and democratic values were gradually eroded. Especially after the failed coup d'état in 2016, President Erdoğan used the event as leverage to consolidate all the power in his hands.

He successfully eliminated military tutelage in politics, but this transformation did not result in the extension of civil rights. Civilians finally were, however, able

to control the military effectively after the failed coup attempt, yet militarism prevailed in the country not only through political discourse but also actual military maneuvers both cross-border and within the country.

In this study, I tried to find an answer the scholarly question of 'what defines the quality of democracy in a country where military has an interventionist stance in politics?' This question, by its nature, is limited to a specific context. In this study, I dealt with the civil-military relations and democratization literatures simultaneously. I tried throughout my writing to show the role of the citizenry in the process of democratization in my case countries -- Argentina and Turkey. The answer to the main question of this study lies under the development of the notion of citizenry in both contexts. The democratization literature inevitably deals with modernization processes, and Argentina and Turkey followed different modernization paths. However, even in these differences there are some similar patterns. Argentinean democratization was based on mass movements (Kadivar 2018:397) while in Turkey it was granted to the people. This difference in the creation of the citizenry led to different results in these countries.

In the contemporary democratic establishment since 1983, Argentinean democracy has survived many economic, political, and violent crises. At the end of the 1980s, a group of soldiers within the army, called *Carapintadas*, revolted against the government. These mutineers asked the government to annul a budget cut and stop the trials against the military members who committed crimes against humanity during the military rule prior to 1983. *Carapintadas* did not represent the majority within the military. Most of the cadets remained supportive of the civilian government. The government resisted the mutineers and, with the strong

support of the people, suppressed all four mutinies between 1987-1990. The failure of the *Carapintadas* mutinies serves as an obvious sign which shows us that there is a concordance on democracy between the military, civilians, and citizenry.

The *Carapintadas* mutinies were not the only challenge to Argentinean democracy. Actually, the biggest challenge for the democratizers has always come from the economic front. Since the beginning of the contemporary democratic order, Argentina has experienced several deep economic crises but no matter how deep the crisis, democracy not only survived but also persistently developed. Although the first elected government after the military era was not able to properly handle the economic instability, the military did not interrupt the democratization process thanks to the citizenry's agile position in the support of democracy. This support continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s during the most severe economic crises in the history of Argentina.

Moreover, Argentineans did not allow any political dynasties to grasp the power on one hand. The Kirchner family (first Nestor Kirchner between 2003-2007, and then his wife Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner between 2007-2015) held power for more than a decade but eventually had to hand power to candidate from another political party.

However, this does not mean that democracy is fully developed in the country. It should be noted that, although the country is listed among free countries (Abramowitz 2018) and the democracy score of the country is one of the best in Latin America, the democratic order in Argentina has several traditional/historical problems independent of military interventions. First, the presidential system gives the president to much autonomy, and undermines the authority of the parliament. When the president wants to



avoid a disagreement in politics, s/he uses presidential decrees to bypass the parliament (or senate). Even the modest presidents who do not use presidential decrees in their early years start using them frequently in time. During the first and second wave of democratization attempts in Argentina the democratic orders not only suffered from military interventions but also from mismanagement and the authoritarian tendencies of the elected presidents. The country saw many deadly strike-breakings under Hipolito Yrigoyen's presidency between 1919-1923 (Hedges 2011:38). Likewise, Juan Domingo Peron, in the second wave of democracy in the country, formed an authoritarian rule. I, of course, do not justify the military interventions but as Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (2013) posit nominal support by the politicians of the democratic ideals are important for the survival of the democratic order. Second, the autonomy of the president in Argentinean politics leads the power holder to corruption. In this kind of presidential system, without the balance of parliament (and/or senate), corruption often becomes another political tool for the president to regulate the politics and the state apparatus. Since the president appoints the supreme court judges, it is often very hard to process lawsuits against the president. Although the constitution guarantees lifetime tenure for the supreme court judges, they remain in the office for four years on average. In other words, accountability is one of the biggest weakness in Argentinean politics (Levitsky and Murillo 2005b:3). Third, there is a big division between the federal and local/provincial governments. The population is concentrated in and around Buenos Aires province, and rural areas are highly conservative. Moreover, local governments were taken by political dynasties during the 1800s in many cases. This structure causes many complications for the federal governments, and reforms

reach rural areas slowly, if ever. In order to bypass rural elites' resistance, the presidents use official decrees too, and this action escalates the tension between the federal and local governments. This structure still prevails in Argentinean politics (Jones and Hwang 2005). And finally fourth, indigenous minority groups (such as Mapuches, as I implied earlier) are often ignored. Indigenous people's problems go back to the conquest of the desert and Patagonia throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Kropff 2005:106). Since then, there has been little progress concerning the civil rights of the indigenous groups in Argentina. Establishing democratic order first in 1916, then in 1946 (first and second waves of democracy in Argentina) did not solve their problems. In fact, one of the biggest tragedies of indigenous people in Argentina took place during Yrigoyen's presidential term in 1922 (Patagonia Rebelde/Rebel Patagonia) (Hedges 2011:39). In the post-1983 era, indigenous rights (especially for Mapuche people) are still problematic. Today, Mapuches became an international crisis between Argentina and Chile when these indigenous people cross the border without documentation (Kropff 2005:107-8). Neither country accepts responsibility, and they each accuse the other.

Today, although Argentinean democracy has the aforementioned problems, the military, political elites, and citizenry have reached a concordance on democracy -- that power should be distributed through free elections. The military's tutelary and interventionist position has been eliminated in Argentinean politics since 1983 in the contemporary democratic order. Argentina's civilian political elites, however, with the help of citizenry, successfully managed to force the Argentinean military to form a concordance for democracy. This democratic concordance is based on: 1) fair and regular free elections; 2)

unchallenged civilian control over the military; and 3) accountability of the government through transparent procedures. As I several times stressed throughout this study, democracy is a continual process. The democratic system should be reproduced almost every-day, and most importantly, democratic processes should become a routine in every-day life. For reproduction of democratic consent in a society, I argue, the citizenry plays an important role as an active agent. As Mohammad Ali Kadivar (2018) argues the new democracies which have been emerged as a result of mass mobilization have a better chance to survive.

This argument brings me to the difference in democratization processes between Argentina and Turkey. The contemporary democratic establishments in both countries are notable in three areas: 1) Change in military style as Charles Moskos (1977) suggests; 2) Civil-military relations in Rebecca L. Schiff's conceptualization (2009); and 3) Democratic consolidation as Samuel P. Huntington (1993) and Charles Tilly (2007) posit. In all three areas, Argentina has shown better performance, hence the democratization level of Argentina is higher than Turkey.

Turkish democracy has, until recently, suffered from military tutelage. The country followed the same pattern in the third wave of the democratization: A) the democratic transformation in 1983 was overseen by the military, which handed power to the civilians intentionally after resetting the country's economy and politics; B) hence, civilians were not able to transform the military. The military remained an important player in Turkish politics with no budget cuts and without institutional or ideological/doctrinal reforms; C) Thus, when the military was not satisfied with the performance of subsequent civilian governments, generals pushed the elected governments from power (1997 Military

Memorandum). The citizenry has always been given only limited space to articulate its opinion, and non-violent mass movements did not emerge. In a political atmosphere with little challenge to the military, it is very hard, if not impossible, to construct concordance in civil-military relations to, as Rebecca L. Schiff suggests, prevent further military interventions -- let alone democratic concordance as this study proposes.

It is interesting to observe that the quality of the contemporary democratic order in Turkey diminished at the hands of civilian political elites. In other words, the civilian government continuously undermined the democratic establishment in the contemporary period. What is more, Turkey had been a somewhat democratic country until 2018 according to Freedom House (see Table 8 on p. 191) but became non-free after civilians finally overcame the traditional military tutelage in the country. Civilian control over the military did not increase the quality of the democratic order. On the contrary, the result is a growing authoritarianism in Turkey. Today, even electoral security is questionable due to the oppressive attitude of the Erdoğan government to the opposition. The ruling JDP government faced a heavy defeat in 2019's local elections but after the elections many elected mayors were detained and stripped from the post. The government appointed trustees to the municipalities.

These trustees -- who were first appointed after the failed coup in 2016 -- are part of crony capitalism in Turkey because the government only appoints those who are close to the government. Erdoğan also intimidated the mayors in metropolitan cities -- such as Istanbul and Ankara -- to replace them with trustees because it was a big loss for him and his cronies to lose the main economic centers in the 2019

local elections. However, since the judicial organs of the state have also been conquered by the government, transparency is totally lost in the country. Thus, the government cannot be held accountable for its actions (Pope 2017). In fact, the Turkish media which is expected to be a medium to inform people and question the deeds of the governments is under heavy pressure. Erdoğan has always been interested in controlling the media. He used his cronies to buy many media outlets, put pressure on the newspapers and TV stations which do not openly support JDP governments' policies (Bekmen 2014:66; Pope 2017:23–24). And after the 2016 coup attempt, the government closed many media outlets (including magazines, publishers, newspapers, radio and TV stations) and incarcerated tens of journalists (Amnesty International 2018:368). The pressure on the media extends even on the Internet. The government banned the access to many websites (including Wikipedia).

The future of the democratic order in Turkey depends on the performance of the citizenry in convincing the military and political elites to construct a concordance. One can see the changing attitude of the citizenry in the country from being passive observers of political struggle to becoming active agents. The first public mobilization for more civil rights came in 2013 from environmentalist concerns during the Gezi Park Protests. The Gezi Park Protests quickly turned into widespread peaceful public unrest but also precipitated Erdoğan's authoritarian turn. The second occasion was even more tragic. In 2016, the citizenry stayed firm against the coup attempt by a clandestine group - the Gülenist cadres - within the military (Haugom 2019). People from all political backgrounds filled the streets in peaceful demonstrations in favor of democracy. Hundreds of people died, and thousands were left injured at the hand of the military, but democracy survived at the end

of the day. However, it was the civilian government that stole democracy after the coup attempt. There is still hope, no matter how bold are Erdoğan's authoritarian dreams. The Turkish citizenry fights back; which is a good sign for the future of the Turkish democracy. In 2019, when the JDP government tried to steal the local elections because it lost in Istanbul – the economic capital of the country - people reacted against the government. The results in Istanbul were revoked by the government and the election was renewed but the opposition candidate won again – this time with a higher margin. Even the conservatives reacted against the undemocratic actions of the government.

### *Generalizability of the Thesis and Further Studies*

I limited my study to civil-military relations and democratization processes after military rule to Argentina and Turkey. One quick adaptation of this study and its theory can be to other cases throughout the world where the military traditionally has an interventionist attitude. This study is also open to both intra- and inter-regional analyses. Of course, any scholar may adapt my theoretical approach to a single case across different time periods.

The success of democratization processes depends on many different variables. As many scholars (Smith 2012) posit, history, culture, institutions, structures, and modernization style matter. Even the discourse of the democratizers matters (maybe the language itself matters too). And even political actors' internalization of democracy matters (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013). However, to cover all these variables in a single study was a bit challenging for me and I had to exclude several things. Although, I implied several of them, I could not go deep analyzing several other factors and relationships. To see the interaction between the religion (and/or religious

institutions) and regime types (democracy, military, authoritarian, etc.) would be interesting, and I look forward to seeing such an analysis in the future.

Moreover, I could not find time and space to construct a multi-layered/intersectional examination. This study deals with civil-military relations and democratizations but it does not have a multi-layered structure. Nilüfer Göle (2011) posits that the limits of Turkish modernization were partially determined by the role of the women in the society. She refers to body politics in the discourse of Kemalist ideals in terms of the liberation of the women by dressing western style. I implied this where I identified the tension between the secularists and conservatives in this work but could not analyze in depth. Thus, this study lacks an intersectional approach. In order to understand the political system changes and/or transformations, I focused on the political and sociological macro level, but my analysis is open to micro level investigations in future studies. Adapting the theory that I propose in this study to an intersectional analysis would be interesting to see.

There are extraordinary studies in different disciplines which deal with the relationship urbanization and democracy, development and democracy, as well as modernization and democracy (Acemoğlu and Robinson 2012; Lipset 1959; Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013; Moore 1969; Przeworski 2006). These studies will definitely help us to understand the dynamics of concordance on democracy.





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